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CIVIL PRACTICE 
Jay C. Carlisle* 
DEDICATION 
The 1988 Survey Article on New York Civil Practice is dedicated 
to former supreme court justice Joseph F. Gagliardi, who retired 
on December 31, 1987, as the Administrative Judge for the 
Ninth Judicial District. 
I n  his celebrated biography of Lord Carson, Marjonibanks 
wrote: "A great lawyer's fame is always written in sand, and he 
leaves behind him no permanent memorial . . . ." Justice Gag- 
liardi's fame is not written in sand. He has left many opinions 
and a legacy as one who many believe was New York State's 
most outstanding administrative judge. The opinions are too nu- 
merous to highlight, let alone to mention; however each was 
presented in lucid prose which is at once persuasive and plea- 
surable to read. His legacy is the respect and affection he earned 
from the bench and bar for his extraordinary administrative ac- 
complishments and for his dedication to each task no matter 
how mundane. 
Justice Gagliardi has also been extraordinarily supportive 
of the Pace Law School since its founding in 1976. He has been a 
loyal booster and an advisor and confident to three deans-thus 
far-as well as numerous faculty members. Justice Gagliardi 
conceived and developed the Law School's successful judicial in- 
ternship program and has been instrumental in the placement 
of Pace Law School graduates. He has been a guest lecturer at 
the Law School's continuing legal education programs and has 
been a frequent VIP at many of the School's receptions for dis- 
tinguished dignitaries. Justice Gagliardi's excellence on the 
bench and personal characteristics of fair play and leadership, 
* Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law. J.D., University of California a t  
Davis; A.B., University of California a t  Los Angeles. Professor Carlisle is the annotation 
author for the 1987 Supplement to the Weinstein, Korn & Miller treatise on New York Civil 
Practice. The author wishes to express his sincere thanks to Professor Richard T. Farrell of 
the Brooklyn Law School, Dr. Josephine Y. King of the Pace Law School, and Associate 
Justice Issac Rubin of the Second Department for their encouragement, and to John Mulli- 
gan for his research assistance. The author is also grateful to Gloria Pagonico for typing this 
article. Ms. Pagonico's patience and willingness to work overtime to produce this piece is 
appreciated more than she can ever imagine. 
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tempered by a wonderful sense of humor, have earned the deep 
respect of students, faculty, deans and alumni of the Pace Law 
School. He is a complete gentleman whose exemplary behavior 
will serve as an inspiration to those fortunate to have known 
him. 
Administrative Judge for the Ninth Judicial District Joseph 
F. Gagliardi, we will sorely miss you. Ad Multos Annos! 
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and Mail: Alternative to Last Known Ad- 
dress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
4. CPLR 5231: Law of Income Execution i n  
New York . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
5. CPLR 8022: New Section Added Entitled 
"Fee on Civil Appeal" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
6. Merger and Reorganization of The New 
York Court System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
B. Proposed Amendments to the Uniform Rules 
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A. Constitutional Limitations on I n  Personain Ju- 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  risdiction 
(1) Parts I ,  I1 & III . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
(2) Part II-B: No Jurisdiction Over Asahi . . . .  
(3) Part II-A: The  "Stream-of Commerce" 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Theory 
(4) Part II-A: Concurring Opinion by Justice 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Brennan 
(5) Part II-A: Concurring Opinion by Justice 
Stevens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
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(6) Effect of Asahi's Constitutioml Considera- 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  tions on New York 
B . Bases for Exercise of Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . .  1 CPLR 301 -General Jurisdiction 
2 . Long-Arm Jurisdiction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
(a) CPLR 302(a)(I) Transaction of Busi- 
ness Clause . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
(b) CPLR 302(a) (3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
C . Enforcement of A Foreign Judgment: Whose 
Law Determines Whether I n  Personam Juris- 
diction Was  Properly Obtained . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
D . Forum Non Conveniens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
E . Statutory Requirements-Service of Summons 
I . Service on a Natural Person . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
2 . Leave and Mail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
3 . Service on Defendant's Agent . . . . . . . . . . . .  
4 . Nail and Mail . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
5 . Expedient Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
6 . Related Service Tips . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
(a) CPLR 312 Amended . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
(b) New York City's I n  Rem Foreclosure 
Notice Proceedings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  (c) V T L  253 
(d) Re-Service I n  the Courthouse . . . . . . . .  
(e) Substituted Service I n  Criminal Con- 
tempt Proceeding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
(f) Service on Infant Through Guardian . 
7 . The Hague Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
IV . STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
A . Section 203(b)(5): Delivery to Sheriff or 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  County Clerk 
B . Section 203(e): The Relation Back Doctrine . . 
C . CPLR 214-a: Exceptions to the General Rule . 
D . CPLR 217: When is a Four-Month Time-Period 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Applicable? 
E . CPLR 214-c: Reviver Statute Challenged . . . . .  
F . Miscellaneous . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
I . Federal Night Depository Box: General 
Rule l (a)  for the Southern District . . . . . .  
2 . CPLR 215(3) As Applied B y  Federal Court 
3 . Toll By  Reason of Insanity . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
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4 . Notice of Claim Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
5 . Federal Superfund Amendment . . . . . . . . . .  
6 . Statute of Limitations: Extension I n  Ac- 
tions Against Non Domiciliary Corpora- 
tio ns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
V . MOTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
VI . DISCLOSURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
A . CPLR 31 01 ( d )  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
B . Expert Medical Witnesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
C . Disclosure I n  Aid of Arbitration . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
D . FOIL Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
E . Sanctions For Disclosure Abuses . . . . . . . . . . . .  
F . Article 31 Superceded By Surrogates Proce- 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  dure Act 
G . Disclosure Against State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
H . Non-Party Document Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
VII . RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL . . . . . . . . . .  
A . Administrative Determinations . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
B . Arbitral Determinations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
VIII . MISCELLANEOUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
A . Certificate of Merit I n  Medical Malpractice 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Actions 
B . Emotional Distress-A New Cause of Action? . 
C . Collateral Source Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
D . Periodic Payment of Awards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
E . Moving For Leave to Appeal I n  the Court of 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Appeals 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  M . CONCLUSION 
While 1986 was a watershed year for the CPLR practitioner. ' 
1987 passed with what one prominent commentator has referred "a 
yawn."2 Nonetheless. there were several important amendments to 
the CPLR in 1987 and our courts produced more than a few 
1 . See Carlisle. Civil Practice. 1986 Survey of N.Y. Law. 38 SYRACUSE L . REV .67.6 9.85 
(1987) (discussing the many new 1986 amendments to the Civil Practice Law and Rules 
(hereinafter CPLR)) . 
2 . Professor Richard T . Farrell of Brooklyn Law School. who was the Civil Practice 
Survey author for ten years. has advised the current author that 1987 "passed with a yawn." 
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''drabnS opinions worthy of discussion. Furthermore, the bar and 
bench should rejoice because this year's Survey marks the twenty- 
fifth anniversary of the CPLR4 and the fiftieth anniversary of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Proced~re.~ It is also the sixty-fifth year 
since a commentator first reviewed significant developments in 
New York civil practi~e.~ 
Last year's Survey7 highlighted significant changes in the 
3. See Rothschild, New York Civil Practice Simplified, 26 COLUMBIA L. REV. 30 (1926) 
(commenting on the practice decisions in 1925, Professor Rothschild states that they "pre- 
sent a drab picture indeed" and "follow each other in endless procession like so many khaki 
clad recruits stumbling along for lack of unified leadership."). 
4. The Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) were adopted a t  the 1962 legislative ses- 
sion and became effective on September 1, 1963. The CPLR replaced the Civil Practice Act 
(hereinafter CPA) which was enacted in 1921. The CPA had superseded the Code of Civil 
Procedure, known as the Throop Code which in turn had replaced the Field Code of 1848. 
The CPLR was the product of six years of work by the Advisory Committee on Practice and 
Procedure (Jackson A. Dykeman, Chairperson and Jack B. Weinstein, reporter) and two 
years work by the Codes Committee of the Senate (John H. Hughes, chairperson) and As- 
sembly (Julius Volker, Chairperson) and by the Senate Finance Committee (Austin W. Er- 
win, Chairperson). The Advisory Committee on Practice and Procedure was established in 
1955 by the Temporary Commission on the Courts (Harrison Tweed, Chairperson) after 
several public hearings had demonstrated a need and demand for a complete study and 
revision of the CPA. Research and drafting of the proposed provisions for the Advisory 
Committee was supervised by Professor Jack B. Weinstein of Columbia Law School, Profes- 
sor Daniel H. Distler of BufTalo Law School and Professor Harvey L. Korn of Columbia Law 
School. Professor Louis R. Frumer of Syracuse Law School and Professor Louis Prashker of 
St. Johns University Law School also participated in the project. The relevant chapters en- 
acted in 1962 are as follows: 308, 309, 310, 311, 237, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317 and 318. 
Governor Rockefeller approved these acts establishing the CPLR in 1962 and they became 
effective on September 1, 1963. 
5. Congress authorized the Supreme Court to promulgate general rules of civil proce- 
dure for the United States District Courts and Courts of Appeal by the Act of June 19, 
1934, Ch. 651, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended a t  28 U.S.C. 2072) (1982). The 
Court adopted the original rules on December 20,1937 and the Attorney General forwarded 
them to Congress on January 3,1938. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure became effective 
on September 16,1938. See 308 U.S. 645, 647-49 (1938). 
6. The first Survey on New York Civil Practice was authored by Professor Jay Leo 
Rothschild of Brooklyn Law School and published in 23 COLUMBIA L. REV. 732 (1923). The 
current Survey has been published for the past twenty-five years by the Syracuse Law Re- 
view and prior thereto, since 1946, by the N.Y.U. Law Review. Prior Survey authors include 
Chief Judge Charles Desmond, Professor Herbert Pettifruend of N.Y.U., Former Dean Jo- 
seph McLaughlin of Fordham University Law School and Professor Richard T. Farrell of 
Brooklyn Law School. 
7. See Carlisle, Civil Practice, 1986 Survey of N.Y. Law, 38 SYRACUSE L,REV. 67 (1987). 
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CPLR8 and discussed the uniform court rules.9 In 1987, there were 
fewer changes by the Legislature; however, modifications and addi- 
tions to the uniform rules have been proposed.1° Also, the Chief 
Administrative Judge of New York has proposed new rules relating 
to sanctions in civil matters," and new rules are now effective in 
the Appellate Term for the Second Department.lz 
A. New CPLR Legislation 
Twenty of the seventy articles of the CPLR were amended in 
1987.lS The most important amendments are mentioned below. 
1. CPLR 211: A New Twenty Year Limitations Period" 
Subdivision (e) of CPLR 211 was added by Ch. 815, Laws of 
1987.16 It establishes a twenty year period for any action or pro- 
ceeding to enforce any judgment, temporary order or permanent 
order of any court that awards support, alimony or maintenance, 
regardless of whether or not arrears have been reduced to a money 
judgment.16 The new subdivision applies only to orders entered af- 
ter July 2, 1987.17 Previously entered orders do not get the benefit 
of the twenty year period.18 
2. CPLR 214(b): Agent Orange Statute1@ 
Chapter 194, Laws of 1987, effective June 29, 1987, extends 
the time within which Agent Orange actions must be brought to 
8. See id. a t  69-85; see also Civil Practice, 1986 Survey, supra note 6, a t  130-40. 
9. See id. a t  83-85. 
10. See infra note 24 and accompanying text. 
11. See infra note 28 and accompanying text. 
12. See 198 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 21, 1987, a t  1, col. 3. 
13. The following sections of the CPLR were amended during the Survey year: 211(e), 
214-b, 308(2) and (4), 312, 318, 321(a), 1101(a), 3012-a, 3045, 4546, 5205(c), 5231, 5241(c), 
5242,7804(i), 8011-a, 8012(d), 8018(a), and 8020(a). Each of the foregoing amendments be- 
came effective on or prior to January 1,1988. The important amendments are highlighted in 
the Survey. In addition CPLR 8022, which is discussed in this Survey, was enacted and 
became effective November 5, 1987. See infra notes 14-21 and accompanying text. 
14. See N.Y. CPLR 211 (McKinney Supp. 1988). 
15. Act of Aug. 7, 1987 ch. 815, 1987 MCKINNEY'S ESS. LAWS OF N.Y. 1470 (codified a t  
N.Y. CPLR 211(e) (McKinney Supp. 1988)). 
16. See N.Y. CPLR 211(e) (McKinney Supp. 1988). 
17. See id. 
18. See id. 
19. See N.Y. CPLR 214(b) (McKinney Supp. 1988). 
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June 16, 1988.2O This marks the fourth one-year extension of the 
Agent Orange tort revival law first enacted in 1981. 
3. CPLR 308(2)(4): "Leave and Mail" and "Nail and Mailya1 
Under CPLR 308(2),22 as amended by Ch. 115, Laws of 1987, 
effective July 15, 1987,2s it  is permissible to mail a copy of the 
summons to the defendant by first class mail to his actual place of 
business?' This is an alternative to mailing a copy to the defend- 
ant at  his last known addre~s.2~ The mailing must be in an envel- 
ope bearing the words "personal and c~nfidential."~~ The envelope 
may not indicate on the outside, by return address or otherwise, 
that it is from an attorney or that it relates to an action at  law 
against the person served.27 Chapter 115 of the Laws of 1987 made 
an identical amendment to CPLR 308(4)28 which provides for per- 
sonal service by "nail and mail."2s 
4. CPLR 5231: Law of Income Execution I n  New Yorkso 
Chapter 829, Laws of 1987, effective August 7, 1987, provides 
that no amount of income may be withheld from a debtor's earn- 
ings unless his "disposable earnings" exceeds thirty times the fed- 
eral minimum hourly wage2l The income execution cannot exceed 
the amount by which a debtor's disposable earnings surpass that 
figure; nor can the execution exceed twenty-five percent of his dis- 
posable earnings.s2 Even as amended, CPLR 5231 provides that an 
20. See N.Y. CPLR 214(b) comment 1 (McKinney Supp. 1988). 
21. See N.Y. CPLR 308(2) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988). 
22. See id. 
23. Act of July 15, 1987, ch. 115,1987 MCKINNEY'S SESS. LAWS OF N.Y. 236-37 (codified 
at N.Y. CPLR 308(2) (McKinney Supp. 1987)). 
24. See N.Y. CPLR 308(2) ( M c K i e y  1972 & Supp. 1988). 
25. See id. 
26. See id. 
27. See id. 
28. Act of July 15, 1987, ch. 115, 1987 MCKINNEY'S SESS. LAWS OF N.Y. 236-37 (codified 
at N.Y. CPLR 308(4) ( M c K i e y  Supp. 1988)). 
29. See N.Y. CPLR 308(4) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988). 
30. See N.Y. CPLR 5231 (McKiney 1978 & Supp. 1988). 
31. The current federal minimum hourly wage is $3.35; therefore, the maximum 
amount that can be withheld is $100.50. 
32. See N.Y. CPLR 5231(c) (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1988). The judgment debtor's 
disposable earnings are defined by new subdivision (c) of CPLR 5231 to include compensa- 
tion payable for personal services (including pension payments) "after the deduction from 
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income execution may not exceed ten percent of a debtor's gross 
earnings.ss CPLR 5231 also requires that an income execution de- 
livered to a sheriff include a notice setting forth the statutory lim- 
its on the amount of the executi~n.~' Additionally, the form of the 
notice is prescribed by subdivision (g) of CPLR 5231.35 CPLR 
5232(a) and (c) require that a copy of the execution be delivered 
by the sheriff to the garnishee and to the debt0r.8~ 
5. CPLR 8022: New Section added entitled "Fee on Civil 
Appeal jJs7 
Chapter 825, section 16 of the Laws of 1987,8" which estab- 
lishes a program to assist local governments in the financing and 
improvement of court facilities throughout the state, added a new 
section 8022 to article 80 of the CPLR.s9 The new provision, which 
became effective on November 5, 1987, imposes a fee of $200.00 
each time a civil record on appeal or statement in lieu of record is 
filed in the appellate division or the Court of Appeals.'O Persons 
granted poor person relief are exempt from payment of the fee.'l 
Additionally, because the statute only applies to civil appeals, the 
fee is not applicable to article 78 proceedings that are transferred 
to the appellate division pursuant to CPLR 7804(g) or in proceed- 
ings that originate in the appellate divisi~n."~ At least one appel- 
those earnings of any amounts required by law to be withheld." When calculating disposable 
earnings, therefore, one has to exclude money withheld for taxes and social security as well 
as deductions made pursuant to orders of support of alimony or maintenance. See id. 
33. See N.Y. CPLR 5231(g) (McKinney 1974 & Supp. 1988). 
34. See id. 
35. See id. 
36. See N.Y. CPLR 5321(a)(c) ( M c K i e y  1978 & Supp. 1988). The Legislature 
amended CPLR 5231 to conform it  to federal law. In Follette v. Vitanza, 658 F. Supp. 492 
(N.D.N.Y. 1987), the federal district court found that New York law authorized income ex- 
ecutions in amounts which exceeded those permitted by the federal Consumer Credit Pro- 
tection Act, 15 U.S.C. 1673 (1982). See id. a t  512. The court also held that the debtors had a 
due process right to be notiiied of their federal rights. See id. a t  513. 
37. See N.Y. CPLR 8022 ( M c K i e y  Supp. 1988). 
38. See Act of Nov. 5, 1987, ch. 825, 1987 MCKINNEY'S ESS. LAWS OF N.Y. 1565-67 
(codified a t  N.Y. CPLR 8022 (McKinney Supp. 1988)). 
39. See id. 
40. See N.Y. CPLR 8022 ( M c K i e y  Supp. 1988); see also Anderson, Court Fees Rise 
Tomorrow For Filing of Civil Actions, 198 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 4, 1987, a t  1, col. 3. 
41. See id. 
42. See N.Y. CPLR 8022 (McKinney Supp. 1988); see also Newman, Appellate Prac- 
tice, 198 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 19,1987, a t  1, col. 1 (full discussion of $200.00 fling fee for both the 
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late division has indicated it does not plan to impose the fee in 
expedited election  case^."^ 
Many other state court fees have increased as a result of chap- 
ter 825, Laws of 1987.'( For example, the typical filing of a civil 
case in supreme court and county court has been increased by 
$45.00.'6 In addition, the former $35.00 fee to buy an index num- 
ber is now $100.00 but the $70.00 fee for filing a note of issue to 
place the case on the trial calendar has been eliminated.'6 More- 
over, a new $50.00 charge has been added for the issuance of a 
request for judicial intervention." 
6. Merger and Reorganization of the New York State Court 
System 
Most Survey articles do not mention legislative inaction. 
Nonetheless, the practitioner should be alerted to the failure of the 
Legislature to give second passage to the proposed constitutional 
amendment to provide for merger and reorganization of our state's 
court sy~tern.'~ The proposed merger of New York7s trial courts 
was declared "dead" by Governor Cuomo in June and formally 
buried when the Legislature left Albany in July without voting on 
the iss~e.'~ 
There are eleven different trial courts in New York State with 
separate judicial systems each dealing with different aspects of 
civil matters.60 Some proceedings must be brought in more than 
one of these systems in order to achieve the desired end, and fre- 
Appellate Division of the State Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals). 
43. See Newman, supra note 42 (referring to the Appellate Division for the Second 
Department). 
44. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
45. See N.Y. CPLR 8022 (McKinney Supp. 1988). 
46. See id. 
47. See id. 
48. See Kaufman, 44th Street Notes: The Association of the Bar of the City of New 
York (Letter From The President), vol. 2, no. 9 (Oct. 1987). New York State Constitution 
requires that a proposed constitutional amendment be passed by two separate Legislatures 
after an intervening general election and that the second passage take place during the first 
session of the newly elected Legislature. The failure of the Legislature to give second pas- 
sage, so that the proposal could be submitted to vote by the citizens of New York State, sets 
back the movement for court reorganization by a t  least two years, if not longer. 
49. McMahon, Court Merger Buried by Legislature, 198 N.Y.L.J., July 14, 1987, a t  1, 
col. 3. 
50. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
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quently, the same question can be in one system or another de- 
pending on how it is br~ught.~ '  Similarly, our current byzantine 
court structure means that some justices have greater staffs and 
facilities than are available to others presiding over cases of major 
irnportanceP2 Robert M. Kaufman, president of the Association of 
the Bar of the City of New York, has recently remarked that "the 
cost of inefficiency" is high and "justice is denied" to many liti- 
g a n t ~ . ~ ~  We should seek strength from the words of Chief Judge 
Sol Wachtler who states, "Court merger, like all elements of court 
reform, is not a game for the short ~inded."~' 
Your author hopes that next year's Survey can discuss the 
movement for a logical structure of the courts more optimistically. 
B. Proposed Amendments to the Uniform Rules for the Trial 
Courts 
The proposed amendments to the Uniform Rules were distrib- 
uted to the bench and bar on July 15, 1987,66 and should be effec- 
tive, as revised, by April 1, 1988P6 The proposed amendments 
make changes in the Supreme Court Civil Rules with respect to the 
Individual Assignment System (IAS) and make a substantial num- 
ber of changes in the Surrogate's Court rules. The proposed 
amendments include sections 202.3 (individual assignment sys- 
tem), 202.6 (request for judicial intervention), 202.7 (calendaring of 
51. See id. 
52. See id. 
53. See id. 
54. See McMahon, supra note 49 and accompanying text. 
55. See Memorandum from Chief Administrative Judge Albert M. Rosenblatt, Pro- 
posed Amendments to the Uniform Rules for the Trial Courts (July 15,1987) (on file in the 
Law Review Office a t  Syracuse University College of Law). 
56. Telephone interview with Wi iam Bullman, Esq., of the Office of Court Administra- 
tion (OCA) and Professor Jay C. Carlisle (Dec. 14, 1987) (Mr.Bullman's customary modesty 
prevents him from takiig credit for the development and implementation of the new uni- 
form rules; however the bench and bar know better and respectfully salute him for his many 
contributions to our profession.) For the bar's response to the uniform rules and the individ- 
ual assignment system, see generally ZAS Gets Good, Poor Marks I n  State Survey of Law- 
yers, 198 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 3,1987, a t  1, col. 3 (discussing state bar survey of 3,000 lawyers and 
concluding that the results "seem to indicate that negative feelings expressed towards IAS 
are . . . the result of dissatisfaction of the way the system is working and not with the 
concept of IAS."). See also Wise, OCA Data On ZAS Judges: How the Lawyers View It, 198 
N.Y.L.J. Oct. 23, 1987, a t  1, col. 3 (including statistics on dispositions by judges handling 
civil cases in State Supreme Court in Manhattan); Note, OCA's Rule-Making Procedures 
Explained By Chief Administrative Judge, 29 State Bar News, a t  2, (Dec. 1987). 
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motions, uniform notice of motion form, and a r m a t i o n  of good 
faith), 202.8 (motion procedure), and 202.12 (preliminary confer- 
ence) of the Uniform Civil Rules of the Supreme Court and County 
The proposed changes suggested for the IAS rules include: sec- 
tions 202.3 (adding an exception to the IAS for the optional crea- 
tion of a "dual track" system of assignment of trial-ready cases), 
202.6 (adding a requirement limited to New York City that a copy 
of the receipt of purchase of an index number be attached to the 
request for judicial intervention), and 202.8 (streamlining the re- 
quirements for the submission of motion papers and the schedul- 
ing of the hearing motions).68 Section 202.12 will make the require- 
ment of a mandatory preliminary conference optional,6n and 
section 202.7 (requiring an attorney's a m a t i o n  of good faith with 
respect to a motion) will be limited to disclosure and bill of partic- 
ulars motions?O 
C. Proposed Sanctions For Frivolous Litigation Practices 
The Office of Court Administration (OCA) distributed its pro- 
posed rule on sanctions for frivolous litigation practices on July 15, 
1987.61 There has been a large and vociferous response to the pro- 
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
59. See id. 
60. See id. Mr. Bullman stated that "it is highly likely" that U.R. 202.7 will be limited 
to disclosure and bill of particulars motions. He also reminded your author that the final 
decision on every proposed rule, as well as the date of its implementation, will be made by a 
majority of the Administrative Board which consists of Chief Judge Wachtler and the pre- 
siding justices of the four appellate divisions. 
61. See Memorandum from Chief Administrative Judge Albert M. Rosenblatt, supra 
note 55; see also Proposed Part 37 of the Rules of the Chief Judge, Award of Costs and 
Impositions of Financial Sanctions For Frivolous Conduct I n  Civil Litigation (copy on file 
a t  the Law Review Office of the Syracuse University College of Law). For a text of the rules, 
see 198 N.Y.L.J., Aug. 21, 1987, a t  3. See also Menaker, Sanctions for Frivolous Litigation: 
Should New York Have a Counterpart to Federal Rule 11,59 N.Y.S. Bar J. 31 (Nov. 1987). 
See generally D. Wise, County Bar Report Objects to Draft of Sanction Rules, 198 
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 5, 1987, a t  1, col. 1 (discussing many objections to the OCA draft for court 
imposed sanctions against attorneys who engage in frivolous litigation); Comment Asked On 
Rules Plan For Sanctions, 198 N.Y.L.J. Aug. 21, 1987, a t  1 col. 2; S. Stein, Roundup of 
Significant Rulings by New York Court of Appeals, 198 N.Y.L.J. Mar. 12, 1987 a t  1, col. 3 
(discussing A.G. Ship Maintenance Corp. v. Lezak, 69 N.Y.2d 1, 503 N.E.2d 681, 511 
N.Y.S.2d 216 (1986), as well as the concept of court imposed sanctions). 
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posed rulee2 and, by the Survey's date of publication, the Adminis- 
trative Board should have decided whether to accept or reject it.68 
The rule, if adopted, will be part 130 of the Rules of the Chief 
Administrative Judge!' Part 130 applies to frivolous conduct for 
"any civil action or proceeding" and thereby extends CPLR 8303- 
ae6 to all other forms of acti0n.6~ Although costs and sanctions to- 
gether can not exceed $lO,OOO,6' an award may be made to a party 
or attorneyes as a compensatory award.69 An award may be made 
against a party or attorney; however, if made against the attorney, 
the proceeds will be paid to the Client's Security Fund.70 Under 
part 130 of the Rules, no award can be made except by motion on 
notice or by the courts sua ~ponte .~l  This rule requires that there 
be a "reasonable opportunity to be heard." Additionally, the court 
must define in a "written memorandum" the offensive behavior 
and discuss why it constitutes "frivolous conduct."72 
It should be noted that part 130 of the Rules has been severely 
criticized on the grounds that, like its counterpart, FRCP ll,?= it 
62. See Wise, County Bar Report Objects to  Draft of Sanction Rules, 198 N.Y.L.J., 
Oct. 5,1987, at 1, col. 1; Report of the Sanctions Subcommittee of the New York State Bar 
Association Committee on the CPLR (discussing reasons for and against adopting rule) 
[hereinafter NYSBA CPLR Committee Sanctions Report] (on file at  the Law Review Office 
o f  the Syracuse University College o f  Law); Telephone interview with William Bullman, 
Esq., o f  the OCA (Dec. 14, 1987); see also supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text. 
63. Telephone interview with Michael Colodner, Esq., Counsel to the OCA, (Dec. 14, 
1987). 
64. See Memorandum from Chief Administrative Judge Albert M. Rosenblatt, supra 
note 55. 
65. See N.Y. CPLR 8303-a (McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1987) (assesses costs and reasona- 
ble attorney's fees o f  up t o  $10,000 when frivolous claims or defenses are filed in tort cases 
in New York State courts); see Carlisle, supra note 7 ,  at  79-82; Carlisle, CPLR 8303-a: At- 
torney's Fees Sanctions for Frivolous Claims and Defenses Filed in  Tort Cases, 14 West- 
chester Bar J., 273 (Summer 1987) (for a more complete discussion o f  CPLR 8303-a). 
66. See supra note 64. 
67. See id. 
68. See id. 
69. See id. 
70. See id. 
71. See id. 
72. See id.; see also Siegel, 331 N.Y.S. L. Dig. (July 1982) (full discussion o f  the pro- 
posed rule including a fifteen-point checklist alerting the members o f  the bar to the more 
apparent features o f  the sanctions rule). 
73. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. See generally Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Stan- 
dards for Rule 11 Sanctions, 100 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1987); Cavanagh, Developing Stan- 
dards Under Amended rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 H o ~ s n u  L. REV. 
66 (Spring 1986) For the most recent Survey year discussion o f  how Federal Rules o f  Civil 
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will generate unnecessary motion practice.74 The practitioner 
should also be aware that Assembly Bill 8193,16 if enacted, would 
extend CPLR 8303-a to all civil actions.76 It will, however, apply 
sanctions more narrowly than the rule proposed by the 0CAT7 AS- 
sembly Bill 8193 provides explicit protection for intellectually 
novel arguments and establishes a statutory appeals process 
whereby a judge can be reversedTS In any event, whether it be by 
the legislature or the courts, civil practice lawyers should expect a 
sanction rule to be in effect shortly after the publication of this 
Survey. 
D. New Rules for Appellate Term in the Second Department 
Effective March 1, 1988 a comprehensive revision of the rules 
governing the filing of appeals in the appellate terms in Appellate 
Division, Second Department, becomes operable.79 The principal 
Procedure is applied in New York federal courts, see Silberberg, Civil Practice Roundups in 
Southern District, 198 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 3, 1987, a t  1, col. 1 (discussing significant sanctions 
decisions handed down by the Southern District in October, 1987). See also Kohn, Frivolous 
Suits Cause Sanctions I n  U. S. Court, 198 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 9, 1987, a t  1, col. 2 (discussing 
fines against both litigants and their lawyers). 
74. See Chase, Sanctions in State Courts-Proposed Rule Needs Changes, 198 
N.Y.L.J., Oct. 22,1987, a t  1, col. 3 (disadvantages of judicial sanctions are likely to outweigh 
the advantages); see also Menaker, Sanctions for Frivolous Litigation: Should New York 
Have a Counterpart to Federal Rule 11, 59 N.Y.S.B.J. 31 (Nov. 1987) (federal rule has a 
number of weaknesses to be avoided in any New York rule). For a discussion of the pitfalls 
of Rule 11, see generally Bates, The Rule 11 Debate, 4 Years Later, Nat'l Law J., Oct. 13, 
1987, a t  3, col. 1. 
75. See E.J. McMahon, Assembly Bill Would Impose Sanctions for Frivolous Suits, 
198 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 18, 1987, a t  1, col. 3 (discussing proposed additional sanctions for frivo- 
lous lawsuits and baseless pleadings). 
76. See id. 
77. Telephone interview with Assemblyman Daniel L. Feldman (Dec. 17, 1987). Assem- 
blyman Feldman of Brooklyn is the sponsor of Assembly Bill 8193 and advises your author 
that i t  explicitly provides for protection of intellectually novel arguments, provides for a 
more equitable statutory appeals process, limits the cap on awards, fees and costs, and 
removes the aura of a "chilling effect" that currently exists in connection with the OCA 
proposed sanction rule. 
78. See id. In response to Assemblyman Feldman's observation, Wiam Bullman of 
the OCA argues that the proposed OCA sanctions rule should not be confused with the 
federal rule. The OCA rule abbreviates many of the Rule 11 pitfalls: i.e., i t  places a lid on 
the award; carefully construes the phrase frivolous; gives the trial judge discretionary power 
to impose the sanction; and provides for more due process in the form of hearings than does 
its federal counterpart. 
79. A copy of these revisions is on file in the Law Review Office a t  the Syracuse Univer- 
sity College of Law. 
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differences for litigators are new rules affecting the calendaring of 
cases. Under the new rules, notes of issue for civil cases must be 
filed on or before the first Friday of the month.BO In addition, the 
appellant must supply blank stamped post cards addressed to 
every appellant and re~pondent.~' Notification of the term to 
which an appeal has been assigned will be accomplished by using 
the postcards. Other portions of the new rules can be obtained 
from the Appellant Term. 
A. Constitutional Limitations on I n  Personam Jurisdiction 
Last year's Survey discussed some of the relevant constitu- 
tional considerations necessary for the assertion of jurisdiction in 
New York.B2 During this Survey year the United States Supreme 
Court analyzed these considerations in Asahi Metal Industry Co. 
u. Superior Court of C a l i f ~ r n i a . ~ ~  Although the case has generated 
sparse Asahi merits discussion because of its approach 
to the doctrine of minimum contacts.B6 It also serves as another 
example of how fourteenth amendment due process limitations are 
placed on state-structured long arm statutes in unintentional tort 
The Asahi facts are simple.B7 The plaintiff, Gary Zurcher, lost 
control of his Honda motorcycle and collided with a tractor.s8 
Zurcher was severely injured and his wife, a passenger, was killed.88 
80. See id. 
81. See id. 
82. See Carlisle, supra note 7, a t  85-88. 
83. 107 S. Ct. 1026 (1987) (holding that the exercise of jurisdiction by the California 
court over a Japanese manufacturer would be unreasonable and unfair). 
84. See Repa, Supreme Court Preview, 72 A.B.A.J., Dec. 1, 1986, a t  42; Stewart, Su- 
preme Court Report, A.B.A.J., Apr. 1, 1987, a t  45; Hoenig, Products Liability, 198 N.Y.L.J., 
May. 27, 1987, a t  1, col. 1. 
85. See infra notes 103-31 and accompanying text. 
86. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); see also 
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 407 (1984). See generally Kee- 
ton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984); J. 
WEINSTEIN, H.KORN & A. MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE 3 301.03 (1986) [hereinafter 
WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER]; Siegel, 297 N.Y. St. L. Dig. 1 (1984) (state "long-arm'' statutea 
are more expansively construed in cases involving intentional torts). 
87. See 107 S. Ct. a t  1029. 
88. See id. 
89. See id. 
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Zurcher filed a products liability action in the Superior Court of 
the State of California alleging that the accident was caused by an 
explosion in the rear tire of the motorcycle and that the tire, tube, 
and sealant were defective.BO The complaint, filed by Zurcher, 
named, inter alia, Cheng Shin Rubber Industrial Co. (Cheng 
Shin), the Taiwanese manufacturer of the tube?' Cheng Shin filed 
a cross-complaint seeking indemnification from its co-defendants 
and from Asahi Metal Industry Co. (Asahi), the Japanese manu- 
facturer of the tube's valve assembly.92 After Zurcher's claims were 
settled for $300,000, the only remaining part of the lawsuit was 
Cheng Shin's indemnification claim against A ~ a h i . ~ ~  Asahi moved 
to quash Cheng Shin's service of summons on the grounds that 
California could not exert jurisdiction over it consistent with the 
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.s4 
Asahi argued that the valve assemblies were sold to Cheng 
Shin in Taiwan and that Asahi had no offices, property, or agents 
in California and made no direct sales within the state.s5 As a re- 
sult, Asahi claimed that it  did not have the minimum contacts with 
California that were necessary for personal jurisdiction to satisfy 
the due process clause.B8 Asahi also alleged that jurisdiction in Cal- 
ifornia was unfair because the action involved a dispute between a 
Japanese company and a Taiwanese c~mpany.~' The California Su- 
preme Court ruled that Asahi had to defend the action in Califor- 
nia.s8 The court based its decision on the fact that Asahi intention- 
90. See id. 
91. See id. 
92. See id. a t  1029-30. 
93. See id. a t  1030. 
94. See id. a t  1029. California's long-arm statute authorizes the exercise of jurisdiction 
"on any bases not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United States." 
CAL. CN. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973) (this statute is far more expansive than New 
York's long-arm statute CPLR 302 which does not provide for in personam jurisdiction in 
every case in which due process will permit it). See Banco Ambrosiano S.P.A. v. Aroc Bank 
& Trust, Ltd, 62 N.Y.2d 65,71-72, 464 N.E.2d 432, 435, 476 N.Y.S.2d 64, 67 (1984). 
95. See Asahi, 107 S. Ct. a t  1030. 
96. See id. 
97. See id. 
98. See Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 35, 702 P.2d 543, 216 
Cal. Rptr. 385 (1985). The California Supreme Court noted that "Asahi has no offices, prop- 
erty or agents in California and has made no direct sales [in California]." Id. a t  48-49, 702 
P.2d a t  549-50,216 Cal. Rptr. a t  392. Moreover, "Asahi did not design or control the system 
of distribution that carried its valve assemblies into California." Id. a t  49, 702 P.2d a t  549, 
216 Cal. Rptr. a t  392. Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court held that the exercise of in 
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ally placed its valve assembly components into the stream of 
commerce and was aware that some of them would eventually find 
their way into California.BB The United States Supreme Court re- 
versed in a complex voting pattern.loO Justice O'Connor announced 
the Court's judgment, and her opinion was joined in its entirety by 
Justice Powell and Chief Justice Rehnquist. The judgment in Part 
I was unanimous; four members of the Court joined the plurality 
opinion in Part 11-A.lo1 Eight members of the Court joined the 
opinion in Part 11-B, and five justices participated in two separate 
concurrences disagreeing with the plurality opinion in Part 11-A.lo8 
Thus, the opinion consists of three parts and two  concurrence^.'^^ 
The bottom line is that a unanimous Court concluded that it was 
unreasonable for California to assert personal jurisdiction over 
Asahi.lo4 
1. Parts I, 11 & 111 
Justice O'Connor announced the judgment of a unanimous 
Court with respect to Part I and an opinion for eight members of 
personam jurisdiction over Asahi was consistent with the due process clause. See id. a t  54, 
702 P.2d a t  555, 216 Cal. Rptr. a t  396. 
99. See id. a t  42,702 P.2d a t  550,216 Cal. Rptr. a t  392. "When Asahi sold value assem- 
blies to Cheng Shin with knowledge that they would be placed in tubes sold in California, 
its purpose fully availed itself of the California market and the benefits and protections of 
California's laws." Id. 
100. See Asahi, 107 S. Ct. a t  1029; see akio infra note 103 and accompanying text. 
101. See id. 
102. See id. 
103. The lineup for the Asahi opinion is as follows: Part I, a unanimous Court agrees 
not to assert jurisdiction over Asahi; Part 11-A, Justice O'Connor, Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
Justice Powell, and Justice Scalia issue a plurality opinion urging that jurisdiction should 
not be asserted over Asahi under the stream of commerce theory; Part 11-B, all Justices with 
the exception of Justice Scalia join the opinion of the Court which holds that i t  would be 
unreasonable to assert jurisdiction over Asahi; Part 111, a one paragraph statement joined by 
Justices Rehnquist, Powell, Scalia, and O'Connor that the facts in Asahi do not establish 
jurisdiction under stream of commerce; Concurrence I, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices 
White, Marshall, and Blackmum, agreeing with the Court's judgment in Part I and conclu- 
sion in Part 11-B that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Asahi would not comport 
with fair play and substantial justice, but disagreeing with the plurality's conclusion that 
Asahi did not purposely avail itself of the California market; and Concurrence 11, Justice 
Stevens, joined by Justices White and Blackmum join Parts I and 11-B but do not join Part 
11-A for two reasons: first, an examination of minimum contacts was not necessary to the 
Court's decision, and second, assuming such an examination to be necessary, Part 11-A mis- 
applied its "contacts" analysis to the facts of the case. 
104. See id. 
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the Court with respect to Part II-B.106 She also delivered an opin- 
ion with respect to Part 11-A and Part I11 in which Chief Justice 
Rhenquist and Justices Scalia and Powell joined.lo8 
2. Part II-B: No Jurisdiction Over Asahi 
Using the traditional convenience test developed in Interna- 
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington,lo7 the Court's opinion in Part 11-B 
which was joined by all justices with the exception of Scalia, con- 
sidered the burden on the defendant, the plaintifPs interest in hav- 
ing a forum in which to litigate, the interests of the forum state, 
and the interests of the interstate judicial system.lo8 The critical 
consideration was that the entire law suit, other than Cheng Shin's 
claim against Asahi, had been resolved.10B Because neither remain- 
ing party was a resident of California, the Court found California's 
interest in the case to be minimal.l1° Additionally, the Court did 
not favor California law governing the question of an indemnifica- 
tion claim between two foreign parties.'ll Moreover, the Court 
warned that "great care and reserve should be exercised when ex- 
tending notions of personal jurisdiction into the international 
field," and stressed the heavy burden on the alien defendant.l12 
Justice Brennan, who since his appointment to the United States 
Supreme Court has never voted against finding personal jurisdic- 
tion, agreed with the Court's conclusion in Part 11-B that the exer- 
cise of personal jurisdiction over Asahi would not comport with the 
requirements of International Shoe v. Wa~hington."~ Brennan 
stated that Asahi was one of those rare cases in which "minimum 
requirements inherent in the concept of 'fair play and substantial 
justice' . . . defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction even [though] 
the defendant has purposefully engaged in forum activities."l14 
105. See id. 
106. See id. 
107. See 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
108. See Asahi, 107 S.Ct at 1033-35. 
109. See id. 
110. See id. 
111. See id. 
112. See id. at 1035. 
113. See id. at 1035-38 (citing International Shoe, 326 U.S. 310). 
114. See id. at 1035. It is also interesting to note that Asahi appears to be the first 
unanimous Supreme Court decision against in penonam jurisdiction since the Court's 1945 
decision in International Shoe. 
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3. Part 11-A: Purposeful Availment (The Stream of Commerce 
Theory) 
Part 11-A of the opinion is a plurality holding unnecessary to 
the Court's unanimous decision not to assert jurisdi~tion."~ Four 
members of the Court urged in Part 11-A that the mere place- 
ment of a product into the stream of commerce, without additional 
activities, was not a purposeful act by the defendant directed to- 
ward the forum state.l16 The plurality found that "something" 
more was required and referred to activities which evidence an "in- 
tent" or "purpose" to serve the market in the forum state."' The 
plurality suggested these activities include designing the product 
for the market in the forum state, advertising in the forum state, 
establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers in 
the forum state, or marketing the product through a distributor 
who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum state.n8 
Because the facts only established Asahi's awareness that some of 
the valves sold to Cheng Shin would be incorporated into the tire 
tubes sold in California, the plurality concluded that Asahi did not 
purposefully avail itself of the California market.l19 Thus, accord- 
ing to the plurality, jurisdiction cannot be asserted over a nondom- 
iciliary defendant whose only contacts with the forum state consist 
of the placement of a product into the stream of commerce.1a0 
4. Part 11-A: Concurring Opinion by Justice Brennan 
Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun, who joined in the 
opinion not to uphold jurisdiction, also joined Justice Brennan's 
concurring opinion that the plurality's reasoning in Part 11-A was a 
narrow construction of the stream of commerce theory and repre- 
sented a "marked retreat" from the Court's analysis in World- 
Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wo~dson . '~~  Justice Brennan reasoned 
115. See Asahi, 107 S.Ct. at 1031-33. 
116. See id. at 1033 ("additional conduct" may consist of "designing the product for 
the market in the forum state, advertising in the forum state, establishing channels for pro- 
viding regular advice to customers in the forum state, or marketing the product through a 
distributor who has agreed to serve as a sales agent in the forum state."). 
117. See id. at 1032-33. 
118. See id. 
119. See id.; see also supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text. 
120. See Asahi, 107 S. Ct. at 1033. 
121. See id. at 1035-36 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. 286). 
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that once Asahi placed its product in the "stream of commerce," 
and was generally aware that the final product was being marketed 
in California, "the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come as a 
s~rprise."'~~ Justice Brennan found that a defendant's awareness 
that the stream of commerce may or will sweep a product into the 
forum state constitutes purposeful awareness.12s Brennan saw no 
need for a "showing" of additional activities and reasoned that a 
defendant who places goods into the stream of commerce benefits 
economically from the retail sale of the final product in the forum 
State and indirectly benefits from the state's laws that regulate 
and facilitate commercial activity.12' 
5. Part 11-A: Concurring Opinion by Justice Stevens 
In a second concurring opinion, Justices Stevens, White, and 
Blackmun, who had joined the decision not to uphold jurisdiction, 
also disagreed with the plurality's purposeful availment (stream of 
commerce) analysis in Part II-A.126 First, Justice Stevens pointed 
out that it was not necessary to the Court's de~is i0n. l~~ Second, he 
observed that even assuming the plurality's purposeful availment 
analysis ought to be formulated, Part 11-A misapplied it to the 
Asahi facts.12? Stevens criticized the assumption that an unwaver- 
ing line could be drawn between "mere awareness" that a compo- 
nent would find its way into the forum state and "purposeful avail- 
ment of the forum's market."12s 
Justice Stevens emphasized a constitutional analysis that is ef- 
fected by the volume, value, and hazardous character of the com- 
122. See id.; see also C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 
1069 (1969); Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate A Suggested Analysis, 79 
HARV. L. REV. 1121 (1966) (providing a full definition of the stream of commerce theory); 
Currie, The Growth of the Long-Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 
1963 U.  ILL. LAW FORUM, 533, 546-560 (1963) (tracing development of the stream of com- 
merce theory). Interestingly enough, Justice White, who authored the opinion in World- 
Wide Votkswagen, subscribes to this notion as he does to the observation that jurisdiction 
"premised on the placement of a product into the stream of commerce is consistent with the 
Due Process Clause and [has] not required a showing of additional conduct." See Asahi, 107 
S. Ct. at 1035. 
123. See Asahi, 107 S.  Ct. at 1035. 
124. See id. 
125. See id. at 1038. 
126. See id. 
127. See id. 
128. See id. 
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ponents to determine if Asahi had engaged in a "higher quantum 
of conduct" than placement of a product into the stream of com- 
merce without more.12s This approach represents a middle ground 
between the plurality opinion with respect to Part 11-A and Jus- 
tice Brennan's concurrence thereto. Justice Stevens explained that 
based on the volume, value, and hazardous character of the compo- 
nents, Asahi had engaged in a higher quantum of conduct than the 
mere placement of a product into the stream of commerce.1s0 Jus- 
tice Stevens concluded that a regular course of business activity 
that results in deliveries of over 100,000 units annually over a pe- 
riod of several years would constitute a "purposeful availment" 
even though the item delivered to the forum state was a standard 
product marketed throughout the world.lsl This analysis by Justice 
Stevens is similar to the approach followed by New York State ap- 
pellate courts in Darienzo v. Wise Shoe Stores Inc.lS2 and in Allen 
v. Canadian Electric Co.lsS It is also compatible with the Court of 
Appeals' decision in Sybron Corp. v. Wetzel.ls4 
129. See id. 
130. See id. 
131. See id. at 1038. Justice Stevens first explains that Part 11-A of the opinion was not 
necessary to the Court's decision. "An examination of minimum contacts is not always nec- 
essary to determine whether a state court's assertion of personal jurisdiction is constitu- 
tional." Id. He then states that "even assuming that the test ought to be formulated here, 
Part 11-A misapplies i t  to the facts of this case." Id. Justice Stevens agrees with the Bren- 
nan view of minimum contacts but is cautious that "a higher quantum of conduct" than the 
mere placement of a product into the stream of commerce is necessary. Id. He suggests that 
delivering 100,000 units annually over a period of several years constitutes purposeful avail- 
ment "even though the item delivered to the forum state was a standard product marketed 
throughout the world." Id. 
132. 74 A.D.2d 342,427 N.Y.S.2d 831 (2d Dep't 1980) (New Hampshire seller of shoes 
to Tennessee retailer could have foreseen that five percent of the shoes would end up in the 
New York market). But see Martinez v. American Standard, 91 A.D.2d 652,457 N.Y.S.2d 97 
(2d Dep't 1982), aff'd, 60 N.Y.2d 873, 458 N.E.2d 826, 470 N.Y.S.2d 367 (1983). 
133. 65 A.D.2d 39,410 N.Y.S.2d 707 (3d Dep't 1978) (although it  amounted to only one 
percent of defendants sales, the approximately nine million dollars per year generated in 
New York was deemed substantial). 
134. 46 N.Y.2d 197, 385 N.E.2d 1055, 413 N.Y.S.2d 127 (1978). Jurisdiction was sus- 
tained when the plaintiff alleged that defendant had sought to hire one of the plaintiff's 
former employees in order to tortiously induce him to reveal trade secrets to the defendant. 
See Sybron, 46 N.Y.2d a t  203-04,385 N.E.2d a t  1058,413 N.Y.S.2d a t  130-31. The Court of 
Appeals held that forum consequences could be foreseen within the meaning of subpara- 
graph (ii) of CPLR 302 (a)(3) because "[gliven that Sybron manufactures the equipment in 
New York, that Wetzel worked a t  Sybron in New York for 34 years, and that Sybron cus- 
tomers in New York are being pursued, i t  is reasonable that De Deitrich foresee New York 
as the place injury will occur." Id. a t  206, 385 N.E.2d a t  1060, 413 N.Y.S.2d a t  132. 
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6. Effect of Asahi's Constitutional Consideration in New York 
There remains the question of what guidance the Asahi opin- 
ion provides for the New York bar. After 110 years of jurisdictional 
developments since Pennoyer v. Neff,135 is Asahi the best the 
United States Supreme Court can do? Clearly, indemnification 
claims between two alien defendants, such as in Asahi, will not 
warrant an assertion of in personam jurisdiction by a New York 
court.136 Asahi, however, portends that our courts may assert long- 
arm jurisdiction over alien and domestic defendants who place 
products into the international or interstate markets even if there 
is not a specific showing of awareness that the products were 
135. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). In Pennoyer v. Neff, Justice Field, writing for the majority, set 
forth two interrelated rules: (1) "that every State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sover- 
eignty over the persons and property within its territory," and (2) "that no State can exer- 
cise direct jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory." Pen- 
noyer, 95 U.S. a t  722. After Pennoyer, there have been several major incursions upon the 
rigidity of the territorial theory and several bases for extraterritorial jurisdiction developed. 
Under present law, as enunciated by Internutional Shoe, 326 U.S. a t  320, the test for sub- 
jecting a nondomiciliary to a forum in personam jurisdiction is that "he have certain mini- 
mum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'tradi- 
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " Id. The Shoe test has been refined by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in recent years. Immediately prior to its opinion in Asahi, the 
Court issued opinions in the following key cases: Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 
(1985) (nonresident defendant who voluntarily entered into a contract that had a substan- 
tial connection with the forum state subject to that state's jurisdiction in a suit for breach of 
contract even though he had never been in the forum state); Calder v. Jones, 470 U.S. 522 
(1984) (defendant was within the constitutional reach of California courts even though he 
had never been in California, because he intentionally committed acts in Florida with 
knowledge that the acts could injure the plaintiff in California); Helicopteros Nationales de 
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 407 (1984) (drawing an important distinction between gen- 
eral and specific jurisdiction, implying that in cases of specific jurisdiction, ie., when the 
suit arises out of or is related to the defendant's contacts with the forum state, fewer con- 
tacts were necessary); Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984) (defendant, an 
Ohio corporation, could reasonably anticipate suit in a New York court on a libel action 
based on the contents of its magazine, where defendant's magazine was circulated regularly 
in that state); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (defendant's 
conduct and connection with the forum state must be such that he could reasonably antici- 
pate being subject to suit in that state); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978) (de- 
fendant must have purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections of the forum 
state's laws); S h d e r  v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) (abandoning the traditional approach 
to determining in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction, which allowed the presence of property 
within the state to serve, without more, as a basis for exercising power over that property 
and holding that all assertions of state power were to be measured by the due process stan- 
dard set forth in International Shoe).. 
136. See Asahi, 107 S.Ct a t  1035. 
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targeted for New York.ls7 Thus, the foreseeability element, a key 
one under the jurisdictional requirements of subparagraph (ii) of 
CPLR 302(a)(3),lS8 may be given as much effect as the statute en- 
visions. Practitioners, however, should note that a t  least one appel- 
late division has held that a third-party defendant that manufac- 
tured a component part of a defendant's product is not subject to 
jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii)lSe merely because the de- 
fendant sells its products in New York.140 In Martinez v. American 
Standard,14' the Appellate Division, Second Department, con- 
cluded that there was no indication that the third-party defendant 
knew or should have known that its customer was serving a New 
York market.142 The Second Department stated that in order to 
meet the constitutional standards for an assertion of jurisdiction as 
set forth in Hanson v. D e n ~ k l a l ~ ~  and World-Wide Volkswagen 
Corp. v. Wo~dson,"~ it must be shown that the manufacturers 
made a "discernible effort to serve, directly or indirectly, a market 
within the forum state."14= This view seems to be a t  odds with the 
position of at least five justices of the current United States Su- 
preme Court who lean toward a more expansive view of long-arm 
j~risdiction.~'~ 
- - 
137. See id. 
138. See N.Y. CPLR 302(a)(3) ( M c K i e y  Supp. 1988); see also infra note 146 and 
accompanying text; Siegel, 329 N.Y.S.L.Dig. 4 (1987) (five justices stop short of rejecting the 
stream of commerce theory). 
139. See N.Y. CPLR 302(a)(3) (McKinney Supp. 1988). 
140. See supra notes 123-37 and accompanying text. 
141. 91 A.D.2d 652,457 N.Y.S.2d 97 (2d Dep't 1982), aff'd, 60 N.Y.2d 873,458 N.E.2d 
826, 470 N.Y.S.2d 367 (1983). Because there was no evidence showing that the component 
part maker knew where the air conditioners were going or that i t  had tried to reach the New 
York market through the compressor manufacturer, there was no purposeful availment nec- 
essary for the assertion of in personam jurisdiction. See Martinez, 91 A.D.2d a t  654, 457 
N.Y.S.2d a t  99. In Asahi there was evidence enough to convince a t  least five justices that 
the component part maker knew its product was intended for California. See supra notes 
103-12 and accompanying text. Compare Martinez v. American Standard, 91 A.D.2d 652, 
457 N.Y.S.2d 97 (2d Dep't 1982) with Darienzo v. Wise Shoe Stores, Inc., 74 A.D.2d 342,472 
N.Y.S.2d 831 (2d Dep't 1980) (where the Appellate Division, Second Department, reached a 
diierent result). Both cases are discussed and applied in Montalbano v. Easco Hand Tools, 
Inc., 766 F.2d 737, 743 (2d Cir. 1985). 
142. See Martinez, 91 A.D.2d a t  653-54, 457 N.Y.S.2d a t  99. 
143. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
144. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). 
145. See Martinez, 91 A.D.2d a t  653-54, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 99. 
146. Justice Brennan's stream of commerce theory does not require the specific ele- 
ments of foreseeability that the Second Department found to be necessary in Martinez. See 
supra note 141 and accompanying text. The Brennan view, which seems to be the position 
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Finally, the Asahi opinion alerts the practitioner to the impor- 
tance of developing a detailed record for purposes of preventing a 
dismissal on jurisdictional  ground^."^ The factual record in Asahi 
was sparse.148 Consequently, the New York practitioner, faced with 
a jurisdictional motion to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a) should in- 
sist on the "jurisdictional disclosure" provided for by subsection 
(d) of CPLR 3211."9 In this respect it is important to note the 
different standards for disclosure in state and federal practice. In 
state courts, good faith conclusory allegations of jurisdiction pre- 
sent a "sufficient start" to entitle the plaintiff to disclosure on ju- 
risdictional issues.160 In federal courts, the plaintiff must make a 
prima facie showing of jurisdiction in order to proceed with 
disc0~ery.l~~ 
of a majority of federal courts, is supported in Asahi by Justices White, Marshall, Black- 
mun, and as modified by Stevens. Nonetheless the practicioner should note that New York's 
state constitution has a due process clause which may require more than the federal coun- 
terpart. See Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, 45 N.Y.2d 152,379 N.E.2d 1169,408 N.Y.S.2d 
39 (1978). 
147. See infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text. 
148. See Asahi, 107 S. Ct. a t  1030. No discovery or traverse hearing was held in connec- 
tion with the motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction; both sides merely submitted conflict- 
ing affidavits regarding foreseeability. See id. 
149. See N.Y. CPLR 3211(d) (McKinney 1979 & Supp. 1988). This section, entitled 
"Facts unavailable to opposing party," provides that: 
Should i t  appear from affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion made under 
subdivision (a) or (b) that facts essential to justify opposition may exist but cannot 
then be stated, the court may deny the motion, allowing the moving party to assert 
the objection in his responsive pleading, if any, or may order a continuance to per- 
mit further affidavits to be obtained or disclosure to be had and may make such 
other order as may be just. 
Id. Subdivision (d) is similar to Federal Rule 56(f) and is analogous to CPLR 3212(f). I t  not 
only protects the party to whom essential facts are not presently available, but also enables 
the court before whom the motion is made to supervise disclosure. For a recent application 
of CPLR 3211 (d), see Ramsey v. Mary Imogene Bassett Hospital, 113 A.D.2d 149, 495 
N.Y.S.2d 282 (3d Dep't 1985) (holding that discovery was warranted); see also O'Connor v. 
Bonanza Interior, 129 A.D.2d 569, 514 N.Y.S.2d 67 (2d Dep't 1987) (holding that CPLR 
3211(d) should be used more often in jurisdictional disputes); WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, 
supra note 86, a t  8 301.07 n.39 (citing Peterson v. Spartan Industries, Inc., 33 N.Y.2d 463, 
467, 310 N.E.2d 513, 515, 354 N.Y.S.2d 905, 908 (1974), for proposition that the Court of 
Appeals favors jurisdictional discovery). 
150. See WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 86, a t  8 301.07. 
151. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1069 
(1969). 
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B. Bases for Exercise of Jurisdiction 
1. CPLR 301: General Jur i sd i~ t ion '~~ 
The traditional bases for the exercise of jurisdiction that de- 
veloped prior to the adoption of the CPLR were incorporated into 
it by CPLR 301.15s Thus, personal jurisdictions based on physical 
presence,154 domicile,166 consent,156 or "doing business"'57 permits 
New York courts to assert jurisdiction over a defendant for any 
cause of action irrespective of whether it arises from the defend- 
ant's contacts with New York.15'j 
The "doing business" concept is frequently used to obtain ju- 
risdiction over a foreign c o r p o r a t i ~ n . ~ ~ ~  Although the Court of Ap- 
peals has stated that "[tlhe test for doing business is and should 
be a simple pragmatic one . . . ,"leO a review of the cases decided 
during the Survey year indicates that the test, whiie pragmatic, is 
far from simple. Four cases are worthy of comment. In Rolls-Royce 
Motors, Inc. v. Charles Schmitt & Co.,161 Judge Leisure held that 
152. See N.Y. CPLR 301 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988). 
153. See id. 
154. See id. Two exceptions should be noted: a person is not deemed present in New 
York for purposes of process service when he was induced to enter by fraud, and he has 
immunity from process when he appears voluntarily, as a plaintiff or defendant, to attend 
proceedings involving criminal or civil litigation. 
155. See N.Y. CPLR 313 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1987) (New York domiciliary sub- 
ject to in personam jurisdiction on any claim, wherever i t  arises, and wherever the defend- 
ant is located a t  the time the summons is served). 
156. See N.Y. CPLR 301 ( M c K i e y  1972 & Supp. 1988). 
157. See Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915 (1917); Bryant v. 
Finnish National Airlines, 15 N.Y.2d 426,432, 208 N.E.2d 439,442,260 N.Y.S.2d 625, 628- 
629 (1965); see also Laufer v. Ostrow, 55 N.Y.2d 305,310,434 N.E.2d 692,695,449 N.Y.S.2d 
456, 458 (1982). 
I t  is the aggregate of the corporation's activities in the State such that i t  may be 
said to be present in the sate' not occasionally or casually, but with a fair measure 
of permanence and continuity. . . and is the quality and nature of the corporation's 
contacts with the State suilicient to make i t  reasonable and just according to tradi- 
tional notions of fair play and substantial justice' that i t  be required to defend the 
action here . . . . [citations omitted]) 
Laufer, 55 N.Y.2d a t  310, 434 N.E.2d a t  695, 449 N.Y.S.2d a t  458. 
158. See Laufer, 55 N.Y.2d 305, 434 N.E.2d 692, 449 N.Y.S.2d 456. 
159. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
160. See Bryant v. F i i s h  National Airline, 15 N.Y.2d 426, 432, 208 N.E.2d 439,442, 
260 N.Y.S.2d 625, 628-629 (1965). Cf. cases collected and discussed in WEINSTEIN, KORN & 
MILLER, supra note 86, a t  5 301.16. 
161. 657 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
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Schmitt & Co., was not doing business in New York.ls2 The record 
established that Schmitt spent millions of dollars purchasing cars 
in New York and also spent substantial money on advertising.lss 
Schmitt, the company president, visited New York every month 
and the company had representatives in New York.ls4 Also, it  sold 
numerous cars in New York, held itself out as having a New York 
location and conducted meetings in New York with representatives 
of the plaintiff.le5 Nonetheless, Judge Leisure, in a fifty-one page 
opinion, stressed the lack of "classic factors of section 301 jurisdic- 
tion"166 such as: (1) maintenance of a local office or bank account 
in New York; (2) possession of property in New York; (3) a local 
phone number; and (4) employees.167 Judge Leisure explained that 
the defendant's solicitation of business in New York plus its other 
activities failed to support a finding that Schmitt Co. was doing 
business in New York.les Relying on Helicopteros Nacionales de 
Colombia v. Hall,16s Judge Leisure carefully analyzed each of the 
defendant's New York contacts and concluded that most of its ac- 
tivities involved the purchase of goods and not the sale of goods.170 
Furthermore, he reasoned that "purchasing activities" were of "rel- 
ative unimportance" for jurisdictional purposes.171 
In Bower v. Weisrnan,lT2 Judge Sweet held that general juris- 
diction could be asserted over a corporate defendant who had a 
New York office, a bank account, elaborate standing reimburse- 
ment procedures for business promotion and an agent to manage 
162. See Rolls Royce Motor, 657 F. Supp. a t  1040. 
163. See id. 
164. See id. 
165. See id. 
166. See id. a t  1044. 
167. See id. 
168. See id. "When considering this criteria, the facts presented by plaintiff fail to es- 
tablish that Schmitt Co.'s presence in New York is sufficiently continuous and substantial to 
warrant the exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to 301." Id. a t  1050. 
169. See id. a t  1045. 
170. See id. (distinguishing between purchases of goods and services in New York and 
the sale of goods and services in New York). 
171. See id.; see also Standard Enterprises, Inc. v. Bag-It, Inc., No. 86-4508 (S.D.N.Y. 
1987) (classic factors for general jurisdiction not present); A.C.K. Sports, Inc. v. Doug Wil- 
son Enterprises, 661 F. Supp. 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (same professional hockey player's ap- 
pearance in New York seventeen times pursuant to his player contract with Illinois hockey 
team did not qualify as doing business). 
172. 650 F. Supp. 1415 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
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its Manhattan fa~i1ity.l~~ The aggregate of these activities demon- 
strated that the defendant had "every indicia of a corporation 'do- 
ing business' in New Y ~ r k " ' ~ ~  Similarly, in Amalgamet, Inc. u. Le- 
doux & C O . , ~ ~ ~  the court held that a New Jersey corporation was 
subject to general CPLR 301 jurisdiction primarily because it was 
registered to do business in New York and maintained a New York 
City telephone number.176 Also, in American Dental Cooperative, 
Inc. v. Attorney General,17? the Appellate Division, First Depart- 
ment, hinted in dicta that the "doing business" test can be satis- 
fied without the maintenance of an office, bank account, employ- 
ees, General jurisdiction will exist if there is a "pattern of 
systematic, regular and continuous contact"179 within the State of 
New York. 
Finally, the practitioner should be reminded of the obvious. 
General jurisdictional issues are crucial only when the plaintifPs 
cause of action does not arise out of the contacts the defendant has 
with the forum.lsO In addition, while CPLR 301 jurisdictional is- 
sues often arise in diversity actions in federal court, the decisional 
law of the forum state (New York) determines if a nonresident is 
doing business.lsl 
173. See Bower, 650 F. Supp. a t  1426. 
174. See id. 
175. 645 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
176. See Amalgamet, 645 F. Supp. a t  249 (foreign corporation which files a certificate 
of authority to do business in New York has consented to personal jurisdiction in the state). 
177. 127 A.D.2d 274, 514 N.Y.S.2d 228 (1st Dep't 1987). 
178. See American Dental, 127 A.D.2d a t  280-81, 514 N.Y.S.2d a t  233. 
179. See id. at 280, 514 N.Y.S.2d a t  233. In American Dental, the Attorney General 
served a subpoena on the defendant, a Delaware corporation, which was not licensed to do 
business in this state, alleging violation of New York's antitrust act; defendant, a purchasing 
cooperative for an independently owned dental equipment and supply dealers, moved to 
quash the subpoena on the ground of lack of personal jurisdiction. See id. The court held 
that under CPLR 301, a foreign corporation is subject to personal jurisdiction if i t  is doing 
business in New York, "not occasionally or casually, but with a fair measure of permanence 
and continuity." See id. (citing Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259,115 N.E. 915 
(1917)). However, the court held that i t  need not reach the question of whether the defend- 
ant was "doing business" in New York since defendant may be subject to jurisdiction under 
CPLR 302(a)(l). See id. Pursuant to CPLR 302(a)(l), a court may exercise personal juris- 
diction over a nondomiciliary as to a cause of action arising out of the transaction of busi- 
ness within the state or the contracting anywhere to supply goods or services within the 
state. See id. 
180. See id. 
181. See Amalgamet, Inc. v. Ledoux & Co., 645 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (when 
subject matter jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship, "the issue of personal juris- 
diction is determined by the law of the fomm state, in this case New York."); see, e.g., 
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2. Long-Arm Jurisdiction 
CPLR 3021e2 allows New York courts to assert jurisdiction 
over nondomiciliary individuals and foreign  corporation^'^^ not 
subject to CPLR 301, but having the contacts with our state which 
are listed in section 302.1a4 This "long-arm" jurisdiction is limited 
by the terms of CPLR 302 and by federal and state constitutional 
considerationsle6 to claims that arise from the defendant's New 
York related activity. This is the important distinition between 
long-arm jurisdiction and jurisdiction based on presence, doing 
business, consent or domicile, none of which is limited to causes of 
action arising from New York related activities.ls6 
Subsection (a) of CPLR 3021e7 deals primarily with commer- 
cial and tort related litigation.ls8 It subjects defendants to jurisdic- 
tion for any cause of action "arising from" acts enumerated in the 
statute which are committed by the defendant or his agent.lae The 
exact scope of the agency is unclear.le0 Several decisions during the 
Survey year illustrate that before an agency relationship can be 
held to exist under CPLR 302, a showing must be made that the 
alleged agent acted in New York for the benefit of, with the knowl- 
edge and consent of, and under some control of the nonresident 
principal.lel Other Survey year decisions make it clear that CPLR 
Arrowsmith v. United Press International, 320 F.2d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 1963). Cf. A.C.K. 
Sports, Inc. v. Doug Wilson Enterprises, 661 F. Supp. 386, 387 (1987). The same is true 
when a federal courts subject matter jurisdiction is founded on the presence of federal ques- 
tions. See Business Trends Analysts v. Freedonia Group, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 1452 (S.D.N.Y. 
1987) (citing United States v. F i s t  Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 381 (1965); Metropa Co. 
v. Choi, 458 F. Supp. 1052, 1054 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)). 
182. See N.Y. CPLR 302 (McKinney Supp. 1988). 
183. See Simonson v. International Bank, 14 N.Y.2d 281,288,200 N.E.2d 427,431,251 
N.Y.S.2d 433, 438 (1964) ("although the section does not in terms refer to corporations, its 
application to foreign corporations, as well as to non-resident individuals, seems clear."). 
184. See N.Y. CPLR 302 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988). 
185. See Carlisle, supra note 7, a t  85-88 (citing Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac, 45 
N.Y.2d 152,379 N.E.2d 1169,408 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1978) (standing for the proposition that New 
York Constitution has a due process clause which the Court of Appeals has held may re- 
quire more than its federal counterpart); see also Svendsen v. Smith's Moving & Trucking 
Co., 54 N.Y.2d 865, 429 N.E.2d 411, 444 N.Y.S.2d 904 (1981)(same). 
186. See generally WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 86, a t  $8 301-16. 
187. See N.Y. CPLR 302(a) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988). 
188. See id. 
189. See id. 
190. See WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 86, a t  $ 302.06. 
191. See Adelona v. Webster, 654 F. Supp. 968 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Barbera v. Smith, 654 
F. Supp. 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Barrett v. United States, 646 F. Supp. 1345 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
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302 does not provide jurisdiction over a defendant in his individual 
capacity based on an agents tortious act within the state unless the 
agent was representing the defendant in his individual capacity.lSz 
These cases indicate that while a formal agency relationship is un- 
necessary, courts will not liberally construe the term "agency" in 
order to assert jurisdiction over a nondomiciliary defendant.lS3 
Most of the long-arm cases during this Survey year deal pri- 
marily with the CPLR 302(a)(l) "transaction of business" clauselS4 
and secondarily with CPLR 302(a)(3) which involves a tortious act 
outside New York causing injury within it.lS6 The practitioner 
should also be aware of the Court of Appeals decision in CPC In- 
ternational, Inc. v. McKesson Corp.ls6 where the Court qualified 
the "fiduciary shield doctrine" discussed in last year's Survey.lS7 
a. CPLR 302(a) (I): Transaction of Business ClauselSa 
In the context of CPLR 302(a)(l),lSs the transaction of busi- 
ness means purposeful activity in New York out of which a cause 
of action arises.z00 While a single act may constitute purposeful ac- 
tivity,201 several decisions during the Survey year confirm that the 
term "transaction of business" is to be narrowly construedzoa and 
192. See Lee v. Carlson, 645 F. Supp. 1430, 1434 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("There is no evi- 
dence, nor does the pla ints  allege, that any employee or tortfeasor a t  the MCC was acting 
as the personal rather than official agent of Carlson."). 
193. See id. But see Kreutter v. McFadden Oil Corp., 122 A.D.2d 614,504 N.Y.S.2d 915 
(4th Dep't 1986), lv. to appeal granted, 69 N.Y.2d 606 (1987) (to be discussed in next year's 
Survey). 
194. See N.Y. CPLR 302(a)(l) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988). 
195. See N.Y. CPLR 302fa)(3)(ii) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988). 
196. 70 N.Y.2d 268, 514 N.E.2d 116, 519 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1987). 
' 197. See CPC Znt'l, 70 N.Y.2d a t  287-88, 514 N.E.2d a t  125-26, 519 N.Y.S.2d a t  814; 
Carlisle, supra note 7, a t  92. Also the Court of Appeals is expected to repudiate the fiduci- 
ary shield doctrine prior to the date of the Survey's publication. See Kreutter v. McFadden 
Oil Corp., 122 A.D.2d 614, 504 N.Y.S.2d 915 (4th Dep't 1986), lv. to appeal granted, 69 
N.Y.2d 606 (1987) (to be discussed in next year's Survey). 
198. See N.Y. CPLR 302(a)(l) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988). 
199. See id. 
200. In the context of CPLR 302(a)(l), the transaction of business involves purposeful 
activity in the forum, perhaps only a single act out of which a cause of action arises. This 
concept is to be distinguished from doing business which contemplates a whole complex of 
activities as discussed in supra notes 153-81 and accompanying text. 
201. See id. 
202. See Standard Enterprises, Inc. v. Bag-It, Inc., 86-6746 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 20, 1987) 
(telephone calls, invoices and one letter insufficient to establish jurisdiction under a 
301(a)(l) analysis); ACK Sports, Inc. v. Doug Wilson Enterprises, 661 F. Supp. 386 
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that the claim arising out of that activity must bear a substantial 
relationship to it.20s These cases support the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals' recent opinion in Fielder u. First City National Bank 
of H o ~ s t o n , 2 ~ ~  where it was held that a nondomiciliary's two tele- 
pone calls and one mailing into New York did not constitute a 
transaction of business.206 The Second Circuit stated "we must 
look at the totality of a defendant's contacts with the forum with- 
out regarding any single act as the sovereign talisman of jurisdic- 
t i ~ n . " ~ ~ ~  The court distinguished Parke-Bernet Galleries, Inc. v. 
Franklyn,207 and C.T. Chemical (U.S.A), Inc. v. Houzens Interna- 
tional, Inc.,208 on the grounds that in those cases the defendants 
had used the telephonic link to New York as a means of projecting 
themselves into local commerce.20B The Second Circuit likened 
Fiedler to the "order solicitation" cases which hold that telephone 
orders not involving visits or consultations in New York do not 
confer personal jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(1).210 Judge Sand 
reached a similar conclusion in Metropolitan Air Service, Inc. v. 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (Illinois hockey player's meetings in locker rooms and restaurants in New 
York with president of New York corporation did not qualify as a transaction of business 
for assertion of in personam jurisdiction under CPLR 302(a)(l)); Talbot v. Johnson News- 
paper Corp., 123 A.D.2d 147, 511 N.Y.S.2d 152 (3d Dep't 1987) (students attendance a t  
college in New York does not constitute a transaction of business); see also Cooperstein v. 
Pan-Oceanic Marine Inc., 124 A.D.2d 632,507 N.Y.S.2d 893 (2d Dep't 1986) (telephone calls 
and mailing of loan papers to New York not enough to constitute a transaction of business). 
203. See id.; see also In re Estate of Bruno, 126 A.D.2d 845,510 N.Y.S.2d 770 (3d Dep't 
1987) (citing McGowan v. Smith, 52 N.Y.2d 268, 272, 419 N.E.2d 321, 323, 437 N.Y.S.2d 
643, 645 (1981) (for proposition that CPLR 302(a)(l) jurisdiction is not properly obtained 
unless a substantial relationship between the claim and the transaction in New York is 
established)). 
204. 807 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying the "totality of the defendant's activities 
within the forum" test). 
205. See Fielder, 807 F.2d a t  317. 
206. See id. 
207. 26 N.Y.2d 13, 256 N.E.3d 506, 308 N.Y.S.2d 337 (1970) (jurisdiction held proper 
over a California resident who participated in a New York art auction via telephone link 
with an agent of the auctioneer who then relayed defendant's bids). 
208. 116 F.R.D. 518 (S.D.N.Y 1985) (defendant established a telephonic course of deal- 
ing with the plaintiff-seller and traveled to New York to have lunch with the seller in order 
to discuss and negotiate the contract). 
209. See id. 
210. See Fielder, 807 F.2d 315; see also M. Katz & Son Billiard Products, Inc. v. G. 
Correale & Sons, Inc., 20 N.Y.2d 903,232 N.E.2d 864,285 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1967); L. F. Roths- 
child, Unterberg, Towben v. McTammey, 89 A.D.2d 540,452 N.Y.S.2d 630 (19821, afd, 59 
N.Y.2d 651, 449 N.E.2d 1275, 463 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1983). 
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Penbestky Aircraft,211 where the court held that under New York 
law a federal district court could not assert jurisdiction over an 
out-of-state principal based on the plaintiff agency's activities 
within the state when the principal's only contact with the agent 
was by telephone and telex.212 Similarly, in Berk v. Nemetz2lS the 
federal district court held that the defendant's physical presence in 
New York on one brief occasion did not constitute a transaction of 
business?14 The court stated that "[a]lthough it is certainly true 
that one of the most concrete manifestations of a nondomiciliary's 
purposeful activity in New York occurs when he physically comes 
to the state, it is hardly dispositive of the jurisdictional question 
under 302."816 
Additionally, the court considered the "number and duration" 
of the defendant's visits to New York and the "purpose" of the 
visits?16 Relying on McKee Electric Co. v. Rauland-Berg, Corp.,417 
and George Reiner & Co. v. Schwartz,218 the court concluded that 
a single trip by Nemetz to New York for a meeting with the plain- 
tifF failed to satisfy the requirements under CPLR 302?lS 
Once there has been a transaction of business, the claim must 
arise out of it.220 At least one appellate division during the Survey 
211. See 648 F. Supp. 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (reviewing New York State cases recogniz- 
ing jurisdiction where defendant's physical presence in state is lacking and concluding that 
jurisdictional assertions based on absent defendant require significant alternative contacts 
which must constitute more than the exchange of telexes and telephone calls with a New 
York plaintiff). 
212. See id. 
218. 646 F. Supp. 1080 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
214. See Berk, 646 F. Supp. a t  1084-85. 
215. See id. a t  1084. 
216. See id. 
217. 20 N.Y.2d 377, 229 N.E.2d 604, 283 N.Y.S.2d 34 (1967) (holding that defendant's 
activities did not confer jurisdiction upon the court even though a t  least three representa- 
tives of the defendant had made several visits to New York, each lasting several hours). 
218. 41 N.Y.2d 648, 363 N.E.2d 551, 394 N.Y.S.2d &l4 (1977) (one visit to New York 
enough for jurisdiction when it  included interviewing, negotiating and contracting which 
resulted in a continuing relationship with a New York corporation). 
219. See Berk, 646 F. Supp. a t  1085. Contrast the court's decision in Berk with last 
year's Survey discussion of Rates Technology, Inc. v. Diosio, 626 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D.N.Y. 
1986), where the court upheld jurisdiction based on one meeting in New York. See Carlisle, 
supra note 7, a t  91-92. 
220. See WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 86, a t  § 302.02 (arising out of require- 
ment usually not a problem when the action is for breach of contract negotiated in New 
York; however, if a plaintiff's claim involves injury out of New York, the negligence action is 
usually considered to be independent of any contract relationship between the parties). 
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year has reminded the practitioner that personal jurisdiction is not 
properly obtainable under CPLR 302(a)(l) "unless a substantial 
relationship between the claim and the transaction in New York is 
established."221 Thus, in I n  re Estate of the Appellate 
Division, Third Department, found that although the nondomicil- 
iary respondent had made 18 or 20 visits to his dying sister at  a 
New York hospital, no relationship had been established between 
his visits to the decedent and the petitioners 
b. CPLR 302(a) (3)224 
CPLR 302(a)(3)226 provides for an assertion of jurisdiction if 
the nondomiciliary commits an act out of state which causes injury 
to a person or his property within the state and one or more of the 
following conditions are met: (i) the defendant regularly does or 
solicits business in New York, or derives substantial revenue from 
goods used or services rendered here, or engages in any other per- 
sistent course of conduct here; or if these requirements are not 
met, (ii) the nondomiciliary defendant could have reasonably fore- 
seen the New York consequences and derives substantial revenue 
from interstate or international commer~e.2~~ 
CPLR 302(a)(3)(i)227 was analyzed during the Survey year in 
Lee v. C a r l ~ o n . ~ ~ ~  Judge Weinfeld held that a government defend- 
ant did not fall within the "persistent course of conduct in the 
state" prong of 302(a)(3)(i)229 through the actions of his agents in 
New York because they represented him in his official rather than 
his individual In Cleopatra Kohlique, Inc. v. New High 
221. See In re Estate of Bruno, 126 A.D.2d 845, 510 N.Y.S.2d 770 (3d Dep't 1987). 
222. See id. 
223. See id. at 846, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 771. The claim concerned petitioner's right of elec- 
tion against a joint bank account in Pennsylvania in respondent's and decedent's names 
with the right of survivorship. The appellate division stated: "No relationship has been es- 
tablished between respondent's visits to decedent and petitioner's claim. The joint account 
predated respondent's visits. Accordingly, no long-arm jurisdiction was ever acquired in this 
case!' Id. at  846-47, 510 N.Y.S.2d a t  772. 
224. See Act of Sept. 1,1966, ch. 590, 1966 MCKINNEY'S ESS. LAWS OF N.Y. 725 (codi- 
fied at N.Y. CPLR 302(a)(3) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988)). 
225. See N.Y. CPLR 302(a)(3) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988). 
226. See id. 
227. See N.Y. CPLR 302(a)(3)(i) ( M c K i e y  1972 & Supp. 1988). 
228. 645 F. Supp. 1430 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
229. See N.Y. CPLR 302(a)(3)(i) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988). 
230. See Lee, 645 F. Supp. at 1434. 
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Glass, Inc.,ZS1 however, Judge Platt held that jurisdiction could be 
asserted under CPLR 302(a)(3)(ii) when a manufacturer made a 
fraudulent statement outside of New York that caused the plaintiff 
buyer to lose some of its New York cu~tomers.2~~ 
C. Enforcement of a Foreign Judgment: Whose Law Deter- 
mines Whether In  Personam Jurisdiction was Properly 
Obtained 
What happens if a New Yorker, who manufactures noodle 
processing machines, receives a telephone call from the president 
of an Arizona corporation who inquires about the availability of a 
machine that would process an egg roll wrap and Oriental noo- 
Assume the New Yorker says: "I will be in Phoenix to at- 
tend a trade show next month-we can meet there to discuss the 
matter."2s4 The New Yorker goes to Phoenix and engages in pre- 
liminary negotiations for the sale of a "mini-noodle cutter."2s5 The 
Arizona purchaser flies to New York to inspect the merchandise 
and later the New Yorker sends a contract to him in Phoenix 
which he signs and returns by mail to Manhattan with a check for 
$8,000.2s6 The New Yorker cashes the check, collects its proceeds, 
and neglects to deliver the noodle cutter to Arizona.2s7 Two weeks 
later, after being served with a summons and complaint by regis- 
tered mail,ZS8 he hires you as his lawyer! Your detailed research 
indicates that under New York law the Arizona courts do not have 
a jurisdictional base.2s9 If a default judgment is obtained in Ari- 
zona will it be entitled to full faith and credit in New Y ~ r k ? ~ ' ~  Yes 
sir! 
231. 652 F. Supp. 1254 (E.D.N.Y. 1987). 
232. See Cleopatra Kohlique, 652 F. Supp. a t  1254. 
233. These facts are taken from China Express, Inc. v. Volpi & Son Machine, 126 
A.D.2d 239, 513 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1st Dep't 1987). 
234. See id. a t  240, 513 N.Y.S.2d a t  388. 
235. See id. a t  240, 513 N.Y.S.2d a t  389. 
236. See id. 
237. See id. a t  241, 513 N.Y.S.2d a t  389. 
238. See id. 
239. See Survey year cases discussed supra notes 202-232 and accompanying text (sup- 
porting a conclusion that there would be no jurisdictional base in New York). 
240. When a default judgment is obtained in a sister state, the plaintiff can move under 
CPLR 3213 for an accelerated judgment in lieu of complaint. If the courts of a sister state 
had jurisdiction the default judgment is entitled to full faith and credit in New York. See 
N.Y. CPLR 3213 (McKinney 1970). 
Heinonline - -  39 Syracuse L. Rev. 106 1988 
19881 Civil Practice 107 
In China Express, Inc. v. Volpi & Son Machine, Corp.,2'l the 
Appellate Division, First Department, held that where a sister 
state's exercise of long-arm jurisdiction is challenged in an action 
on a foreign judgment, the law of that state determines whether 
jurisdiction was properly as~erted.2'~ This is true even if that 
state's long-arm statute is at  odds with our r~le.2 '~ New York, un- 
like many states, has not chosen to extend its long-arm jurisdiction 
to the limits of constitutional tolerance?" Thus, if the long arm 
statute of a sister state does not violate constitutional safeguards, a 
default judgment rendered there can be enforced in New York. 
China Express warns the practitioner of the obvious. If you want 
to exercise your jurisdictional challenge and maintain your right to 
a full hearing on the merits, "Go West Young Man" for the chal- 
lenge. If you default, you can exercise your challenge in New York 
but pursuant to the law of the foreign forum which will frequently 
be more expansive than CPLR 302.245 
D. Forum Non Conveniens 
Even if a New York court has jurisdiction over the subject 
matter of an action and over the person of the defendant, the court 
may decline to hear the case.246 CPLR 327=" permits a court to 
stay or dismiss any action if it  finds that "in the interest of sub- 
stantial justice the action should be heard in another forum."248 
241. 126 A.D.2d 239, 513 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1st Dep't 1987). 
242. See China Express, 126 A.D.2d a t  239, 513 N.Y.S.2d a t  388. 
243. See ARIZ. R. CN. P. 4(e)(2). This Rule authorizes Ariiona courts to assert bases 
over nonresident defendants who have "caused an event to occur in this state out of which 
the claim which is the complaint arose." Id. This statute is simiiar to but obviously broader 
than CPLR 302(a)(l) which provides for an assertion of bases over a nondomiciliary who 
"transacts any business within the state or contracts anywhere to supply goods or services in 
the state." N.Y. CPLR 302(a)(l) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988). Thus, if the Ariiona long- 
arm statute does not violate state or federal due process requirements, then the default 
judgment in China Express is realized. See Chiia Express, Inc. v. Volpi & Son Mach. Corp., 
126 A.D.2d 239, 513 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1st Dep't 1987). 
244. See China Express, 126 A.D.2d a t  242, 513 N.Y.S.2d a t  389. "In that regard, we 
should note that New York, unlike Arizona, has not chosen to extend its long-arm jurisdic- 
tion to the limits of constitutional tolerance." Id. 
245. For examples of states, other than Ariiona, which have more expansive long-arm 
statutes than New York, see J. MDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 139-47 
(1985). 
246. See N.Y. CPLR 329 (McKinney Supp. 1988). 
247. Id. 
248. Id. 
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Several Survey year opinions in this area demonstrate that our 
courts are frequently applying the statutory doctrine of forum non 
conveniens to dismiss c a ~ e s . 2 ~ ~  
In Rappaport v. Rose Robert Travel Bureau, I ~ C . , ~ ~ O  the plain- 
t s ,  a New Jersey resident, was injured when struck by an automo- 
bile driven by her husband who was also a New Jersey resident.251 
The accident occurred in the garage of their New Jersey home, and 
a New Jersey police officer, who was called to the scene, investi- 
gated the circumstances surrounding the accident.262 The only con- 
nections that the case had with New York were the following: the 
automobile was owned by a New York corporation; the plaintiff 
underwent orthopedic surgery in New York; and the plaintiff was 
examined by a New York psy~hiatrist.2~~ The Appellate Division, 
Second Department, relying on "all of the relevant factors,"264 held 
that the trial term properly exercised its discretion in granting the 
defendant's motion for dismissal of the complaint pursuant to 
CPLR 327.266 The Court of Appeals, in Islamic Republic of Iran v. 
P a h l a ~ i , 2 ~ ~  listed the following factors for courts to consider when 
ruling on a CPLR 327 motion: "the burden on the New York 
courts, the potential hardship to the defendant, and the unavaila- 
bility of an alternative forum in which the plaintiff may bring 
The Court of Appeals further stated that a court may also 
consider that both parties to the action are nonresidents and that 
the transaction out of which the cause of action arose occurred pri- 
marily in a foreign jurisdiction.268 
249. See Troni v. Banca Popolare Di Milano, 129 A.D.2d 502, 514 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1st 
Dep't 1987); Rappaport v. Rose Robert Travel Bureau, Inc., 129 A.D.2d 620, 514 N.Y.S.2d 
255 (2d Dep't 1987); VSL Corp. v. Dunes Hotel & Casinos, Inc., 128 A.D.2d 23,515 N.Y.S.2d 
12 (1st Dep't 1987), reu'd, 70 N.Y.2d 948, 519 N.E.2d 617,524 N.Y.S.2d 671 (1988); see also 
Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cadillac Fairview US, Inc., 125 A.D.2d 181,508 N.Y.S.2d 445 (1st 
Dep't 1986); Moezinia v. Moezinia, 124 A.D.2d 571, 507 N.Y.S.2d 716 (2d Dep't 1986); 
Evdokias v. Oppenheimer, 123 A.D.2d 598, 506 N.Y.S.2d 883 (2d Dep't 1986). 
250. 129 A.D.2d 620, 514 N.Y.S.2d 255 (2d Dep't 1987). 
251. See Rappaport, 129 A.D.2d a t  621, 514 N.Y.S.2d a t  255. 
252. See id., 514 N.Y.S.2d a t  255-56. 
253. See id. 
254. See id., 514 N.Y.S.2d a t  256 (citing Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 62 N.Y.2d 
474, 467 N.E.2d 245, 478 N.Y.2d 597 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1108 (1985)). 
255. See id., 514 N.Y.S.2d a t  255. 
256. 62 N.Y.2d 474, 467 N.E.2d 245, 478 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1984). 
257. Pahlaui, 62 N.Y.2d a t  479, 467 N.E.2d a t  248, 478 N.Y.S.2d a t  600. 
258. See id.; see also Silver v. Great Amer. Ins. Co., 29 N.Y.2d 356,278 N.E.2d 619,328 
N.Y.S.2d 398 (1972). 
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Two appellate divisions have given trial courts broad latitude 
when exercising their discretionary power under CPLR 327.269 
Thus, in both Troni v. Banca Popolare di M i l a n ~ ~ ~ O  and Moezinia 
v. M0ezinia,2~l the fact that a party to the action resided in New 
York State did not prevent the trial courts from granting the de- 
fendants' CPLR 327 motions to dismi~s.2~~ Similarly, in VSL Corp. 
v. Dunes Hotel and Casinos, I n ~ . , 2 ~ ~  the Appellate Division, First 
Department, held that the New York domicile or residence of a 
party did not prevent the court from dismissing the plaintiFs 
complaint sua sponte on the ground of forum non con~eniens.2~' 
VSL Corp. is a case of first impression and suggests that appellate 
courts will not hesitate to disregard the merits of a trial court's 
decision2B6 and sua sponte dismiss a case whenever appropriate 
under the doctrine of forum non c0nveniens.2~" It should be noted, 
however, that the Court of Appeals has rejected this approach and 
--- - - - - - - - 
259. See Troni v. Banca Popolare di Milano, 129 A.D.2d 502, 503, 514 N.Y.S.2d 246, 
248 (1st Dep't 1987); Moezinia v. Moezinia, 124 A.D.2d 571,572,507 N.Y.S.2d 716, 717 (2d 
Dep't 1986). 
260. 129 A.D.2d 502, 514 N.Y.S.2d 246 (1st Dep't 1987). The appellate division held 
that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint on forum non 
conveniens grounds. See Troni, 129 A.D.2d a t  503,514 N.Y.S.2d a t  248. The trial court had 
considered the burden on New York courts, the interest of an alternative forum in deciding 
the issues, the need to translate documents from a foreign language, the need for interpreta- 
tion of foreign law, and the fact that the lower court's dismissal permitted the plaintiff to 
file his suit in Italy. See id. a t  503-04, 514 N.Y.S.2d a t  248. 
261. 124 A.D.2d 571,507 N.Y.S.2d 716 (2d Dep't 1986). The appellate division &rmed 
the trial court's order dismissing the complaint on forum non conveniens grounds. See 
Moezinia, 124 A.D.2d a t  571,507 N.Y.S.2d a t  716. All the events complained of took place 
in Iran. See id. a t  572,507 N.Y.S.2d a t  717. Also, a key witness resided in France, and the 
plaintiff was a California resident. See id. Although the defendant resided in New York 
State, the Second Department, relying on the factors set forth in Pahlavi, held that under 
the totality of the circumstances a balancing of the equities did not favor the action being 
heard in a New York court. See id.; see also supra notes 255-58 and accompanying text. 
262. See Troni, 129 A.D.2d a t  503, 514 N.Y.S.2d a t  247; Moezinia, 124 A.D.2d a t  572, 
507 N.Y.S.2d a t  717. 
263. 128 A.D.2d 23,515 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1st Dep't 1987), rev'd, 70 N.Y.2d 948,519 N.E.2d 
617, 524 N.Y.S.2d 671 (1988). 
264. See VSL Corp., 128 A.D.2d a t  26,515 N.Y.S.2d a t  14. The appellate division held 
that an action by a California construction corporation against a New York parent corpora- 
tion based upon a construction agreement with a Nevada subsidiary would be dismissed sua 
sponte because the action had no substantial tie to  New York. See id. a t  27,515 N.Y.S.2d a t  
15. 
265. See id. a t  25-26,515 N.Y.S.2d a t  14 (stating that "where, as here, an action which 
has only minimal contact with the State is instituted in New York, the court is not obliged 
to await the motion of counsel but may invoke the doctrine sua sponte."). 
266. See id. 
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reversed the First Department's decision in VSL C ~ r p . ~ ~ ~  In a terse 
memorandum opinion the Court held that: 
The Appellate Division acted outside of its authority in sua 
sponte dismissing the complaint on forum non conveniens 
grounds. Under CPLR 327(a) a court may stay or dismiss an ac- 
tion in whole or in part on forum non conveniens grounds only 
upon the motion of a party; a court does not have the authority to 
invoke the doctrine on its own motion?es 
The Court of Appeals decision is questionable for obvious reasons. 
Suppose lawyers in a sister state or foreign country come to New 
York to litigate and by agreement do not raise forum non con- 
veniens. New York courts may be overwhelmed with this type of 
litigation. 
Finally, the practitioner should note another important Sur- 
vey year opinion. In Carlenstolpe v. Merck & C O . : ~ ~  the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled for the first 
time that a federal district court's order denying a motion to dis- 
miss a complaint on forum non conveniens grounds is not an ap- 
pealable order under 28 U.S.C. $ 1291.270 Also, three Survey year 
decisions by the Federal District Court for the Southern District of 
New York confirm that, unlike state practice,e7l the availability of 
267. See VSL Corp. v. Dunes Hotels & Casinos, Inc., 70 N.Y.2d 948, 519 N.E.2d 617, 
524 N.Y.S.2d 671 (1988). 
268. See id. a t  949, 519 N.E.2d a t  617, 524 N.Y.S.2d a t  671. 
269. 819 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1987). 
270. See Carlenstolpe, 819 F.2d a t  36. The Third, Fifth, Sixth and District of Columbia 
Circuits have also ruled that district court orders denying motions to dismiss on forum non 
conveniens grounds are nonappealable. See id. a t  33; see also Partrederiet Treasure Saga v. 
Joy Mfg. Co., 804 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1986); Rosenstein v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
769 F.2d 352 (6th Cir. 1985); Nalls v. Rolls Royce, Ltd., Nos. 82-1975, 82-1976, 82-2033, 
reh'g denied, 702 F.2d 255 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 461 U.S. 970 (1983); Coastal Steel Corp. 
v. Tilghman Wheelabrator, Ltd., 790 F.2d 190 (3d Ci.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 938 (1983). 
The Fourth Circuit, however, has ruled that a district court order denying a motion to dis- 
miss on forum non conveniens grounds is appealable. See Kontoulas v. A.H. Robins co., 745 
F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1984). 
271. The New York State rule is set forth as follows: 
Without doubt, the availability of another suitable forum is a most important factor 
to be considered in ruling on a motion to dismiss but we have never held that i t  was 
a prerequisite for applying the conveniens doctrine and in Varkonyi [Varkonyi v. 
S.A. Empresa De Viacao Airea Reo Grandense (VARIG), 22 N.Y.2d 333, 338, 239 
N.E.2d 542,544,239 N.Y.2d 670,673 (1968)J we expressly described the availabiIity 
of an alternative forum as a 'pertinent factor', not as a precondition to dismissal. . . . 
Nor should proof of the availability of another forum be required in all cases before 
dismissal is permitted. That would place an undue burden on New York c0wt-s forc- 
Heinonline - -  39 Syracuse L. Rev. 110 1988 
19881 Civil Practice 111 
an alternative forum is an absolute prerequisite for applying the 
doctrine to dismiss a complaint in federal court.272 
E. Statutory Requirements-Service of Summons 
Last year's Survey article reminded the practitioner that New 
York State courts require strict compliance for service of sum- 
m o n ~ . ~ ~ ~  Decisional law during the current Survey year warrants 
that the admonition be repeated274 because even the most minor 
defect in service of a summons can be fatal to the This 
is true for the following reasons: one, a defect in service of the 
summons dismisses the action;276 two, the dismissal frequently oc- 
curs after the original statute of limitations has expired;277 and fi- 
nally, the six-month grace period under CPLR 205(a) does not ap- 
ply to actions dismissed on jurisdictional g r o ~ n d s . 2 ~ ~  
To avoid summons service challenges, the practitioner should 
always debrief his or her process server. Also, if the defendant 
raises a jurisdictional objection, serve a second summons and com- 
plaint for the same action. Let the defendant move to dismiss the 
complaint on the grounds that a prior action is pending. By doing 
so he must admit that the first action is not jurisdictionally defec- 
tiveZTs With the foregoing advice in mind, several Survey year no- 
tice decisions are worthy of note.280 In addition, service of sum- 
ing them to accept foreign-based actions unrelated to this State merely because a 
more appropriate forum is unwilling or unable to accept jurisdiction. . . . Moreover, 
even if we were to hold that the motion should be denied if no alternative forum is 
available, then the burden of demonstrating that fact should fall on plaintiff. . 
Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 62 N.Y.2d 474, 481, 467 N.E.2d 245, 249, 478 N.Y.S.2d 
597, 601 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1108 (1985). 
272. See Cruz v. Maritime Co. of Philippines, 655 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); ACLI 
Int'l Commodity Serv., Inc. v. Banque Populaire Suisse, 652 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); 
Hatzlachh Supply, Inc. v. Tradewind Airways, Ltd., 659 F. Supp. 112 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
273. See Cariisle, supra note 7, a t  93-99. The practitioner should contrast the strict 
compliance approach followed by New York State courts with the more liberal federal ap- 
proach. See Romandette v. Weetabix, 807 F.2d 309, 311 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that Rule 4 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to be liberally construed to further the purpose of 
finding personal jurisdiction in cases where the party has received actual notice). 
274. See infra notes 286, 290, 297, 300-02, 313 and accompanying text. 
275. See Siegel, Civil Procedure, 198 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 28, 1987, a t  9-24, col. 1. 
276. See id. 
277. See id. 
278. See id. 
279. See id.; see also Yanni v. Chopp, 130 A.D.2d 489,515 N.Y.S.2d 72 (2d Dep't 1987). 
280. See infra notes 286, 290, 297, 300-02, 313 and accompanying text. 
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mons under the Hague Convention merits review.281 
1. Service on a Natural Person 
Delivery of the summons under CPLR 308(1)2sz may be ac- 
complished by personally delivering it to the defendantza8 or some- 
times "by leaving it in the general vicinity of a person to be served 
who resists service."284 Two Survey year opinions, however, limit 
the "general vicinity" exception.286 In Thermidor u. Wycoff 
Heights H0spital,2~~ the plainti£F's process server delivered the 
summons and complaint to the defendant doctor's secretary 
outside of the defendant's presence.2s7 The Appellate Division, 
Second Department, citing Macchia v. R ~ s s o , 2 ~ ~  held that the ser- 
vice of summons was not properly effected and thus the trial court 
lacked personal jurisdiction.28s The Second Department reached 
the same result in Selby v. Jewish Memorial Hospitalzs0 where de- 
livery of the summons was made to a doctor's receptionist who had 
stated that she was authorized to accept service.zs1 The appellate 
division held that it was not shown that "the papers were left in 
the general vicinity of the defendant doctor" and that he was not 
"made aware of the fact and manner of service."2sz The Second 
Department also observed that service "could properly have been 
effected pursuant to CPLR 308(2) by the mailing of a copy of the 
summons and complaint to [defendant] at  his residence."2ss 
281. See infra notes 335-50 and accompanying text. 
282. See N.Y. CPLR 308(1) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988). 
283. See id. 
284. Id. 
285. See Thermidor v. Wyckoff Heights Hosp., 130 A.D.2d 653, 515 N.Y.S.2d 583 (2d 
Dep't 1987); Selby v. Jewish Memorial Hosp., 130 A.D.2d 651, 515 N.Y.S.2d 580 (2d Dep't 
1987). 
286. 130 A.D.2d 653, 515 N.Y.S.2d 583 (2d Dep't 1987). 
287. See Thermidor, 130 A.D.2d a t  653, 515 N.Y.S.2d a t  583. 
288. 67 N.Y.2d 592,496 N.E.2d 680, 505 N.Y.S.2d 591 (1986) (where the Court of Ap- 
peals held that the delivery of a summons to the wrong penon does not confer jurisdiction 
over a defendant even though he shortly thereafter receives it; a summons was delivered to 
the defendant's son outside the family house, and the son entered the house and gave the 
summons to the father). 
289. See Therrnidor, 130 A.D.2d a t  653, 515 N.Y.S.2d a t  583. 
290. 130 A.D.2d 651, 515 N.Y.S.2d 580 (2d Dep't 1987). 
291. See Selby, 130 A.D.2d a t  651, 515 N.Y.S.2d a t  581. 
292. Id. a t  652, 515 N.Y.S.2d a t  581. 
293. Id., 515 N.Y.S.2d a t  581-82. 
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2. Leave and Mail 
CPLR 308(2)284 permits service by leaving the papers with a 
person of suitable age and discretion at  the actual place of abode 
of the defendant, and by mailing the summons to the defendant at  
his last known address or, as an alternative, to his actual place of 
b~siness."~~ If one of the two steps is omitted, the service is 
invalid.gB6 
The Court of Appeals issued its opinion in Raschel v. R i ~ h ~ ~ '  
after last year's Survey article was submitted. In Raschel, the 
court held that when more than one defendant is served in the 
same action, by leaving the summons with a person of suitable age 
and discretion, a separate copy must be left for each 
Thus, if a single summons naming a doctor and hospital as defend- 
ants is delivered to a hospital administrator, then jurisdiction will 
not be obtained over the defendant d o ~ t o r . 2 ~ ~  
During the Survey year, the Appellate Division, Second De- 
partment, held that substituted service on a person with adverse 
interests to those of the respondent was not proper under CPLR 
308(2).300 Similarly, the Second Department held that a building 
security guard was not authorized to accept service for a physician 
who maintained an office in the building.301 The Second Depart- 
ment also affirmed that neither the term "dwelling place" nor 
"usual place of abode" may be equated with the "last known resi- 
dence" of a defendant for purposes of substituted service under 
294. N.Y. CPLR 308(2) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988). 
295. See id. 
296. See id. I t  must also be noted that filing with the clerk of the court is necessary in 
order to effectuate service. See id. 
297. 69 N.Y.2d 694, 504 N.E.2d 389, 512 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1986). 
298. See Raschel, 69 N.Y.2d a t  696-97, 504 N.E.2d a t  390, 512 N.Y.S.2d a t  24. 
299. See id. (stating that although the administrator was qualied to accept service for 
the defendant doctor under CPLR 308(2), actual notice depended on the following contin- 
gencies: the Administrator had to know that service was being made on the doctor as well as 
on the hospital, had to notify the doctor, and had to furnish him with copies of the 
documents). 
300. See Community School Dist. No. 13 v. Goodman, 127 A.D.2d 830, 511 N.Y.S.2d 
945 (2d Dep't 1987) (holding that the service of process upon respondent, by leaving papers 
with the school superintendent, was improper in an article 78 proceeding brought by a 
school district against an employee). 
301. See Gottesman v. Lazansky, 127 A.D.2d 563, 511 N.Y.S.2d 643 (2d Dep't 1987). 
The amendment to the CPLR 308(2) "cures the problems sharply raised" in this case. See 
Barker, New York Practice, 198 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 28, 1987, a t  1, col. 1; see also infra notes 
304-06. 
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CPLR 308(2).302 
Several other appellate decisions, holding that the mailing of a 
summons to the defendant's place of employment is improper,go8 
have been overruled by the Legislature's amendment to CPLR 
308(2) which now permits the plaint8 to mail a copy of the sum- 
mons to the defendant by first class mail to his actual place of 
business.304 This is an alternative to the "last known address" rule, 
however, the mailing must be in an envelope marked "personal and 
confidential."306 Also, the envelope may not indicate on the 
outside, by return address or otherwise, that it is from an attorney 
or relates to a legal action against the person served.306 
3. Service on Defendant's Agent 
CPLR 308(3)307 permits service to be effected by delivery of 
the summons to an "agent designated under Rule 318."308 Effective 
November 3, 1987, CPLR 318 was amended to provide that the 
writing in which the principal appoints his agent must be executed 
and acknowledged in the same manner as a deed.308 
4. Nail and Mail 
Last year's Survey warned the practitioner that service under 
CPLR 308(4)310 is unusually hazardous because it requires proof of 
"due diligence" to make service under subsections (1) and (2) of 
Section 308.311 While the "mail" requirements of CPLR 308(4) 
302. See Chiari v. D'Angelo, 123 A.D.2d 655, 507 N.Y.S.2d 26 (2d Dep't 1986). 
303. See Foley Machinery Co. v. Amaco Const. Corp., 126 A.D.2d 603,511 N.Y.S.2d 40 
(2d Dep't 1987); Gottesman v. Lazansky, 127 A.D.2d 563,511 N.Y.S.2d 643 (2d Dep't 1987). 
304. See Act of July 15,1987, ch. 115,s 1,1987 MCKINNEY'S ESS. LAWS OF N.Y. 357-58 
(codified a t  N.Y. CPLR 308(2) (McKinney Supp. 1988)). 
305. See N.Y. CPLR 308(2) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988). 
306. See id.; see also Barker, New York Practice, 198 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 28, 1987, a t  1, col. 
1 (discussing the new provisions in CPLR 308(2) and (4) providing for mailing to the de- 
fendant's place of business). 
307. See N.Y. CPLR 308(3) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988). 
308. See id.; see also Gottesman v. Lazansky, 127 A.D.2d 563, 564, 511 N.Y.S.2d 643, 
645 (2d Dep't 1987). 
309. See Act of July 15, 1987, ch. 115,s 1,1987 MCKINNEY'S ESS. LAWS OF N.Y. 357-58 
(codified at  N.Y. CPLR 308(3) (McKinney Supp. 1988)); see also Donaldson v. Melville, 124 
A.D.2d 361, 507 N.Y.S.2d 301 (3d Dep't 1986) (agency must be express and not implied). 
310. See N.Y. CPLR 308(4) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988). 
311. See Carlisle, supra note 7, a t  97-98; see also Farrell, Good Old Unreliable Service 
Under New York's Nail and Mail Statute, 196 N.Y.L.J., July 28, 1986, a t  1, col. 1. 
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t 
have been expanded to include alternative mailing to the defend- 
ant's actual place of business,512 the due diligence requirements 
continue to be rigidly construed. Thus, in Smith v. WilsonSIS the 
Appellate Division, Third Department, held that substituted ser- 
vice under subsection (4) was improper where the process server 
attempted to serve each of the two defendants on three separate 
occasions, none of which were on a ~eekend.~" The Third Depart- 
ment stated: 
The fact that the instant case presents a close question on the 
issue of due diligence was acknowledged by County Court when it 
concluded that plaintiffs complied with the standard of due dili- 
gence, but 'barely'. On the one hand, Orloff did attempt to serve 
each defendant a t  home outside normal working hours on one oc- 
casion. On the other hand, a total of only three attempts at  per- 
sonal service were made with respect to each defendant, none of 
these attempts was made on weekends and Orloff never made any 
inquires to determine defendants' whereabouts or their possible 
places of employment. . . . In light of the well-established policy 
of strictly observing the due diligence requirement and of scruti- 
nizing the quality of the efforts made a t  personal service, we con- 
clude that Orloff failed to exercise due diligence as a matter of 
5. Expedient Service 
Although CPLR 308(5)s16 does not require proof of due dili- 
gence or of actual prior attempts to serve a party under each and 
every method provided in CPLR 308,517 the practitioner should 
continue to expect the "impracticable" requirements of subsection 
(5) to be strictly construed.s18 
312. See N.Y. CPLR 308(4) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988). 
313. 130 A.D.2d 821, 515 N.Y.S.2d 146 (3d Dep't 1987) 
314. See Smith, 130 A.D.2d at 822, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 147. 
315. Id. 
316. See N.Y. CPLR 308(5) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988). 
317. See id. 
318. See Saulo v. Nourni, 119 A.D.2d 657, 501 N.Y.S.2d 95 (2d Dep't 1986) (expedient 
service authorized because plaintiff had attempted to personally deliver the summons to the 
defendant and thereafter made numerous inquiries as to his whereabouts). 
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6. Related Service Tips 
CPLR 31231s was amended to permit service on a board or 
commission of a town or village by delivering the summons to the 
clerk of the town or village.320 Also, New York City's in rem fore- 
closure notice procedures do not require that a property owner re- 
ceive personal notice of an in rem foreclosure unless the owner files 
a registration card with the New York City Department of Fi- 
n a n ~ e . ~ ~ l  During the Survey year the Appellate Divisions for the 
First and Second Departments have issued conflicting decisions re- 
garding the constitutionality of these notice requirements.82e Also, 
the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, has held a similar pro- 
cedure violates due process.s2s Leave to appeal has been granted 
for review of the Second Department's position.324 Service under 
New York Vehicle and TrafEc Law, section 253,925 is not obtained 
by serving a summons on the Secretary of State if the plaintiff fails 
to include the defendant's out-of-state address.s26 Also, service is 
proper when a defendant is served within a courthouse, and there- 
fore does not deprive a court of jurisdiction over housing owners 
319. See N.Y. CPLR 312 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988). 
320. See Act of June 8, 1987, ch. 109, 1 1, 1987 MCKINNEY'S ESS. LAWS OF N.Y. 338 
(codified a t  N.Y. CPLR 312 (McKinney Supp. 1988)). 
321. See N.Y.C. Admin. Code $3 11-406, 11-417. 
322. See Alliance Property Management & Dev., Inc. v. Andrews Ave. Equities, Inc., 
133 A.D.2d 30, 518 N.Y.S.2d 804 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 70 N.Y.2d 831, 517 N.E.2d 1327, 523 
N.Y.S.2d 441 (1987) (affirming solely on the procedural grounds that the appellate division 
had the power to award the relief granted and the Court ruled on no other issues). The First 
Department voided these same notice requirements and found that publication notice to an 
unregistered property owner whose whereabouts were nevertheless readily ascertainable did 
not satisfy due process because the city had an obligation to give personal notice to all 
interested parties and not merely to those who requested such notice by filing registration 
cards. See id. a t  31,518 N.Y.S.2d a t  508; see ako In re Tax Foreclosure No. 35,127 A.D.2d 
220, 227, 514 N.Y.S.2d 390, 394 (2d Dep't 1987) (where the city acquired title to some land 
in Staten Island through an in rem foreclosure, and the property owner did not receive 
personal notice of the proceeding because he had failed to register with the city; publication 
notice in the City Record satisfied due process because the owner had waived his right to 
personal notice of the sale by failing to 6le a registration card). 
323. See East River Savings Bank v. Cerullo Motors, Inc., 134 Misc. 2d 699, 512 
N.Y.S.2d 327 (Erie County Ct. 1987); see ako In re Foreclosure of Tax Liens by Erie 
County (Mfr. & Traders Trust Co.), 103 A.D.2d 636,481 N.Y.S.2d 547 (4th Dep't 1984). 
324. See In re Tax Foreclosure No. 35,199 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 13,1988, a t  15, col. 1; see ako 
In re Tref Realty Co., 199 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 21, 1988, a t  17, col. 3. 
325. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW 3 253 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1988). 
326. See Adirondack Transit Lines, Inc. v. Lapazlia, 128 A.D.2d 228, 515 N.Y.S.2d 668 
(3d Dep't 1987). 
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served while in housing maintenance code proceedings.327 
Finally, a criminal contempt proceeding can be commenced by 
substituted service instead of personal delivery.328 In an issue of 
apparent first impression, the Appellate Term, First Department, 
held that personal service under CPLR 308(2)329 was a sufficient 
jurisdictional predicate for criminal contempt.330 The appellate 
term noted that there was no appellate case expressly holding that 
personal delivery of an order to show cause was the only permissi- 
ble means of initiating a criminal contempt matter, or that statu- 
tory alternatives to in-hand delivery were jurisdictionally in- 
firmed.331 Although personal delivery of process is always 
preferable, "due process does not require it in a special proceeding 
. . . as long as the party charged is notified of the accusation and is 
afforded a reasonable time to defend."332 Another case of apparent 
first impression is Cascone v. B r e n n ~ n ~ ~ ~  where the Bronx County 
Civil Court determined that it had jurisdiction over a fifteen-year- 
old child defendant in a tort action even though service of process 
was made on his guardian father.334 
7. The Hague Convention 
First, count the number of automobiles in New York State 
with foreign license plates. Second, count the number of actions 
filed in New York State courts during the Survey year where a 
327. See Department of Housing Preservation & Dev. v. Koenigsberg, 133 Misc. 2d 893, 
509 N.Y.S.2d 270 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1986). In a thoughtful opinion, Housing Judge 
Lewis R. Friedman held that valid reservice of process on the owners conferred jurisdiction 
notwithstanding the pendency of motions alleging defective original service. See id. a t  896, 
509 N.Y.S.2d a t  272. Judge Friedman also held that the respondent owners were not im- 
mune from reservice while in court contesting the original service. See id. a t  897-98, 509 
N.Y.S.2d at 273. 
328. See Department of Housing Preservation & Dev. v. 24 West 132 Equities, Inc., No. 
86-92738 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct., N.Y. Co. Dec. 8, 1987). 
329. See N.Y. CPLR 308(2) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988). 
330. See Department of Housing Preservation & Dev. v. 24 West 132 Equities, Inc., No. 
86-92738 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct., N.Y. Co. Dec. 8, 1987). The practitioner should also note that 
personal delivery is not necessary for imposition of civil contempt. See Lu v. Betancourt, 
116 A.D.2d 492, 496 N.Y.S.2d 754 (1st Dep't 1986) (personal delivery of an order to show 
cause is not necessary for civil contempt sanctions). 
331. See Department of Housing Preservation & Dev. v. 24 West 132 Equities, Inc., No. 
86-92738 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct., N.Y. Co. Dec. 8, 1987). 
332. See id. 
333. 134 Misc. 2d 417, 511 N.Y.S.2d 501 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct., Bronx Co. 1987). 
334. See Cmcone, 134 Misc. 2d at 418, 511 N.Y.S.2d a t  502. 
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defendant was a foreign national. Third, count the number of law- 
yers you know who have of copy of the Hague Convention. Fourth, 
if your answer to any of the preceding inquiries is more than one, 
read this section of the Survey carefully. 
If a defendant in any action is a citizen of a country that is a 
signatory to the Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and 
Extra Judicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters, an in- 
ternational treaty known as the Hague Convention,ss6 then watch 
out! You may be required to make special efforts to comply with 
the Convention's service requirements.ss6 The Hague Convention is 
purportedly designed to "simplify service of process abroad so as 
to ensure that documents are brought to the notice of the ad- 
dressee in sufficient time."ss7 The treaty allows signatory nations 
to ratify it subject to conditions or objections.s38 If a signatory na- 
tion has made any objections that would affect the method of ser- 
vice on its citizens or corporations, the New York lawyer should be 
aware of them,sS9 particularly because two Survey year decisions 
reach conflicting results on how service of summons is accom- 
plished under the Hague Conventi~n.~'~ 
335. See 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, reprinted in Fed. R. Civ. P. 4, a t  104-08 
(West Supp. 1987)[hereinafter The Hague Convention]. 
336. See id. 
337. Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L., 431 F. Supp. 1226,1228 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 
565 F.2d 1194 (7th Ci. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 905 (1978). 
338. See The Hague Convention, supra note 335, a t  105. Article 10 of the Hague Con- 
vention provides: 
Provided the State of destination does not object, the present Convention shall not 
interfere with - 
a) the freedom to send judicial documents, by postal channels, directly to per- 
sons abroad, 
b) the freedom of judicial officers, officials or other competent persons of the 
State of origin to effect service of judicial documents directly through the judicial 
officers, officials or other competent persons of the State of destination. 
c)the freedom of any person interested in a judicial proceeding to effect service 
of judicial documents directly through the judicial officers, officials or other compe- 
tent persons of the State of destination. 
Id. 
339. See Russell v. Arthur Trask Co., 125 A.D.2d 136, 139, 512 N.Y.S.2d 575, 578 (3d 
Dep't 1987) (stating that i t  should be apparent from the trial record if the signatory State 
had made any objections to  The Hague Convention); see also Reynolds v. Koh, 109 A.D.2d 
97,99,490 N.Y.S.2d 295,297 (3d Dep't 1985) ("Japan objected 'to the use of the methods of 
service referred to in subparagraphs (b) and (c) of article 10,' but not to the provision of 
article 10."). 
340. See Rissew v. Yamaha ,Motor Co., 129 A.D.2d 94, 515 N.Y.S.2d 352 (4th Dep't 
1987); Russell v. Arthur Trask Co., 125 A.D.2d 136, 139, 512 N.Y.S.2d 575, 578 (3d Dep't 
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In Rissew v. Yamaha Motor CO.,~'' the Appellate Division, 
Fourth Department, held that service of process on a Japanese cor- 
poration by mail pursuant to New York Business Corporation Law, 
section 307,5'= was permissible under the Hague Con~ention.~'~ 
The Fourth Department, in Rissew, declined to follow a contrary 
holding by the Third Department found in Reynolds u. Ko~.~' '  
During this Survey year, the Third Department followed Reynolds 
in Russell v. Arthur Trask CO.~'~ although the court required that 
1987). 
341. 129 A.D.2d 94, 515 N.Y.S.2d 352 (4th Dep't 1987). 
342. See N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW $ 307 (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1988). 
343. See Rissew, 129 A.D.2d a t  98-99, 515 N.Y.S.2d a t  355. Plaintiff served defendant 
a t  its corporate headquarters in Japan pursuant to New York Business Corporation Law 
section 307. See id. a t  96, 515 N.Y.S.2d a t  353. He delivered a copy of the summons and 
complaint to the New York Secretary of State and mailed a copy to the defendant. See id. 
Ultimately, the plaint8 effected service under article 10 of the Hague Convention by send- 
ing copies to the Japanese Miistry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo, but service was made after 
the applicable four-year statute of limitations under UCC section 2-275(1) had run. See id. 
a t  96, 515 N.Y.S.2d 353-54. The issue was whether New York Business Corporation Law, 
section 307 service was authorized under The Hague Convention. See id. a t  97,515 N.Y.S.2d 
a t  354. The Fourth Department held that article 10(a) of the Convention permitted such 
service. See id. a t  98,515 N.Y.S.2d a t  355. The court rested its decision on its interpretation 
of the purpose of the Hague Convention, which was "to simplify service of process abroad so 
as to ensure that documents are brought to the notice of addressee in suEicient time." See 
id. at 97-98, 515 N.Y.S.2d a t  354. The Fourth Department also observed that Japan, al- 
though objecting to subdivision (b) and (c) of Article 10, never objected to subdivision (a). 
See id. a t  98, 515 N.Y.S.2d a t  354. 
344. See id. (citing Reynolds v. Koh, 109 A.D.2d 97,490 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dep't 1985)). 
In Reynolds, the plaintiffs brought a tort action against several defendants, including Nis- 
san Motor Company who had manufactured the auto that plaintiffs were driving when they 
were injured in the auto accident. See Reynolds, 109 A.D.2d a t  98, 490 N.Y.S.2d a t  296. 
Plaintiffs served Nissan with an amended summons and complaint by registered mail, and 
delivered a copy to the New York Secretary of State under Business Corporation Law sec- 
tion 307. See id. Although the process was received, Nissan argued that service was still 
ineffective because plaintiffs had failed to serve them through the Japanese Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, as required by The Hague Convention. See id., 490 N.Y.S.2d a t  296-97. The 
Third Department held that service under New York Business Corporation Law section 307 
was defective. See id. a t  99, 490 N.Y.S.2d a t  297. The court held that the word "send" 
rather than the words "serve or service" in article 10(a) did not authorize service, and con- 
cluded that because the plaintiffs had not satisfied the service requirements of The Hague 
Convention there was no jurisdiction over Nissan. See id. a t  99-100,490 N.Y.S.2d a t  296-98. 
The appellate division stated that the law of Japan was incompatible with the law of New 
York, which provides for direct service by one litigant upon another, because under Japa- 
nese law service is the courts' responsibility. See id. a t  100, 490 N.Y.S.2d a t  298 
345. 125 A.D.2d 136, 512 N.Y.S.2d 575 (3d Dep't 1987) (following Reynolds , but re- 
manding the case for further development of the record on question of whether Italy had 
made any objection to the Hague Convention that would affect the method of service on its 
citizens or corporations). On remand the third party defendant was served in accordance 
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the record before the trial court show whether the signatory state 
had made any objections to the Hague Convention that would ef- 
fect service of 
Until the split in authority is clarified by the Court of Ap- 
peals, why gamble? Lawyers should rely on the Third Depart- 
ment's restrictive interpretation of the Hague Convention found in 
Reynolds.347 Xerox a copy of the Convention articles from the 
United States Code Annotated, and check to be sure if service of 
process by postal channels is permitted under article 10(a).848 If 
there is any doubt, then follow article 5 to determine if the service 
law of the foreign jurisdiction is compatible with the law of New 
Y ~ r k . ~ ~ ~  The practitioner should also be alert to the "interplay" 
between rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
Hague Convention, because several federal district courts in New 
York have reached conflicting conclusions as to whether service 
can be made on a foreign national pursuant to rule 4.360 The con- 
flicting approaches to the Hague Convention, on the state and fed- 
eral levels, will have to be clarified by the New York Court of Ap- 
peals and by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit. Until then, the practitioner should "double check" when 
making service of process on a foreign national.s61 
IV. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Of the many Survey year decisions interpreting and applying 
article I1 of the CPLR, the following should be of selective interest 
to the practitioner. 
with the Hague Convention. See Telephone interview with Professor Jay C. Carlisle and 
Robin Bartlett Phelan, Counsel for Arthur Trask Company (Dec. 21, 1987). 
346. See Russell, 125 A.D.2d a t  139, 512 N.Y.S.2d a t  577. 
347. See supra note 344-46 and accompanying text. 
348. See The Hague Convention, supra note 335, a t  105. 
349. See id. 
350. See Silverberg, Civil Practice Roundup I n  Southern District, 198 N.Y.L.J., Dec. 3, 
1987, at  1, col. 1, (citing Lana Mora Inc. v. S.S. Woermann Ulanga, 672 F. Supp. 125 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (holding that the Hague Convention "provides merely a mechanism for ser- 
vicing process which is otherwise authorized, and is not an independent federal authoriza- 
tion for service abroad.")). But see Cargill, Inc. v. M N  Paschalis, No. 86-0805 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 30,1987) (holding that mail service outside the United States is not permitted by Rule 
4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
351. See supra notes 337-50 and accompanying text. 
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A. Section 203(b)(5): Delivery to Sheriff or County Clerk 
The most common method of interposing a claim is by serving 
the summons upon the defendant.362 Another method is by deliver- 
ing the summons to the sheriff of an appropriate county for service 
upon the defendant.363 When the action will be tried within the 
City of New York, the summons must be filed with the clerk of a 
specified county.364 This provision is useful when the applicable 
limitations period is about to run and the defendant cannot be lo- 
cated or served quickly because it  extends the time period within 
which the defendant must be served by sixty days.366 
Traditionally, New York courts have liberally interpreted the 
service and filing requirements of CPLR 203(b)(5),566 but several 
decisions during the Survey year suggest that the statute is being 
more restrictively interpreted.367 In Petrone v. S.S.K.S. Restaurant 
C O ~ ~ . , J ~ ~  the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that the 
plaintiffs application for a preference, which resulted in the sum- 
mons ending up in the files of the county clerk, was not a filing for 
purposes of CPLR 203 (b).368 The same appellate division held in 
another case that the plaintws failure to file papers in the county 
listed on the summons as being the defendant's address prevented 
the 60-day tolling provision from taking effect.360 The Second De- 
352. See N.Y. CPLR 203(b)(l) ( M c K i e y  1972 & Supp. 1988). 
353. See N.Y. CPLR 203(b)(5) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988). 
354. See id.; D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE. 5 47 (Supp. 1987) A summons is not filed 
with the clerk of the county where the action will be brought, but with the clerk of the 
county where the individual or corporate defendant resides. See N.Y. CPLR 203(b)(5) (Mc- 
Kinney 1972 & Supp. 1988). The county in which the claim arose is an alternative but only 
if the plaintiff cannot determine with due diligence where the individual defendant resides. 
See id. The corporate defendant may be served in the county of its residence, in the county 
where i t  does business, or where the cause of action arose. See id. 
355. See N.Y. CPLR 203(b)(5) (McKiney 1972 & Supp. 1988). 
356. See id. 
357. See Bellamund v. Beth Israel Hosp., 131 A.D.2d 796, 517 N.Y.S.2d 161 (2d Dep't 
1987); Petrone v. S.S.K.S. Restaurant Corp., 125 A.D.2d 654, 510 N.Y.S.2d 178 (2d Dep't 
1986); Nelson v. Downstate Medical Center, 135 Misc. 2d 980, 517 N.Y.S.2d 354 (Sup. Ct., 
Kings Co. 1987); see also Raschel v. Riih, 69 N.Y.2d 694, 504 N.E.2d 389, 512 N.Y.S.2d 22 
(1986). 
358. 125 A.D.2d 654, 510 N.Y.S.2d 178 (2d Dep't 1986). 
359. See Petrone, 125 A.D.2d a t  655-56, 510 N.Y.S.2d a t  179. 
360. See Bellamund v. Beth Israel Hosp., 131 A.D.2d 796, 517 N.Y.S.2d 161 (2d Dep't 
1987). But see Woll v. R d a ,  124 A.D.2d 726, 508 N.Y.S.2d 474 (2d Dep't 1986) (where the 
court rejected appellant's contentions that CPLR 203(b)(5) was not operable because appel- 
lant's actual place of residence and business was in Kings County and plaintiff had filed the 
summons and complaint in Queens County, because the plaintiff fulfilled the purpose of the 
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partment stated that "[slince CPLR 203(b)(5) requires, inter alia, 
that the summons be filed in the county in which the defendant 
'resides, is employed or doing business,' the plaintiffs failure to file 
the summons in New York County prevented the statutory 60-day 
tolling provision from taking effect."s61 
The Kings County Supreme Court also held, in Nelson v. 
Downstate Medical Center,SB2 that the plaintiff must make a "rea- 
sonable inquiry" as to where the defendant resides, and that it is 
not enough to check the yellow pages under "physicians."sBS In 
that case, the plaintiff should have used an investigator or tele- 
phoned the attorneys for the defendants to ascertain their 
whereabo~ts.~~' 
Finally, in a related matter the Court of Appeals held in Ra- 
schel v. Rish,SB6 that the statute of limitations was not tolled as 
against a doctor by service on a hospital in the absence of a show- 
ing that the hospital and doctor were united in interest by evi- 
dence of the doctor's employment rather than his mere affiliation 
with the hospital.sB6 
B. Section 203(e): The Relation Back DoctrineSB7 
During last year's Survey year the appellate divisions liberally 
statute by filing the papers in the county of defendant's last known place of business after 
making reasonable inquiry to determine his actual whereabouts). 
361. Bellamund, 131 A.D.2d a t  797, 517 N.Y.S.2d a t  162. 
362. 135 Misc. 2d 980, 517 N.Y.S.2d 354 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 1987). 
363. See Nelson, 135 Misc. 2d a t  986, 517 N.Y.S.2d at  358. 
364. See id. (stating that "CPLR 203 subd.(b) par. 5 requires reasonable inquiry not 
minimal inquiry."). 
365. 69 N.Y.2d 694, 504 N.E.2d a t  389, 512 N.Y.S.2d 22 (1986). 
366. See Raschel, 69 N.Y.2d a t  697, 504 N.E.2d a t  390-91,512 N.Y.S.2d a t  23-4. "Here, 
however, there was no showing of the doctor's employment by the hospital, nor was there 
any showing that plaintiff had sought care directly from the hospital rather than from the 
doctor himself." Id., 504 N.E.2d a t  391,512 N.Y.S.2d a t  24. The Court of Appeals held that 
service of one copy of the summons and complaint upon the hospital was not sufiicient 
absent a showing that the administrator knew that he was accepting service on behalf of the 
doctor and had reason to notify him of the same. See id. a t  696-97,504 N.E.2d a t  390,512 
N.Y.S.2d a t  23; see also Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Liidauer, 135 Misc. 2d 132, 
513 A.D.2d 629 (Sup. Ct., Cattaraugus Co. 1987) (holding that the wife was not "united in 
interest" with her co-borrower husband in respect to the bank's action on a credit card and, 
therefore, could assert a defense of statute of limitations in a later action for summary judg- 
ment when she was not sewed in the first matter). 
367. N.Y. CPLR 203(e) (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988) 
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construed CPLR 203(e)36s to permit amendment of pleadings. Al- 
though most of this year's Survey decisions permit amendments in 
general,36s courts have been reluctant to allow the addition of 
claims that would otherwise be barred by the statute of limita- 
t i o n ~ . ~ ~ ~  For example, in Laudico u. Sears, Roebuck and C O . , ~ ~ ~  the 
Appellate Division, Fourth Department, held that a wife's loss of 
services claim could not be allowed to relate back to the earlier 
pleading that asserted her husband's claim.372 Similarly, in Clark v. 
Turner Construction the Appellate Division, Second De- 
partment, held that an employee could not amend her claim to al- 
368. See id. (providing that added claims in amendments permitted by leave of court 
are timely unless the original claim did not give notice of the transactions or occurrences to 
be proved). 
369. See Cutwright v. Central Brooklyn Urban Dev. Corp., 127 A.D.2d 731, 512 
N.Y.S.2d 128 (2d Dep't 1987) (leave to amend granted by the appellate division in a fraud 
action); Getz v. Getz, 130 A.D.2d 710,516 N.Y.S.2d 26 (2d Dep't 1987) (leave granted in a 
matrimonial action); Hopper v. Hise, 131 A.D.2d 814, 517 N.Y.S.2d 178 (2d Dep't 1987) 
(leave granted in a dental malpractice action); Shepherd v. New York City Transit Auth., 
129 A.D.2d 574,514 N.Y.S.2d 72 (2d Dep't 1987) (leave granted in a personal injury action); 
McKinney v. Bay Ridge Medical Group, 126 A.D.2d 711,511 N.Y.S.2d 123 (2d Dep't 1987) 
(leave granted in a medical malpractice action); Stephan v. Shulman, 130 A.D.2d 484, 515 
N.Y.S.2d 67 (2d Dep't 1987) (leave granted in an action seeking accounting of partnership 
profits); Powe v. City of Albany, 130 A.D.2d 484, 514 N.Y.S.2d 725 (3d Dep't 1987) (leave 
granted to assert statute of limitations as a defense in an action to recover damages for the 
demolition of a building); Nab-Tenn Constructors v. City of New York, 123 A.D.2d 571,507 
N.Y.S.2d 146 (1st Dep't 1986) (motion to amend denied but without prejudice). 
370. See Laudico v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 125 A.D.2d 960,510 N.Y.S.2d 787 (4th Dep't 
1986); Clark v. Turner Constr. Co., 130 A.D.2d 454, 515 N.Y.S.2d 33 (2d Dep't 1987); 
Zavetta v. Portelli, 127 A.D.2d 760,512 N.Y.S.2d 152 (2d Dep't 1987); see akro Thompson v. 
Pittman, 123 A.D.2d 683, 506 N.Y.S.2d 979 (2d Dep't 1986) (where the original pleadings 
did not give notice of the claims sought to be added by amendment, the new complaint was 
time barred); Shairo v. Schoninger, 122 A.D.2d 38, 504 N.Y.S.2d 199 (2d Dep't 1986) (no 
notice in original pleadings bars complaint). But see State v. St. James Nursing Home, 128 
A.D.2d 694,513 N.Y.S.2d 195 (2d Dep't 1987) (where the original complaint notified defend- 
ants that the State's claims were based on certain financial reports, the court permitted the 
claims asserted in the amended complaint that were based on the same reports). 
371. 125 A.D.2d 960, 510 N.Y.S.2d 787 (4th Dep't 1986). After filing the note of issue 
and statement of readiness, p la in t s  moved to add his wife as a party plaintiff together with 
her cause of action for loss of services. See Laudico, 125 A.D.2d a t  960,510 N.Y.S.2d a t  787. 
The appellate division held that hi wife's cause of action was time-barred when plaintiff 
sought to amend and the trial court properly denied his request. See id. a t  961, 510 
N.Y.S.2d a t  788. The court held that pursuant to CPLR 203(e) the cause of action would 
not relate back to the time the action was commenced on the grounds that the wife was not 
a prior participant in the action, and the prior pleadings gave defendants no notice that the 
wife would be asserting a claim. See id. 
372. See id. at 961, 510 N.Y.S.2d a t  787. 
373. 130 A.D.2d 454, 515 N.Y.S.2d 33 (2d Dep't 1987). 
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lege that she lost control of her vehicle and sustained further inju- 
ries because of injuries resulting from the original accident.s74 Also, 
in Zaveta v. P~r t e l l i ,S~~  the Second Department held that CPLR 
203(e) did not apply to save the plaintiffs claim asserted against a 
third-party defendant after the expiration of the applicable statute 
of limitations.s76 This was true even though the third-party de- 
fendant had received notice of the circumstances underlying plain- 
tiffs proposed amended claim prior to expiration of the statute of 
limitations.s77 The message is clear; don't expect to use CPLR 
203(e) to revive a dead claim unless you can definitely show that 
the amendment will not prejudice your adversary.s78 
C. CPLR 214-a: Exceptions to the General Rules78 
Medical, dental, and podiatric malpractice actions are gov- 
erned by CPLR 214-asB0 which requires actions to be brought 
within two years and six months of the act or omission at  issue.981 
This year's exception cases include those involving the discovery of 
foreign objects,SB2 the continuous treatment do~t r ine ,9~~ fraudulent 
c0ncealrnent,9~~ and equitable estoppel.s86 
At least one appellate court agrees with last year's Survey, 
374. See Clark, 130 A.D.2d a t  455,515 N.Y.S.2d 33 (where the motion for leave to serve 
further amended complaint was made nearly three years after the injuries were sustained). 
375. 127 A.D.2d 760, 512 N.Y.S.2d 152 (2d Dep't 1987). 
376. See Zaveta, 127 A.D.2d a t  761, 512 N.Y.S.2d at  153 (stating that even where a 
third-party defendant receives notice of the circumstances surrounding p1aint-s claim, 
contained in the amended complaint, prior to expiration of the applicable statute of limita- 
tions by a third-party action against it, plaintiff is not allowed to circumvent the time bar). 
377. See id. a t  761, 512 N.Y.S.2d a t  154 (stating that although CPLR 1009 permits a 
plaintiff to amend his complaint without leave of court to assert any claim that the plaintiff 
has against a thud party defendant, this provision does not relieve a plaintiff from the oper- 
ation of the statute of limitations). 
378. See D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE 8 237 (1978). 
379. N.Y. CPLR 214-a (McKinney Supp. 1988). 
380. Id. 
381. See id. 
382. See Mitchell v. Abitol, 130 A.D.2d 906, 515 N.Y.S.2d 810 (2d Dep't 1987); Stern- 
berg v. Gardstein, 120 A.D.2d 93, 508 N.Y.S.2d 14 (2d Dep't 1986). 
383. See Bobrow v. DePaulo, 655 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Malavenda v. New 
York Telephone Co., 127 A.D.2d 452, 512 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1st Dep't 1987); Fox v. Glens Falls 
Hosp., 129 A.D.2d 955, 515 N.Y.S.2d 118 (3d Dep't 1987). 
384. See Szajna v. Rand, 131 A.D.2d 840,517 N.Y.S.2d 201 (2d Dep't 1987). 
385. See Ettore I. v. Angela D., 127 A.D.2d 6, 513 N.Y.S.2d 733 (2d Dep't 1987); 
Thompson v. Whitestone Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 131 A.D.2d 749, 516 N.Y.S.2d 963 (2d Dep't 
1987). 
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which suggested that intrauterine devices ("IUDs") qualify in some 
trial courts for the foreign object exception rule.3s6 In Sternberg v. 
Gard~tein:~? the Appellate Division, Second Department, held 
that an IUD became or took on the character of a foreign object 
when the defendant performed an abortion and tubal ligation ster- 
ilization procedure but negligently failed to remove the IUD.S8s 
The plaintiffs medical malpractice action therefore accrued when 
the IUD was or could reasonably have been discovered by the pa- 
tient.38D In Mitchell v. Abit01,3~O however, the Second Department 
held that a medical malpractice claim based solely on an allegation 
that a wrong suturing method and material were used did not 
bring the action within the ambit of the foreign exception rule.391 
The continuous treatment doctrine continues to be restric- 
tively applied by New York Courts.392 In Fox v. Glens Falls Hospi- 
ta1,3g3 the Appellate Division, Third Department, held that a pa- 
tient's return to the hospital emergency room five days after her 
386. See Carlisle, supra note 7, a t  104 n.344. 
387. 120 A.D.2d 93,508 N.Y.S.2d 14 (2d Dep't 1986). The Second Department deserves 
kudos for this thoughtful opinion. In November of 1979, an IUD was inserted into plaintiff 
by a nonparty physician. See Sternberg, 120 A.D.2d a t  94,508 N.Y.S.2d a t  15. On February 
13, 1981, defendant agreed to perform an abortion on the plaintiff and to remove the IUD. 
See id. During the operation on March 2, 1981, defendant did not remove the IUD. See id. 
On November 1, 1983, plaintiff commenced a personal injury action to recover damages 
caused by the IUD which defendant negligently failed to remove. See id. a t  95,508 N.Y.S.2d 
a t  15. Defendant sought a dismissal on the grounds that the action was barred by CPLR 
214-a and argued that the foreign object exception did not apply. See id. The appellate 
division held that the exception was applicable and that the plaintws malpractice claims 
accrued on the date she discovered or should have discovered the IUD. See id. a t  97, 508 
N.Y.S.2d at 17. 
388. See id. The appellate division noted that i t  had previously held that the failure of 
a physician to remove an IUD upon the implantation of a second IUD was a "fact pattern 
appropriate for the application of the foreign object rule set forth in CPLR 214-a." Id. a t  95, 
508 N.Y.S.2d at 16, (citing Darragh v. County of Nassau, 63 A.D.2d 1010,405 N.Y.S.2d 1020 
(2d Dep't 19781, aff'g, 91 Misc. 2d 53, 397 N.Y.S.2d 553 (Sup. Ct., Nassau Co. 1977)). The 
appellate division then concluded that the Darragh decision was indistinguishable from the 
Sternberg fact pattern for "while the defendant did not insert a second IUD, he did provide . 
an alternative means of contraception." Id. a t  97, 508 N.Y.S.2d a t  16.. 
389. See id. a t  97, 508 N.Y.S.2d a t  17. 
390. 130 A.D.2d 633, 515 N.Y.S.2d 810 (2d Dep't 1987). 
391. See Mitchell, 130 A.D.2d a t  633-34, 515 N.Y.S.2d a t  810-11 (holding that the su- 
ture material was a "fixation device placed intentionally within the body" and could not 
therefore be considered a foreign object, citing Goldsmith v. Howmedica, Inc., 67 N.Y.2d 
120, 491 N.E.2d 1097, 500 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1986)). 
392. See Carlisle, supra note 7, a t  103 (stating that courts during the 1986 Survey year 
restrictively read CPLR 214-a when applying the continuous treatment doctrine). 
393. 129 A.D.2d 955, 515 N.Y.S.2d 118 (3d Dep't 1987). 
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initial discharge was continuous treatment.s94 The court, however, 
held that her subsequent return to the hospital nearly two and 
one-half years later constituted a resumption of treatment rather 
than a continuation thereof.s96 Similarly, in Bobrow v. DePaulo,Bm 
Judge ,Leval held that independent checkups for detection of 
breast cancer did not constitute a continuous course of treatment 
and could not be linked together to toll the statute of limita- 
t i o n ~ . ~ ~ ~  Also, in Malavenda v. New York Telephone Co.,BBB the 
Appellate Division, First Department, held that CPLR 214-a could 
not be tolled because the plaintiff had failed to meet her burden of 
showing that the defendant was more than an independent 
~ o n t r a ~ t o r . ~ ~ ~  
The doctrines of fraudulent concealment and equitable estop- 
pel are applied by courts to prevent a defendant from raising a 
time bar if it would be inequitable for the defendant to do so.'OO 
They cannot be applied, as a matter of law, unless a plaintiff is 
able to establish the necessary elements for the assertion of each 
doctrine.'O1 In Szajna u. Rand,'02 the AppeIIate Division, Second 
Department held that because the record before the trial court 
contained disputed allegations pertaining to the issue of fraudulent 
concealment, an award of summary judgment would be inappropri- 
ate.'Os In Thompson v. Whitestone Sav. & Loan Ass~ciation,'~~ the
394. See Fox, 129 A.D.2d a t  956, 515 N.Y.S.2d a t  120. 
395. See id., 515 N.Y.S.2d a t  119 (stating that the "continuous nature of a diagnoses 
does not itself amount to continuous treatment."). 
396. 655 F. Supp. 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
397. See Bobrow, 655 F. Supp. a t  687. (stating that the continuous treatment requires 
more than merely a continuous physician-patient relationship). 
398. 127 A.D.2d 542, 512 N.Y.S.2d 110 (1st Dep't 1987). 
399. See Malavenda, 127 A.D.2d a t  543,512 N.Y.S.2d a t  111. An employee brought an 
action against a radiologist who had read mammograms in connection with the employer's 
breast screening program. See id. The appellate division held that the statute of limitations 
was not tolled absent a showing that the radiologist was more than an independent contrac- 
tor. See id. 
400. See infra notes 406-07 and accompanying text. 
401. See Ettore I. v. Angela D., 127 A.D.2d 6,513 N.Y.S.2d 733 (2d Dep't 1987); Szajna 
v. Rand, 131 A.D.2d 840,517 N.Y.S.2d 201 (2d Dep't 1987); Thompson v. Whitestone Sav. & 
Loan Ass'n, 131 A.D.2d 749, 516 N.Y.S.2d 963 (2d Dep't 1987). 
402. 131 A.D.2d 840, 517 N.Y.S.2d 201 (2d Dep't 1987) 
403. See Szajna, 131 A.D.2d a t  841,517 N.Y.S.2d a t  202 (stating that the "plaintiff has 
raised triable issues of fact as to whether the Statute of Limitations should be tolled by 
virtue of the defendants' fraudulent concealment of plaintiffs injuries and the plaintiffs 
consequent reliance upon his representations and advice"). 
404. 131 A.D.2d 749, 516 N.Y.S.2d 963 (2d Dep't 1987). 
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Second Department concluded that the trial court properly refused 
to apply the doctrine because the plaintiffs failed to establish the 
necessary elements of equitable estoppel?06 
Thus, parties wishing to assert these doctrines should follow 
the lead of the Court of Appeal's decision in Simcuski v. Saeli.'Q6 
An estoppel argument must state facts upon which there is a fac- 
tual dispute as to whether the defendant's acts, however innocent, 
were reasonably relied upon by the plaintiff who did not sue until 
the otherwise applicable time period had run.'07 For fraudulent 
concealment, the plaintiff must prove that he justifiably relied 
upon the defendant's intentional misrepresentation and then pros- 
ecute the claim with due diligence after learning of the 
c~ncealment.'~~ 
D. CPLR 217: When is a Four-Month Time Period 
Appli~able?'~~ 
Last year's Survey discussed, for the first time, some of the 
1986 decisions interpreting CPLR 217.'1° This provision set a four- 
month time limitation in a proceeding against a body or officer af- 
ter the determination becomes binding or final upon the peti- 
tioner."' Several appellate division opinions during the Survey 
year demonstrate that there continues to be confusion on both the 
bar and the bench as to when the period is applicable and when it 
begins to run.(12 In Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v. City of Alb~ny,"~ 
405. See Thompson, 131 A.D.2d a t  750,516 N.Y.S.2d a t  965; see also Green v. Abbott 
Laboratories, 198 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 17, 1987, a t  17, col. 2 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co.) (rejecting the 
plaintiffs arguments that the DES manufacturers should be equitably estopped from assert- 
ing the statute of limitations where the industry allegedly concealed facts about the link 
between their product and cancer, but plaintiff had not specified the allegedly concealed 
facts and had not presented evidence of any manufacturer's wrongful acts). 
406. 44 N.Y.2d 442, 377 N.E.2d 713, 406 N.Y.S.2d 259 (1978). 
407. See Simcuski, 44 N.Y.2d a t  449, 377 N.E.2d a t  716,406 N.Y.S.2d a t  262. 
408. See id. a t  451, 377 N.E.2d a t  718, 406 N.Y.S.2d a t  264. 
409. See N.Y. CPLR 217 (McKinney 1972 & Supp. 1988). 
410. See Carlisle, supra note 7, at 104-05. 
411. See id.; see also N.Y. CPLR 217 (McKiney 1972 & Supp. 1988). 
412. See Burrell v. Ortiz, 128 A.D.2d 391,512 N.Y.S.2d 677 (1st Dep't 1987); Dionisio v. 
Board of Educ., 128 A.D.2d 524,512 N.Y.S.2d 458 (2d Dep't 1987); Waterside Assoc. v. New 
York State Dep't of Environmental Conservation, 127 A.D.2d 663, 511 N.Y.S.2d 890 (2d 
Dep't 1987); People ex rel. Mianda v. Kuhlman, 127 A.D.2d 924, 511 N.Y.S.2d 981 (3d 
Dep't 1987); Vasbiner v. Hartnett, 129 A.D.2d 894,514 N.Y.S.2d 530 (3d Dep't 1987); Kur- 
land v. McLaughlin, 122 A.D.2d 947,505 N.Y.S.2d 967 (2d Dep't 1986); see also Calvest v. 
Westchester Co. Personnel Office, 128 A.D.2d 523, 512 N.Y.S.2d 456 (2d Dep't 1987) (ad- 
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the Court of Appeals held the enactment of a city ordinance to be 
administrative and not legislative."' The four-month statute under 
article 78(16 was applied, therefore, and not the six-year provision 
applicable to declaratory judgments or  injunction^.'"^ It is often 
difficult to determine what sort of remedy to pursue, therefore, 
particularly when a citizen perceives a municipal wrong. One com- 
mentator suggests that serious thought be given to making article 
78(17 the only remedy available against a government body for 
challenged actions.'l8 
E. CPLR 214-c: Revivor Statute Challenged41s 
Last year's Survey discussed the revival of time-barred claims 
in cases of exposure to DES, tungsten-carbide, asbestos, chlordane, 
and polyvinyl chloride.'*O The one year revival period has ex- 
ministrative determination becomes final and binding under CPLR 217 on the date i t  be- 
comes effective); Bardou v. Town of North Dansville, 134 Misc. 2d 927, 513 N.Y.S.2d 584 
(Sup. Ct., Livingston Co. 1987) (date upon which applications of town for urban develop- 
ment action grant became final is the date upon which the applications were executed by 
the town supervisors). 
413. 70 N.Y.2d 193, 512 N.E.2d 526, 518 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1987). 
414. See Save the Pine Bush, 70 N.Y.2d a t  204-05,512 N.E.2d a t  530,518 N.Y.S.2d a t  
947. 
415. N.Y. CPLR 7801-06 (McKinney Supp. 1988) 
416. See id.; see ako People ex rel. Miranda v. Kuhlmann, 127 A.D.2d 924, 511 
N.Y.S.2d 981 (3d Dep't 1987). In Miranda, the petitioner instituted a habeas corpus pro- 
ceeding seeking an immediate release from prison. See Miranda, 127 A.D.2d a t  926, 511 
N.Y.S.2d a t  983. The supreme court converted the proceeding to an article 78 proceeding 
and dismissed i t  on the ground that it was time-barred. See id. a t  927,511 N.Y.S.2d a t  983. 
A disciplinary determination made in 1972 resulted in the loss to petitioner of 180 days of 
good time and in 1986, the time allowance committee effectuated the loss of such time thus 
prolonging petitioner's period of incarceration. See id. a t  928, 511 N.Y.S.2d at  984. Peti- 
tioner subsequently sought a writ of habeas corpus; the appellate division &rmed the lower 
court, holding that a collateral attack on the disciplinary determination which had resulted 
in petitioner's loss of good time must be obtained by way of an article 78 proceeding, and is 
thus subject to the four-month limitation period of CPLR 217. See id. a t  927, 511 N.Y.S.2d 
a t  983. The court further stated that language in the governing regulations that a loss of 
good time is tentative until the recommended loss affects consideration for parole or condi- 
tional release, does not render the 1972 disciplinary determination non-final. See id. a t  928, 
511 N.Y.S.2d a t  984. 
417. See N.Y. CPLR 7801-06 ( M c K i e y  1981 & Supp. 1988). 
418. See Barker, New York Practice, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 28, 1987, a t  1, col. 1. 
419. See N.Y. CPLR 214-c (McKinney Supp. 1988). 
420. See Carlisle, supra note 7, a t  69-74 (discussing newly enacted CPLR 214-c and 
warning the practitioner to expect the constitutionality of the revivor statute to be 
challenged). 
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~ i r e d . ' ~ ~  Constitutional challenges to the statute, however, were 
made during the Survey year.'22 
In Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly and Company423 a state supreme 
court justice upheld the constitutionality of CPLR 214-~.'~( The 
defendants had challenged the revival statute on equal protection 
and due process grounds arguing that the statute was the result of 
an arbitrary and irrational political arrangement without rational 
guidelines, scientific certainty, or public ne~essity.'~~ The defend- 
ants also argued that the legislative concern for limiting the num- 
ber of potential claimants and costs was not related to the objec- 
tive of the legislation, which was to allow victims of latent injuries 
to maintain actions.(26 One defendant contended, furthermore, 
that before the constitutionality of the revival statute could be de- 
termined, further discovery was necessary on the question of 
whether or not such extraordinary circumstances existed to justify 
invocation of the ~tatute.'~? In a well-reasoned opinion, Justice 
Gammerman held that the revival statute had a reasonable rela- 
tionship with the legislative purpose of providing "a forum for in- 
nocent victims who might otherwise be time-barred before becom- 
ing aware of their injurie~."'~~ According to the court: 
As a general rule, state statutes of limitation reviving time barred 
actions are not violative of due process. Statutes of limitation re- 
421. Id. The one-year period began running on July 30,1986. See Act of July 30,1986, 
ch. 682,1986 MCKINNEY'S ESS. LAWS OF N.Y. 1567 (codified a t  N.Y. CPLR 214-c (McKinney 
1987)); see also Piccirelli v. Johns Manville Sales Corp. 128 A.D.2d 762, 513 N.Y.S.2d 469 
(2d Dep't 1987). In this action alleging negligence and strict products liability, plaintiff 
sought to recover damages for injuries resulting to his exposure to asbestos. See Piccirelli, 
128 A.D.2d a t  762, 513 N.Y.S.2d a t  469. The Appellate Division, Second Department, held 
that the action, which was time barred as of July 30, 1986, was revived pursuant to the 
provisions of chapter 682. See id. a t  763,513 N.Y.S.2d a t  470; see also Act of July 30,1986, 
ch. 682,1986 MCKINNEY'S SESS. LAWS OF N.Y. 1565 (codified a t  N.Y. CPLR 5041-49 (McKin- 
ney 1987)). Plaintiffs last exposure to the asbestos was 14 years prior to the commencement 
of the action. See Piccirelli, 128 A.D.2d a t  762, 512 N.Y.S.2d a t  469. 
422. The principal challenge is Hymowitz v. Eli L i y  & Co., 136 Misc. 2d 482, 518 
N.Y.S.2d 996 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1987). I t  should also be noted that on the same day the 
Hymowitz decision was issued, the same court upheld plaintiffs' cause of action despite their 
inabilities to identify which DES products caused the injuries. See Tigue v. E.R. Squibb & 
Sons, Inc., No. M-4231, slip op. (1st Dep't Dec. 1, 1987). 
423. 136 Misc. 2d 482, 518 N.Y.S.2d 996 (1987). 
424. See N.Y. CPLR 214-c (McKinney Supp. 1987) 
425. See Hymowitz, 136 Miic. 2d a t  493, 518 N.Y.S.2d a t  1002. 
426. See id. a t  4&1, 518 N.Y.S.2d a t  998. 
427. See id. a t  485, 518 N.Y.S.2d a t  999. 
428. Id. a t  486, 518 N.Y.S.2d a t  1000. 
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present a public policy statement with respect to the privilege to 
litigate. [Tlhe history of pleas of limitations shows them to be 
good only by legislative grace and to subject to a relatively large 
degree of legislative control. Chase Securities Corp. v.Donaldson, 
325 U.S. 304, 314 (1944). The expiration of the applicable time 
period does not eliminate a cause of action but rather, suspends 
the court's power to grant a remedy. In other words, statutes of 
limitations relate to the availability of a remedy and not to the 
destruction of any fundamental right.'2B 
On appeal to the Appellate Division, First Department, the 
appellants made three fundamental challenges to the revival stat- 
~te:'~O first, that the reopener is, on its face, an unconstitutional 
exercise of legislative power;4s1 second, that it is unconstitutional 
as applied to any claim that the plaintiff could have brought under 
the old statute of limitations but chose not to bring;4s2 and finally, 
that section 12,'ss which deprives the defendant manufacturers of 
the five targeted substances of the benefit of CPLR article 16,"s4 is 
an unconstitutional discrimination against those companies.4s6 I t  is 
highly likely that the appellate division will uphold the constitu- 
tionality of the revivor statute and also uphold the theory that 
drug manufacturers are liable even though they are not identified 
as the makers of the specific pills taken by the plaintiff. 
In a related matter,'sB a state supreme court justice refused to 
expand the one-year revival statute to include actions for wrongful 
death that were viable a t  the time of the decedent's death.4s7 
While acknowledging that "the legislative design may work an in- 
justice in this case,"4s8 Justice Gammerman ruled that "it would be 
429. Id. a t  485, 518 N.Y.S.2d a t  999. 
430. See Brief of Defendant Eli Lilly & Co. (Preliminary Statement) (copy on file at  
Syracuse Law Review, Syracuse Univ. College of Law). 
431. See id. 
432. See id. 
433. See id.; see also N.Y. CPLR 1201-11 (McKinney Supp. 1988) 
434. See Brief of Defendant Eli L i y  & Co. (Preliminary Statement); see also N.Y. 
CPLR 1601-03 (McKinney Supp. 1988) 
435. See supra note 430 and accompanying text. This argument is based on the fact 
that revision of the rules of joint liability do not pertain to suits revived under CPLR 214- 
~ (4) .  See Act of July 30, 1986, ch. 682, 1986 MCKINNEY'S ESS. LAWS OF N.Y. 1567 (codified 
a t  N.Y. CPLR 214-c (McKinney 1987)). 
436. See Green v. Abbott Laboratories, 198 N.Y.L.J., Nov. 17, 1987, a t  13, col. 2 (Sup. 
Ct., N.Y. Co.). 
437. See id. 
438. See id. 
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improper to judicially extend the revival provisions as it relates to 
wrongful death claims."4Sg Justice Gammerman also rejected the 
plaintifF's arguments that the DES manufacturers should be equi- 
tably estopped from asserting the statute of  limitation^."^ It 
should be noted that a supreme court justice has refused to permit 
defendants in a products liability action pending for almost ten 
years to take advantage of newly enacted 2 1 4 - ~ ~ ~ '  and win dismis- 
sal of claims based upon a new discovery rule pertaining to injuries 
caused by exposure to harmful  substance^.'^^ 
F. Miscellaneous 
During the Survey year, some other decisions emerged that 
merit at  least brief mention. 
1. Federal Night Depository Box: General Rule l (a)  for the 
Southern District 
In Greenwood v. State of New York Office Of Mental 
Health,"= a psychiatrist brought a federal civil rights action 
against the State of New Yorkfi4 The claim was subject to the 
three-year statute of limitations for general personal injury 
~laims."~ Federal procedural rules require that district courts be 
deemed open for filing pleadings twenty-four hours each dayF6 
Judge Leisure held that the plaintifF's action was not "com- 
menced" for limitations purposes on the date his complaint was 
placed in a night depository box maintained by the clerk of the 
Instead, placement was only effective to commence the ac- 
tion on the following day by which time the action was time 
barred!448 Judge Leisure based his decision on General Rule l(a) of 
the Southern District of New York which provides that papers 
439. Id. 
440. See id. 
441. N.Y. CPLR 214-c (McKinney 1987). 
442. See O'Halloran v. Toledo Scales, Co., - A.D.2d - 524 N.Y.S.2d 666 (1st Dep't 
1988), aff'g, 135 Miic. 2d 1098,517 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1987) (the action was 
not controlled by the new and liberalized statute of limitations period). 
443. 645 F. Supp. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
444. See Greenwood, 645 F. Supp. at 113. 
445. See id. at 115. 
446. FED. R CIV. P. 77(a). 
447. See Greenwood, 645 F. Supp. at 114. 
448. See id. 
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submitted after business hours in the night depository box will be 
considered to have been filed as of 8:30 a.m. the following business 
day."9 This decision is on appeal and should be reversed by the 
Second Circuit. 
2. CPLR 215(3): As Applied by Federal Courts460 
In Von Bulow By Auersperg v. Von Bul~w, '~l  Judge Walker 
held that a malicious prosecution action arising out of criminal 
proceedings in Rhode Island was barred by CPLR 215(3).'5e Judge 
Walker noted that the action should have been brought within one 
year from the date on which the claim first accrued.'5s Since a ma- 
licious prosecution action first accrues after a plaintiff receives a 
favorable final determination in the prior legal proceeding, the 
date it was rendered forms the basis of the a~tion.'~' Judge Walker 
reminded the practitioner that federal courts applying New York 
State law should also apply New York's statute of limitations 
provi~ion.'~~ 
3. Toll by Reason of Insanity 
One result of the appellate divisions' power to make factual 
determinations is that it can reverse the trial court and find a per- 
son "insane" under CPLR 208466 for the purposes of tolling a stat- 
ute of  limitation^.'^' The test is whether a person is "unable to 
manage his business affairs and estate and to comprehend and pro- 
tect his own legal rights and liabilities because of an overall ability 
449. See id. Judge Leisure found that rule 77(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
does not specify the date on which papers should be considered filed if deposited a t  the 
courthouse after regular hours. See id. a t  113. He also reasoned that the drafters of the 
federal rules intended rule 77 to be read in conjunction with General Rule l(a) of the South- 
ern District. See id. a t  116. Greenwood is on appeal before the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit (86-7926). Your author predicts that the Second Circuit will reverse and 
remand the case to the district court prior to the Survey's publication. 
450. See N.Y. CPLR 215(3) (McKinney 1972). 
451. 657 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
452. See Von Bulow, 657 F.Supp. a t  1136 (citing N.Y. CPLR 215(3) (McKiney 1972)). 
453. See id. at 1138. 
454. See id. 
455. Id. a t  1138 (citing Stafford v. International Harvester, 668 F.2d 142, 147 (2d Cir. 
1981)); see akio Bank of Boston v. Argue110 Tefel, 626 F. Supp. 314, 315 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). 
456. N.Y. CPLR 208 (McKiney Supp. 1988). 
457. See Yannon v. R.C.A., 131 A.D.2d 843, 517 N.Y.S.2d 205 (2d Dep't 1987). 
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to function in society."46s 
4. Notice of Claim Provisions 
Some limitations of time are not true statutes of limitations, 
but are in actuality conditions precedent. They require the plain- 
tiff to do an act other than commencing the action prior to the 
expiration of a stated period of time.'69 When the required act is 
the filing of a notice of claim, the plaints must plead and prove 
compliance with the condition pre~edent.'~~ Because there is no 
comprehensive compilation of conditions precedent a~ailable,'~' 
the practitioner must ascertain in each case whether one applies. 
When one does, the practitioner should be aware that there will be 
an applicable statute of limitations in addition to the notice re- 
quirement.'62 In this respect, the New York Court of Appeals has 
held that the notice of claim requirement of General Municipal 
Law 50-e46s applies to a federal civil rights claim, whether the 
claim is based on section 1981464 or 1983466 of the United States 
Code. Although Survey year decisions by at least two appellate di- 
458. Id. a t  845, 517 N.Y.S.2d a t  206-07. 
459. See, e.g., Becker v. City of New York, 131 A.D.2d 413,516 N.Y.S.2d 225 (2d Dep't 
1987) (the plaintiff had to allege that the city commissioner of transportation had received 
written notice of a pothole). 
460. See id.; see also Halperin v. City of New York, 127 A.D.2d 461, 511 N.Y.S.2d 273 
(1st Dep't 1987) (plaintiff had to prove prior knowledge of an inoperative tr&c signal). 
461. Perry Pazer, a former president of the New York State Trial Lawyers Association, 
states there are nearly 400 applicable time limitations between notices of claim and various 
statutes of limitations in New York State. See N.Y.S.T.L.A. Bill of Particulars (Sept.-Oct. 
1987). He also refers the practitioner to a listing prepared by attorney Bert Bauman of 
statutes of limitations significant to the New York City area. See id. 
462. In an action against the City of New York, for example, a notice of claim must be 
filed within 90 days, N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW 50(e) (McKinney 1986), while a summons in a 
personal injury action must be filed within one year and 90 days, and a summons for wrong- 
ful death within two years. See N.Y. EPTL 5-5.1 (McKinney 1987). The same time periods 
apply in actions against the Transit Authority and the New York City Health and Hospi- 
tals, except wrongful death actions for the latter two must be filed within one year and 90 
days for the Transit Authority. See id.; see also N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW $ 1212 (McKinney 
1987). Practitioners would be well advised to join the New York State Trial Lawyers' Asso- 
ciation and obtain a copy of Bert Bauman's statutes of limitations list. 
463. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW 3 50(e) ( M c K i e y  1986). 
464. See Mills v. County of Monroe, 59 N.Y.2d 307,451 N.E.2d 456,464 N.Y.S.2d 709 
(1983); see also Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 107 S. Ct. 2617 (1987). 
465. See 423 S.Salina S t ,  Inc. v. City of Syracuse, 68 N.Y.2d 474, 503 N.E.2d 63, 510 
N.Y.S.2d 507 (1986). 
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visions466 and one federal district demonstrate that courts 
are liberally construing notice of claim requirements, the practi- 
tioner should be careful to comply with them.'6s 
5. Federal Superfund Amendment 
Last year's Survey mentioned the Superfund and 
Reauthorization Act of 1986.469 The Act establishes an accrual rule 
for claims brought under state law for damages from exposure to 
any hazardous substance, pollutant or contaminant released into 
the en~ironrnent.'?~ The federal statute governs many actions 
brought after December 11,1980."' It should be noted that impor- 
tant limitations in the coverage of the Superfund Amendment are 
found in the Act's definitions se~tion.'?~ 
6. Statute of Limitations: Extension In Actions Against Non- 
domiciliary Corporations 
On November 2, 1987, the United States Supreme Court 
agreed to decide whether a state may extend its statute of limita- 
tions to allow suits that would otherwise be untimely against out- 
of-state  corporation^.'^^ The case grew out of a contract with a 
chemical plant in Ohio, and is limited to the extent that corpora- 
tions have avoided subjecting themselves to the state's jurisdiction 
before the normal limitations period has run.'?' 
466. See Halperin v. City of New York, 127 A.D.2d 461, 511 N.Y.S.2d 273 (1st Dep't 
1987); Becker v. City of NewYork, 131 A.D.2d 413, 516 N.Y.S.2d 225 (2d Dep't 1987). 
467. See Piesco v. City of New York Dep't of Personnel, 650 F. Supp. 896 (S.D.N.Y. 
1987). 
468. See generally, D. SXEGEL, NEW YORK PRACTICE 3 35 (Supp. 1987). 
469. See Carlisle, supra note 7, a t  72 n.29 (citing Superfund Amendments and 
Reauthorization Act of 1986, No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986)). 
470. See id. 
471. See 42 U.S.C. 9 9658 (1982) 
472. See id. "Relevant release into environment" is defined to exclude emissions from 
engine exhausts of motor vehicles and aircraft release of federally regulated nuclear material 
and the common application of fertilizer. See 42 U.S.C. 9 9601(2) (1982). In addition expo- 
sure to products intended for consumer use are excluded. See id. 
473. See Bendix Autolite, Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, 820 F.2d 186 (6th Cir. 1987), 
cert. granted, 56 U.S.L.W. 3320 (U.S. Nov. 2, 1987) (No. 87-367). 
474. See id. 
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The practitioner knows the importance of motion practice 
under CPLR 3211475 and 3212476. Your author often wonders, in 
fact, if the Survey piece should be entitled "Motion Practice" with 
designated subdivisions relating to jurisdiction, statute of limita- 
tions, res judicata, etc. Instead, he continues the Survey tradition 
of integrating article 31 and 32 cases into other subject areas.'?? 
The number of CPLR 3211 and 3212 cases decided by New 
York State courts during the Survey year is impres~ive.'?~ The 
most important one is a short memorandum opinion by the Court 
of Appeals in Addesso v. Shemt~b.'?~ Professor Siegel has already 
analyzed the Addesso case twice.'80 It is important, however, to re- 
mind the practitioner of the obvious. Defendants seeking to take 
advantage of jurisdictional challenges must rigidly abide by the re- 
quirements of CPLR 3211(e).'81 If a motion is made, it is impor- 
tant to include jurisdiction as a ground. If an answer is interposed 
without making a motion, be certain to include the jurisdictional 
objection in it. As Professor Siegel states, the Court of Appeals is 
"warning the bar to stop being careless with the subject of 
jurisdi~tion."'~~ 
Additional Survey year motion practice cases which are wor- 
thy of mention include Yanni v. C h ~ p p , ' ~ ~  Montgomery Ward Co. 
v. 0thmer,'84 and Jeraci v. Froehli~h."~~ In Yanni, the Appellate 
Division, Second Department, held that where counsel for the de- 
475. N.Y. CPLR 3211 (McKinney 1987) (motion to dismiss). 
476. N.Y. CPLR 3212 (McKinney 1987) (motion for summary judgment). 
477. Your author is always grateful for advice and suggestions made by Survey readers. 
A good number of my New York Practice students insist that the course should be renamed 
Motion Practice Under the CPLR as well. 
478. See WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 86, a t  art. 32 (Supp. 1987). 
479. 70 N.Y.2d 689,512 N.E.2d 314, 518 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1987). Plaintiff filed complaint 
and defendant moved to dismiss i t  for failure to state a cause of action. See Addesso, 70 
N.Y.2d a t  690,512 N.E.2d a t  315,518 N.Y.S.2d a t  794. Plaintiff amended complaint to cure 
the defect and defendant then raised a jurisdictional objection to serve in his amended an- 
swer. See id. The Court of Appeals held that objection should have been raised in the f i s t  
motion. See id. 
480. See Siegel, Civil Practice, 198 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 28, 1987, a t  23-24, col. 1; see also 
Stein, New York Court of Appeals Roundup, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 10, 1987, a t  1, col. 1. 
481. N.Y. CPLR 3211(e) (McKinney 1987). 
482. Siegel, Civil Practice, 198 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 28, 1987, a t  24, col. 1. 
483. 130 A.D.2d 489, 515 N.Y.S.2d 72 (2d Dep't 1987). 
484. 127 A.D.2d 913, 512 N.Y.S.2d 273 (3d Dep't 1987). 
485. 129 A.D.2d 557, 514 N.Y.S.2d 53 (2d Dep't 1987). 
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fendants conceded validity of service of process in a request for 
dismissal of an action in a second county, defendants were equita- 
bly estopped from contesting jurisdiction or raising the defense of 
statute of limitations in an action filed in the first county.'86 In 
Montgomery Ward, the Appellate Division, Third Department, 
held that two lawsuits emanating from a common transactional oc- 
currence is not in and of itself enough to dismiss the state court 
action on the ground that another claim is pending between the 
parties for the same cause of action in federal In Jeraci, 
the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that the defend- 
ant's claim that he had never received responses to discovery de- 
mands was not sufficient to rebut the presumption flowing from 
facially proper &davits to service by 
The practitioner should also be alerted to a split of authority 
on the notice required before a motion under CPLR 3211(a)489 can 
be converted to a motion for summary judgment. The Appellate 
Division, First Department, has held that the notice must come 
from the court.'@O The Second Department, on the other hand, 
concludes that the notice may come from one of the parties in the 
form of a request to the court to convert the original motion.491 
VI. DISCLOSURE 
Of the many disclosure decisions rendered during the Survey 
year, the following areas should be of interest to the practitioner. 
A. CPLR 31 01 (d)'02 
CPLR 3101(d)49S was amended in 1985 to liberalize discovery 
relating to trial experts. It  contains two numbered paragraphs.'@' 
Paragraph 1 requires, upon request, the prompt disclosure of the 
486. See Yanni, 130 A.D.2d at 496, 515 N.Y.S.2d at 74. 
487. See Montgomery Ward, 127 A.D.2d at 913, 512 N.Y.S.2d at 273. 
488. See Jeraci, 129 A.D.2d at 558, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 54. 
489. See N.Y. CPLR 3211(a) (motion to dismiss). 
490. See Four Seasons Hotels Ltd. v. Vinnik, 127 A.D.2d 310,515 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1st Dep't 
1987). 
491. See Reed v. Shoratlantic Development Co., 121 A.D.2d 525,503 N.Y.S.2d 840 (2d 
Dep't 1986). 
492. See N.Y. CPLR 3101 (McKinney Supp. 1988). 
493. See Act of July 1,1985, ch. 294,1985 MCKINNEY'S SESS. LAWS OF N.Y. 688 (codified 
at N.Y. CPLR 3101(d) (McKiney Supp. 1988)). 
494. See id. 
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name, qualifications, and expected testimony of any expert a party 
anticipates calling at  trial.'96 Medical, dental, and podiatric experts 
are exempt from this provisi~n.'~~ Paragraph 2 is addressed to 
materials subject to dis~losure.'~~ 
In Landmark Insurance Co. v. Beau Rivage Res ta~rant , '~~  the 
Appellate Division, Second Department, held that investigation re- 
ports of experts retained by an insurer were not material prepared 
for litigation, and were therefore subject to disclosure unless the 
insurer had previously issued a disclaimer of coverage or had made 
a firm decision to do That view comports with the policy of 
liberal disclosure under CPLR 3101(a).600 It has received a mixed 
following in other Survey year decisions involving the application 
of material protected from disclosure under subsection (2) of 
CPLR 3101(d).601 
Another area of controversy concerns the special exception in 
subparagraph (1) of CPLR 3101(d) for medical, dental, and podia- 
tric malpractice cases.602 Although the actual name of the expert 
can be concealed, revealing the experts "qualifications" if they 
tend to facilitate his identification may be problematic.60s In Pizzi 
u. M~ccia,~O' the Appellate Division, Third Department, held that 
in appropriate cases a court could strike a request for qualifica- 
tions when it is demonstrated that the experts identity would be 
re~ealed."~ The Court denied plaintiffs motion to strike, however, 
495. See id. 
496. See id. 
497. See id. 
498. 121 A.D.2d 98, 509 N.Y.S.2d 819 (2d Dep't 1986). 
499. See Landmark Ins., 121 A.D.2d a t  101, 509 N.Y.S.2d a t  823. 
500. See N.Y. CPLR 3101(a) (McKinney Supp. 1988). 
501. See id. 3101(d)(2); see also Crowe-Crimrnins-WOE v. Munier, 126 A.D.2d 696,507 
N.Y.S.2d 428 (2d Dep't 1986) (reports relating to  allegedly defective diesel engines discover- 
able under 3101(d)); Crowe v. Lederle Laboratories, 125 A.D.2d 875, 510 N.Y.S.2d 228 (3d 
Dep't 1986) (report prepared by manufacturer's professional medical services department 
was discoverable by p la in t s  because i t  was prepared not only for litigation but to monitor 
products claims). But see Wallace v. Benedictine Hospital, 124 A.D.2d 433, 507 N.Y.S.2d 
533 (36 Dep't 1986) (material not discoverable); DiNova v. Sunnyview Hosp., 135 Misc. 2d 
961, 517 N.Y.S.2d 410 (Sup. Ct., Rensselaer Co. 1987) (insurer's file not subject to discov- 
ery); Gentile v. Wakeel, 135 Mic. 2d 301, 514 N.Y.S.2d 878 (Sup Ct., Oneida Co. 1987) 
(reports prepared by a private investigator retained by the defendant's liability insurer were 
exempt from disclosure). 
502. See N.Y. CPLR 3101(d)(l) ( M c K i e y  Supp. 1988). 
503. See id. 
504. 127 A.D.2d 338, 515 N.Y.S.2d 341 (3d Dep't 1987). 
505. See Pizzi, 127 A.D.2d a t  340, 515 N.Y.S.2d a t  343; see also McGoldrick v. W. M. 
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because they did not meet their burden under CPLR 3103606 of 
showing how the identities would be revealed.607 The Appellate Di- 
vision, Second Department, adopted a more liberal view in Catino 
v. KirschbaumSo8 and sustained the qualifications items re- 
quested.50g The Second Department concluded that the qualifica- 
tions requirement "is not to preclude any possibility of identifying 
an adversary's medical expert."610 
B. Expert Medical Witnesses 
In Gilly v. City of New Y ~ r k , ~ ~ l  the Court of Appeals held 
that, within certain limits, an opponent can subpoena his adver- 
sary's expert who has prepared a report that is not helpful to the 
position of the party who retained him.612 In Gilly, the defendant's 
doctor prepared a report helpful to the After a copy of 
the report was sent to the plaintiff pursuant to Uniform Rule 
202.17,614 she sought to have the physician testify at trial.s16 The 
Court of Appeals, reversing the lower courts, held that the expert 
could be compelled to relate the "substance" of his report.s16 The 
Court focused on the fact that the doctor had reduced his report to 
writing, which implied that an expert who gave an oral report 
could not be forced to testify by the nonretaining party."7 
C. Disclosure in Aid of Arbitration 
Courts may not generally order discovery in aid of arbitra- 
t i ~ n . ~ ' ~  In Hendler & Murray, P.C. u. Lambert,619 however, the Ap- 
Young, Jr. Health Ctr., 135 Misc. 2d 200, 514 N.Y.S.2d 872 (Sup. Ct., Albany Co. 1987). 
506. See N.Y. CPLR 3103 (McKinney Supp. 1988). 
507. See Pizzi, 127 A.D.2d a t  340, 515 N.Y.S.2d at  343. 
508. 129 A.D.2d 758, 514 N.Y.S.2d 751 (2d Dep't 1987) 
509. See Catino, 129 A.D.2d at  759, 514 N.Y.S.2d a t  752. 
510. Id. 
511. 69 N.Y.2d 509, 508 N.E.2d 901, 516 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1987). 
512. See Gilly, 69 N.Y.2d a t  510, 508 N.E.2d a t  902, 516 N.Y.S.2d a t  167. 
513. See id. The expert in Gilly was a doctor hired by the defendant to determine 
whether plaintips angina was caused by the defendant. See id. The physician prepared a 
report favorable to the plaints, a copy of i t  was sent to the plaintiff pursuant to court rules, 
and the plaintiff sought to have the physician testify a t  trial. See id. 
514. See MCKINNEY'S 1987 N.Y. RULES OF THE COURT $ 202.17 (22 NYCRR 202.17). 
515. See Gilly, 69 N.Y.2d a t  509, 508 N.E.2d a t  901, 516 N.Y.S.2d a t  166. 
516. See id. a t  509, 508 N.E.2d a t  902, 516 N.Y.S.2d a t  167. 
517. See id. a t  512, 508 N.E.2d a t  904, 516 N.Y.S.2d a t  168. 
518. See Hendler & Murray v. Labert, 127 A.D.2d 820, 511 N.Y.S.2d 941 (2d Dep't 
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pellate Division, Second Department, held that document discov- 
ery was authorized on the trial court's discretionary finding that 
the documents were "required to present a proper case to the arbi- 
trat~r."~~O Absent extraordinary circumstances, it  is unlikely that 
courts will permit examination before trial in an arbitration hear- 
ing. The decision in Hendler hints, however, that the gates may be 
opening. 
D: FOIL Disclosure 
In M. Farbman & Sons, Inc. v. New York City Health & Hos- 
pitals C0rp.,6~l the Court of Appeals held that a party could use 
the Freedom of Information to obtain materials not availa- 
ble through disclosure under the CPLR.62S During the Survey year 
the Court of Appeals held in Capital Newspapers v. Whalen634 
that if a private document is among the records retained by a gov- 
ernment agency, it is also subject to FOIL discl~sure."~ Thus, a 
document having nothing to do with a government function will 
not be exempt from FOIL requests if it is a "record," it is "kept" 
or "held" by an agency, and it is not otherwise subject to a specific 
exemption under the FOIL.626 
E. Sanctions for Disclosure Abuses 
Under CPLR 3126,627 any party or person who refuses to obey 
1987) Courts may not order discovery in aid of arbitration unless the movant has demon- 
strated extraordinary circumstances. See id. a t  821, 511 N.Y.S.2d a t  942. 
519. See id. 
520. Id. (quoting In re Moock v. Emmanuel, 99 A.D.2d 1003, 473 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1st 
Dep't 1984)). 
521. 62 N.Y.2d 75, 464 N.E.2d 437,476 N.Y.S.2d 69 (1984). 
522. See Farbman, 62 N.Y.2d a t  77,464 N.E.2d a t  440,476 N.Y.S.2d a t  73 (citing N.Y. 
PUB. OFF. LAW $4 91-99 ( M c K i e y  1983)). 
523. See id. a t  78,464 N.E.2d a t  440,476 N.Y.S.2d a t  74. The Court of Appeals refuses: 
to read into the FOIL the restriction that, once litigation commences, a party for- 
feits the rights available to all other members of the public and is conferred to 
discovery in accordance with article 34. If the Legislature had intended to exempt 
agencies involved in litigation from FOIL, i t  certainly could have so provided. 
Id. a t  77-78, 464 N.E.2d a t  440, 62 N.Y.S.2d a t  71-72. 
524. 69 N.Y.2d 246, 505 N.E.2d 932, 513 N.Y.S.2d 367 (1987). 
525. See Capital Newspapers, 69 N.Y.2d a t  248, 505 N.E.2d a t  936, 513 N.Y.S.2d a t  
368. 
526. See id. 
527. See N.Y. CPLR 3126 (McKinney 1987). 
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an order for disclosure or willfully fails to disclose information is 
subject to sanction.628 Last year's Survey warned the practitioner 
that he should expect to be held accountable to strict compliance 
with CPLR 3126.62s This year's decisions warrant the same mes- 
sage.6s0 The appellate divisions have not been reluctant to dismiss 
complaints,Bs* strike answer~,6~~ and impose monetary sanctions for 
failure to comply with disclosure orders.6ss 
F. Article 31 Superceded by SCPA 
In Will of Devine,BS4 the Appellate Division, First Department, 
held that the Surrogate improperly required the parties in a pro- 
bate proceeding to comply with provisions of article 316s6 when 
they sought to have the decedent's paper examined. The First De- 
partment held that the disclosure provisions of section 1412 of the 
Surrogates' Procedure Act,BS6 which direct a preliminary executor 
to make all papers of a decedent available for examination and 
528. See id. 
529. See Carlisle, supra note 7, a t  120-21. 
530. See Corona v. A-B-C Packaging Mach. Corp., 129 A.D.2d 763, 514 N.Y.S.2d 756 
(2d Dep't 1987); Craigie v. Consolidated Edison Co., 127 A.D.2d 556,511 N.Y.S.2d 359 (2d 
Dep't 1987); Scharlack v. Richmond Mem. Hosp., 127 A.D.2d 580, 511 N.Y.S.2d 380 (2d 
Dep't 1987); Simon v. Avis Rent-A-Car, Inc., 125 A.D.2d 583, 511 N.Y.S.2d 384 (2d Dep't 
1987); Carmen v. West Hudson Hosp., 129 A.D.2d 868, 514 N.Y.S.2d 137 (3d Dep't 1987); 
Metflex Corp. v. Klafter, 123 A.D.2d 845,507 N.Y.S.2d 460 (2d Dep't 1986). But see Dauria 
v. City of New York, 127 A.D.2d 459, 511 N.Y.S.2d 271 (1st Dep't 1987) (reversing the 
supreme court's order striking the city's answer for failure to produce an employee who had 
personal knowledge of the area where the plaintiff fell where the City had made a good faith 
effort to comply with the disclosure request). 
531. See Scharlack v. Richmond Mem. Hosp., 127 A.D.2d 580, 511 N.Y.S.2d 380 (2d 
Dep't 1987) (complaint dismissed based on patient's nine-month unexcused failure to com- 
ply with discovery order). Carmen v. West Hudson Hosp., 129 A.D.2d 868,514 N.Y.S.2d 137 
(3d Dep't 1987) (holding motion to dismiss should have been granted without condition 
where plaintiffs failed to fde a timely note of issue, offered no acceptable excuse, and did not 
provide court with affidavit of merits of case). 
532. See Corona v. A-B-C Packaging Mach. Corp., 129 A.D.2d 763, 514 N.Y.S.2d 756 
(2d Dep't 1987) (appellate division held trial court did not abuse its discretion to strike 
answer as sanction, although the sanction was severe). 
533. See Simon v. Avis Rent-A-Car, Inc., 125 A.D.2d 583,511 N.Y.S.2d 384 (vacatur of 
automatic dismissal upon personal payment of $500 by plaintiffs attorney); Metflex Corp. v. 
Klafter, 123 A.D.2d 845,507 N.Y.S.2d 460 (2d Dep't 1986) (fine of $1,500 imposed on party 
who disregarded several court disclosure orders). 
534. 126 A.D.2d 491, 511 N.Y.S.2d 231 (1st Dep't 1987). 
535. See Deuine, 126 A.D.2d a t  493, 511 N.Y.S.2d a t  234 (citing N.Y. CPLR 3100-40 
(McKinney Supp. 1988)). 
536. N.Y. SCPA 8 1412 (McKiney 1982). 
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copying, are inconsistent with and preempt article 31657 to the ex- 
tent that it requires papers to be specified with reasonable particu- 
larity and authorizes disclosure only after the filing of objec- 
t i o n ~ . ~ ~ ~  The court also held that the Surrogate erred in resorting 
to the legislative history of article 31 to interpret section 1412 of 
the SCPA.63s 
G. Disclosure Against State 
CPLR 3102(f)640 now provides that in any state court action in 
which the state is properly a party, disclosure by the state will be 
available as if the state were a private litigant.M1 Moreover, a court 
order is no longer required in order to obtain disclosure from the 
state.642 Requests for admissions and interrogatories are not availa- 
ble from the 
H. Non-Party Document Discovery 
Non-party document discovery is conducted in New York pur- 
suant to CPLR 3120(b)"sS. which requires that a court order be 
obtained authorizing discovery. In Beiny v. Wynyar~l,"'~.~ the Ap- 
pellate Division for the First Department held that documents ob- 
tained from a third party without proper notice under subsection 
(b) must be suppressed and disqualified the law firm which failed 
to follow the proper procedure under CPLR 3120.643.3 
VII. RES JUDICATA AND COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
Last year's Survey highlighted recent developments in the 
doctrines of claim preclusion6" and issue pre~lusion.~'~ During 
537. See N.Y. CPLR 3100-40 (McKinney Supp. 1988). 
538. See Deuine, 126 A.D.2d a t  493, 511 N.Y.S.2d a t  233. 
539. See id.; see also N.Y. SCPA 3 1412 (McKinney 1982). 
540. See N.Y. CPLR 3102(f) (McKinney Supp. 1987). 
541. See id. 
542. See id. 
543. See id. 
543.1 N.Y. CPLR 3120(b) (McKinney 1987). 
543.2 133 A.D.2d 37, 517 N.Y.S.2d 474 (1st Dep't 1987). 
543.3 See Beiny, 133 A.D.2d a t  - 517 N.Y.S.2d a t  478-80. 
544. Under the doctrine of claim preclusion, a final judgment on the merits bars a sub- 
sequent action between the parties, or persons in privity with them, from relitigating the 
same cause of action. It bars the relitigtion of claims which might have been litigated as well 
as those which actually were litigated. See O'Brien v. City of Syracuse, 54 N.Y.2d 353,429 
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1987, both doctrines were liberally applied in a variety of 
contexts.546 
In Henry Model1 & Co. v. Minister, Elders & Deacons of the 
Reformed Protestant Church,M7 the Court of Appeals held the 
doctrine of claim preclusion barred a sublessee's action based on a 
renewal option in the prime leaseP4* In the prior civil court action 
the landlord sought to recover possession and the plaintiff de- 
fended, in part, by asserting a right of possession arising from the 
renewal clause in its lease.M9 The Court held that the plaintiffs' 
claim was "really nothing more than a resuscitated assertion of a 
right to possession recast on terms of a new legal theory."5s0 Since 
the claim could have been raised in the first action the Court con- 
cluded that "a party is not free to remain silent in an action in 
which he is the defendant and then bring a second action seeking 
N.E.2d 1158, 445 N.Y.S.2d 687 (1981); Smith v. Russell Sage College, 54 N.Y.2d 185, 429 
N.E.2d 746, 445 N.Y.S.2d 68 (1981). 
545. As the doctrine of issue preclusion now stands, a valid final judgment on the mer- 
its rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction prevents relitigation by the parties or their 
privies, of matters of fact or law actually litigated or necessarily determined, in the earlier 
action. Two prerequisites must be met to apply the doctrine in New York State courts. 
"First, the identical issue necessarily must have been decided in the prior action and be 
decisive of the present action, and second, the party to be precluded . . . must have had a 
full and fair opportunity to contest the prior determination." Kaufman v. Eli L i y  & Co., 65 
N.Y.2d 449, 453, 482 N.E.2d 63, 66, 492 N.Y.S.2d 584, 588 (1985). 
546. For examples of cases in which claim preclusion was applied, see, e.g., Estate of 
Young v. Williams, 810 F.2d 363 (2nd Cir. 1987) (prior action in which plaintiffs obtained 
injunctive relief barred personal injury action on claim preclusion grounds); Kikland v. City 
of Peekskill, 651 F. Supp. 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (police commissioner's federal action barred 
by prior adverse determination by New York State Division of Human Rights); Lawrence v. 
McGuire, 651 F. Supp. 312 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (prior state court judgment barred federal ac- 
tion); Multi-Communications, Inc. v. United States, 648 F. Supp. 1203 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) 
(prior decision of District of Columbia Court of Appeals barred second federal action); 
Walentas v. Johnes, 126 A.D.2d 417, 510 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1st Dep't 1987) (decision in prior 
action holding that tenant had a right to have roommate live with him in apartment barred 
landlord from denying existence of a valid landlord-tenant relationship in a subsequent 
counterclaim). See infra notes 547-52 and accompanying text. For examples of cases in 
which issue preclusion was applied, see, e.g., United States v. Diamond, 657 F. Supp. 1204 
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (a physician's criminal conviction barred relitigation of the same issues by 
him in civil action); Samhammer v. Home Mutual Ins. Co., 120 A.D.2d 59,507 N.Y.S.2d 499 
(3d Dep't 1986) (hearing board determination precluded husband and nonparty wife from 
subsequent civil litigation). See infra note 576 and accompanying text. 
547. 68 N.Y.2d 456, 502 N.E.2d 978, 510 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1986). 
548. See Henry Modell, 68 N.Y.2d a t  459, 502 N.E.2d a t  980, 510 N.Y.S.2d a t  67. 
549. Minister, Elders & Deacons of the Reformed Protestant Dutch Church v. 198 
Broadway, Inc., 59 N.Y.2d 170,451 N.E.2d 164,464 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1983). 
550. Henry Modell, 68 N.Y.2d a t  459, 502 N.E.2d a t  981, 510 N.Y.S.2d a t  66. 
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relief inconsistent with the judgment in the first action by assert- 
ing what is simply a new legal theory."661 
In Green v. Santa Fe I n d ~ s t r i e s , ~ ~ ~  the Court of Appeals re- 
fused to apply the doctrine of "res judicata" or "collateral estop- 
pel"663 when a similar action in federal court resulted in a dismis- 
sal on the merits.664 The Court held that the prior dismissal did 
not involve the resolution of factual and that the party 
against whom the doctrine was asserted was not in privity with the 
parties in the federal litigation.666 However, in People v. 
A~evedo,"~ the Court of Appeals held that ultimate and eviden- 
tiary facts determined by an acquittal of the defendant in one 
criminal proceeding were entitled to preclusive effect against the 
People in a subsequent criminal proceeding against the same indi- 
v i d ~ a l . ~ ~ ~  Acevedo had been charged with robbery in two separate 
incidents and was acquitted of the first charge.669 In refusing to 
permit the alleged victim of the first robbery to testify to having 
seen the defendant the night of the incidents the Court stated that 
the "[dlefendant, having once been acquitted by a jury, should not 
a t  a subsequent trial be subjected to the burden of meeting issues 
that were already necessarily decided in his favor."560 The Court 
551. Id. a t  458, 502 N.E.2d a t  980, 510 N.Y.S.2d a t  65. 
552. 70 N.Y.2d 244, 514 N.E.2d 105, 519 N.Y.S.2d 793 (1981) 
553. Id. Judge Hancock's terminology nothwithstanding, i t  should be noted that the 
New York State Court of Appeals has adopted the "claim preclusion" and "issue preclu- 
sion" terminology of section 68 of the the Restatement (Second) of Judgments. See Ameri- 
can Ins. Co. v. Messinger, 43 N.Y.2d 184, 189 n.2,371 N.E.2d 789,792 n.2,401 N.Y.S.2d 36, 
39 n.2 (1977); see ako Carlisle, Getting a Full Bite of the Apple: When Should The Doc- 
trine Of Issue Preclusion Make an Administrative Or Arbitral Determination Binding In A 
Court Of Law, 55 FORDHAM L. REV. 63 (1986). "Consistent use of the terms 'claim preclu- 
sion' and 'issue preclusion' will help clarify the distinction between the two concepts in 
judicial opinions and will minimize the confusion created when 'res judicata' is used to de- 
scribe both of them." Carlisle, supra, a t  65. 
554. See Green v. Santa Fe Indus., 576 F. Supp. 269, aff'd,  742 F.2d 1434, cert. denied, 
469 U.S. 917 (1984). 
555. See Green, 70 N.Y.2d a t  246, 514 N.E.2d a t  107, 519 N.Y.S.2d a t  795 (issues re- 
garding Martin Act not resolved in federal court action). 
556. See id. a t  247, 514 N.E.2d a t  108, 519 N.Y.S. a t  796. Because the privity issue 
involved questions of fact, summary judgment was improper. See id. a t  248, 514 N.E.2d a t  
108, 519 N.Y.S. a t  797. 
557. 69 N.Y.2d 478, 508 N.E.2d 665, 515 N.Y.S.2d 753 (1987). 
558. See Acevedo, 69 N.Y.2d a t  486-87, 508 N.E.2d a t  670-71, 515 N.Y.S.2d a t  759. 
559. See id. a t  483, 508 N.E.2d a t  668, 515 N.Y.S.2d a t  757. 
560. Id. a t  485, 508 N.E.2d a t  669, 515 N.Y.S.2d a t  758. 
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distinguished People v. Go0dman,5~~ where it  recently did not ap- 
ply issue preclusion, on the grounds that it  did not require going 
beyond the ultimate facts.wBe Furthermore, adoption of the eviden- 
tiary fact rule in Goodman would not have changed the result 
reached.60S 
Finally, the Appellate Division, First Department, refused to 
give res judicata (claim preclusion) effect to a prior federal court 
dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a cause of action.6a 
The First Department rested its decision on the fact that, although 
the same transaction was involved in the federal and state actions, 
the federal court's dismissal was based solely on allegations of 
fraud and was therefore not on the merits.606 
A. Administrative Determinations 
In Ryan v. New York Telephone Co.666 the Court of Appeals 
expanded the doctrine of issue preclusion to administrative deter- 
mination~.~~' The Ryan case was strongly criticized by several com- 
rnentat~rs:~~ and during the Survey year the case was legislatively 
overruled by section 623 of the Labor Law."s That section pro- 
vides that no finding of fact or law contained in a decision ren- 
dered on a claim for unemployment insurance may be given 
preclusive effect in subsequent litigation.670 The limit is applicable 
when the initial decision is made by a court appeal board or refe- 
ree.671 It does not apply in a subsequent action which (1) itself 
arises under the unemployment insurance article of the Labor 
561. 69 N.Y.2d 32, 503 N.E.2d 996, 511 N.Y.S. 2d 565 (1986) (people not collaterally 
estopped from presenting evidence to a second jury). 
562. See Acevedo, 69 N.Y.2d a t  489, 508 N.E.2d a t  669, 515 N.Y.S. 2d a t  759 
563. See id. a t  490, 508 N.E.2d a t  670, 515 N.Y.S. 2d a t  759. 
564. Evans v. L.F. Rothschild, Unterberg, Towbin, Inc., 131 A.D.2d 278, 520 N.Y.S.2d 
940, (1st Dep't 1987). 
565. See id. a t  279, 520 N.Y.S.2d a t  940. 
566. 62 N.Y.2d 494, 467 N.E.2d 487, 478 N.Y.S.2d 823 (1984). 
567. See Ryan, 62 N.Y.2d a t  495, 467 N.E.2d a t  489, 478 N.Y.S.2d a t  825. 
568. See Carlisle, supra note 553; see also Dusovic v. New Jersey Transit Bus Opera- 
tions, Inc., 124 A.D.2d 634,508 N.Y.S.2d 26 (2d Dep't 1986) (a "reverse Ryan" fact pattern). 
Dusovic is a good illustration of the inherent unfairness of the Court of Appeals reasoning in 
Ryan. 
569. See Act of July 7,1987, ch. 258,1987 MCKINNEY'S ESS. LAWS OF N.Y. 387 (codified 
a t  N.Y. LAB. LAW § 623 (McKinney Supp. 1988)). 
570. See id. 
571. See id. 
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clearly any personal injury action on behalf of the plaintiffs 
against Nu Way (the vehicle owner) is barred by the previous ar- 
bitration between Mr. Maldonado's assignee and Nu Way's insur- 
ance carrier, as the hospital, with which the plaintiffs were in 
privity, had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of the 
vehicle's identity in the prior forumPsl 
If the plaintiffs assignee had prevailed before the arbitrator, the 
result could not have been used aflirmatively on his behalf because 
the defendant was not a party to the arbitration.682 
Reference must also be made to Taylor v. A ~ h b y . ~ ~ ~  The Ap- 
pellate Division, Second Department, held that preclusive effect 
should be given to a New Jersey arbitration award.684 Only the de- 
fendants had been parties to the prior arbitration.686 The practi- 
tioner should also be alert of the Court of Appeals decision in 
Claim of G ~ i m a r a l e s , ~ ~ ~  where the Court held that the Appellate 
Division, Third Department, had erred in not giving preclusive ef- 
fect to an arbitrator's factual findings regarding a claimant's 
The above Survey year decisions should cause the bench and 
bar to recognize that the typical justification for giving preclusive 
effect to arbitral determinations must have limited application in 
judicial proceedings.6s8 Before applying the doctrine to arbitral 
findings, courts should permit the party seeking to avoid preclu- 
sion to show factors which can raise a rebuttable presumption that 
the nonjudicial determinations be denied preclusive effect.68s 
Although a decision to grant issue preclusion needs to be 
based on the specific circumstances of each case, such factors 
should include: (1) the existence of admissible evidence, unavaila- 
ble at the previous hearing (because, for example, full disclosure 
was not available, tending to support the position of the party de- 
fending against preclusion); (2) a showing that the party defending 
against preclusion was denied the opportunity to present evidence 
581. Id. at 737, 517 N.Y.S.2d at  48. 
582. See id. at  738, 517 N.Y.S.2d at  50. 
583. 134 A.D.2d 248, 520 N.Y.S.2d 587 (2d Dep't 1987). 
584. See Taylor, 134 A.D.2d at  250, 520 N.Y.S.2d at  588. 
585. See id., 520 N.Y.S.2d at  589. 
586. 68 N.Y.2d 989, 503 N.E.2d 113, 510 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1986). 
587. See Guimarales, 68 N.Y.2d at  991, 503 N.E.2d a t  116, 510 N.Y.S.2d at  560. 
588. See supra note 572 and accompanying text. 
589. See id. 
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and cross-examine witnesses, or that the effectiveness of such pres- 
entation and cross-examination was severally limited by the pre- 
siding officer at  the nonjudicial forum or because the evidence was 
inadmissible under the rules of that forum; and (3) a showing that 
the party was not represented by an attorney in the previous 
action. 
When this presumption is raised on the ground of the exis- 
tence of new evidence, the party seeking to invoke preclusion may 
rebut by showing that the sum of the evidence, viewed in the light 
most favorable to the party defending against preclusion, could not 
support an alternate finding. Similarly, when the presumption is 
raised on the ground of a denial of the opportunity to present evi- 
dence and cross-examine witnesses, or the severe limitation of this 
opportunity, the party seeking to invoke preclusion must demon- 
strate that such opportunity would not have resulted in a different 
determination. 
Finally, when the party defending against preclusion has 
raised this presumption by showing that he was not represented by 
an attorney, the party seeking preclusion may successfully rebut it  
in two ways. The first is by demonstrating that the defending 
party was fully aware of the possible preclusive effect of the earlier 
determination (such as by showing that the judicial action was 
commenced prior to the one in the nonjudicial forum) and that the 
party was afforded an opportunity to present evidence and cross- 
examine witnesses. The second is to demonstrate that the party 
had the opportunity to present evidence and cross-examine wit- 
nesses, and that the evidence on which the nonjudicial determina- 
tion was based was sufficiently reliable to be termed a judicial 
action. 
It does not follow that denying preclusive effect to arbitration 
awards will render these decisions meaningless. Arbitral findings 
may be admissible as evidence in subsequent court proceedings 
subject to the usual rules of evidence. This approach will permit 
many findings of fact to be used for impeachment purposes with- 
out resulting in the harsh results of Maldonado or in the mechani- 
cal application of the doctrine by the Court of Appeals in the 
Claim of G u i r n a r a l e ~ . ~ ~ ~  
590. See supra notes 577-86 and accompanying text. 
Heinonline - -  39 Syracuse L. Rev. 147 1988 
148 Syracuse Law Review [Vol. 39:75 
VIII. MISCELLANEOUS 
During the Survey year some other decisions emerged that 
merit mentioning. 
A. Certificate of Merit in Medical Malpractice Actions 
The recent amendment to CPLR 3012-a591 requires a certifi- 
cate of merit as a prerequisite to filing a medical malpractice 
case.592 The first decision rendered subsequent to the passage of 
CPLR 3012-a5gs was Steinberg v. Brookdale Hospital Medical 
Center.694 The court held that the failure to file a certificate was 
not jurisdictional, and therefore did not mandate dismissal of the 
action where the certificate was subsequently served.696 The plain- 
tWs late service of the certificate was therefore not fatal, and he 
was given leave to re-serve the complaint together with the requi- 
site certificate within twenty days after service of the copy of the 
Under CPLR 3012-a6e7 the practitioner should seek a qualified 
expert evaluation as soon as possible.598 Failure to do so can lead 
to the imposition of sanctions under CPLR 8303(a)."g9 Counsel 
should immediately obtain all pertinent hospital records including 
x-rays, prior medical records and reports, fetal monitoring strips, 
photographs and any other material that will familiarize the expert 
with the case. The next step would be to screen all potential candi- 
dates and select an expert who is competent and credible.600 
591. See Act of July 30, 1987, ch. 507, 1987 MCKINNEY'S ESS. LAWS OF N.Y. 855-56 
(codified a t  N.Y. CPLR 3012-a (McKiney Supp. 1988)). 
592. N.Y. CPLR 3012-a (McKinney Supp. 1988). 
593. See id. 
594. 134 Misc. 2d 268,510 N.Y.S.2d 797 (Sup. Ct., King's Co. 1986); see also Cirigliano 
v. De Perio, 134 Misc. 2d 1065,514 N.Y.S.2d 321 (Sup. Ct., Erie Co. 1987) (holding it would 
be inappropriate to consider the certificate a "nullity" as the court did in the Steinberg 
case). 
595. See Steinberg, 134 Misc. 2d a t  268, 510 N.Y.S.2d a t  797. 
596. See id. a t  271, 510 N.Y.S.2d a t  801. 
597. N.Y. CPLR 3012-a (McKinney Supp. 1988). 
598. See id. 
599. See N.Y. CPLR 8303(a) (McKinney Supp. 1988) 
600. See Stone, Choosing The Right Medical Expert For Your Malpractice Case, 
N.Y.S.T.L.A. Bill of Particulars, Sept-Oct. 1987, a t  6, col.1. 
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B. Emotional Distress: A New Cause of Action? 
In Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hospital,601 the Court of 
Appeals created a new cause of action in tort for the recovery of 
damages for emotional distress derived from a persons subjective 
feeling of guilt following the negligently given advice of a physi- 
~ian.~O* The holding is limited, however, by the Court of Appeals' 
explicit classification of this case as one involving unusual circum- 
stances.Bo3 The practitioner should still be prepared to inform and 
advise clients with respect to a possible claim under the Martinez 
rationale.Bo4 The practitioner should also be aware of an emerging 
area of products safety law which encourages plaintiffs to seek 
compensation for the mental anguish and anxiety arising from the 
fear of contracting cancer in the future.606 The majority of 
cancerphobia claims have arisen in asbestos and DES claims.606 
C. Collateral Source Rule 
CPLR 454V07 limits the recovery of certain damages when a 
plaintiff will be collaterally reimbursed for them.608 The first Sur- 
vey year decision to apply newly added subdivision (c) of CPLR 
4545 was Budano v. Messina,60B where the Supreme Court of New 
York County eliminated most of a jury's award of $151,000 for loss 
of past and future earnings because of collateral benefits available 
to the plaintiff in the form of social security benefits.610 The 
601. 70 N.Y.2d 697, 512 N.E.2d 538, 518 N.Y.S.2d 955 (1987). 
602. See Martinez, 70 N.Y.2d a t  700, 512 N.E.2d a t  539, 518 N.Y.S.2d a t  956 (Titone, 
J., dissenting). 
603. See id. a t  699, 512 N.E.2d a t  538-39, 523 N.Y.S.2d a t  956. 
604. See Connors, Pandora's Box Opened in Expansion of Recovery for Emotional 
Distress, 197 N.Y.L.J., Aug. 4,1987, a t  1, col. 1 (historical analysis of recovery for emotional 
distress). 
605. See Mayesh & Rome, Compensation for Cancerphobia: The Return of High Anxi- 
ety, 198 N.Y.L.J., Oct. 27, 1987, a t  1, col. 1 (discussing trends in other jurisdictions and 
predicting new issue for New York Courts). 
606. See id. 
607. See N.Y. CPLR 3 4545 (McKinney 1986)). 
608. See id. 3 4545. The amendment added subdivision (c) which is applicable to per- 
sonal injury, property damage, or wrongful death actions where a plaintiff seeks to recover 
for the cost of medical care, custodial care, rehabilitation services, loss of earnings, or other 
economic loss. See id. 3 4545(c). Here, collateral-source evidence is available to mitigate 
damages; however, the rule does not apply to life insurance. See id. 
609. 197 N.Y.L.J., June 8, 1987, a t  19, col. 2. (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co.). 
610. See id. 
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Budano case has been sharply criticized by several prominent corn- 
mentat~rs.~ll Budano, however, is an important example of trial 
strategy.612 Should reference to collateral source payments and the 
court's obligation to reduce the verdict after trial be raised and 
included in the jury instructions? In Budano none of the parties 
requested such an instruction and none was given.BIS 
D. Periodic Payment of Awards 
Article 50-B became effective on July 30, 1986.614 It requires 
that the jury be asked to render a verdict itemizing damages be- 
tween past special, past general, future special, and future general 
damages.B16 The first Survey year appellate decision to apply arti- 
cle 50-B was Cabreaja v. New York City Health & Hospitals 
C ~ r p . ~ ' ~  The Appellate Division, First Department, held that be- 
cause the Article was passed after the commencement of a medical 
malpractice action, but prior to the scheduled examination of an 
infant, recovery of damages in excess of $250,000 may be paid on a 
periodic basis, rather than in a single lump sum.817 
E. Moving for Leave to Appeal in the Court of Appeals 
In 1986, the right of appeal to the Court of Appeals was lim- 
ited and the need to move for leave expanded.618 In Quain v. Buz- 
zetta Construction Corp.,6l9 the Court of Appeals struck portions 
of a defendant appellant's jurisdictional statement and brief that 
sought to raise issues not included in its motion to leave.BPO The 
Court stated: 
[Olrdinarily when the court grants a motion for leave to appeal 
all issues of which the court may take cognizance may be ad- 
dressed by the parties. Where, however, the party seeking leave 
611. See Kramer & Kramer, Medical Malpractice, 197 N.Y.L.J., Aug. 28, 1987, a t  1, 
col. 1. 
612. See Budano, 197 N.Y.L.J., June 8, 1987, a t  20, col. 2 (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Co.) 
613. See id. 
614. See Act of July 30,1986, ch. 682,1986 MCKINNEY'S ESS. LAWS OF N.Y. 1565 (codi- 
fied a t  N.Y. CPLR 5041 (McKinney Supp. 1988)). 
615. See id. 
616. 129 A.D.2d 516, 514 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1st Dep't 1987). 
617. See Cabreaja, 129 A.D.2d a t  518, 514 N.Y.S.2d a t  371. 
618. See Carlisle, supra note 7, a t  82-83. 
619. 69 N.Y.2d 376, 507 N.E.2d 294, 514 N.Y.S.2d 701 (1987). 
620. See Quain, 69 N.Y.2d a t  379, 507 N.E.2d a t  296, 514 N.Y.S.2d a t  704. 
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specifically limits the issues to be raised, it is bound thereby and 
may not thereafter raise other questions.sZ1 
The practitioner, therefore, should be careful to seek leave to ap- 
peal on all issues. Frivolous or unimportant issues, however, which 
are usually good bets for denial, should not be included in the 
leave. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Your author is grateful for the helpful comments and sugges- 
tions made by many members of the bench and bar. Positive com- 
ments from Daniel Kramer, Esq., Judge Weinfeld and Judge Mc- 
Laughlin of the United States District Courts for the Southern and 
Eastern Districts, Justice Green from the Fourth Department, and 
Justice Rubin and Presiding Justice Mollen from the Second De- 
partment are appreciated more than they can imagine. 
Special acknowledgment is also due, in alphabetical order to 
Professor Oscar 0. Chase, Professor Richard T. Farrel, and Profes- 
sor David D. Siegel. Each has generously welcomed and guided a 
new guy to the New York Civil Practice block. 
621. Id. at 402, 507 N.E.2d at 317, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 724. 
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APPENDIX A 
TABLE OF NEW CPLR AMENDMENTS 
CPLR SECTION 
211 
EFFECTIVE DATE 
8-7-87 
Added new subd. (e), making a twenty year limitation period ap- 
plicable to actions or proceedings to enforce orders or judgments 
awarding support, alimony or maintenance. 
Amended to extend applicability of statute to "Agent Orange" ac- 
tions commenced not later than 6-16-88. 
Amended to provide alternative means of satisfying mailing re- 
quirements of substituted service and "nail and mail" procedures. 
Amended to add provision that personal service upon a board or 
commission of a town or village may also be made by delivering the 
summons to the clerk of the town or village. 
Amended to provide that a writing designating an agent for service 
be "executed and acknowledged in the same manner as a deed." 
Amended to make rule that a corporation or voluntary association 
shall appear by an attorney; subject to "sections 501 and 1809" of 
the uniform justice court act. 
Amended to add requirement that an appellate court to which a 
motion for leave to appeal as a poor person has been or will be 
taken. Shall hear such motion on the merits. 
Amended to apply to podiatric malpractice actions. 
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Amended to apply to podiatric malpractice actions. 
Amended to apply to podiatric malpractice actions. 
Amended to revise definition of trust for purposes of property for 
exemption. 
Amended to redefine amounts that may be subject to an income 
execution and to require that the execution contain a statement, as 
set out in subd. (g), advising the debtor of limitations on the 
amounts that may be deducted, and of the procedures for challeng- 
ing such executions. 
Amended to provide that determinations of mistake of fact appli- 
cations objecting to income executions issued by the sheriff of the 
clerk of the court, be made by the court rather than the issuer, to 
provide that applications to the Family Court be made to the court 
having jurisdiction under FCA 461 and that such applications be 
by petition on notice to creditor, and to specify procedure for ap- 
plications made to the Supreme Court. 
New subd. (e) added to provide that a creditor is not rquired to 
issue process under CPLR 5241 prior to obtaining relief under 
CPLR 5242. 
Make provision relating to appearance by judicial officer applicable 
to proceedings brought by a party to a pending action or proceed- 
ing, and eliminating requirement that proceedings be brought by a 
party to a pending criminal action or to a proceeding involving the 
custody of a child. 
Amended to increase amounts of certain fixed fees of sheriffs in 
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counties within the City of New York. 
Amended to increase from ten dollars to fifteen dollars, the mile- 
age fee of the sheriff of the city of New York for mileage traveled 
within such city. 
Amended to increase from thirty-five dollars to one hundred dol- 
lars the fee to a county clerk for the assignment of an index 
number. 
Amended to clarify language related to the payment of fee of sev- 
enty dollars to a county clerk for placing a cause on a calendar for 
trial or inquest, and added an exception which authorizes a fee of 
fifty dollars where the rules of the chief administrator of the courts 
require that a request for judicial intervention be made in a pend- 
ing action. 
New section added entitled "Fee on civil appeal." 
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APPENDIX B 
NEW COURT FEES AS OF NOVEMBER 5,1987 
STATUTE 
CPLR 8018(a) 
CPLR 8020(a) 
CPLR 8020(c) 
CPLR 8022 
SPCA 2402(5) 
SPCA 2402(8) 
SPCA 2402(9) (a) 
SPCA 2402(10)(i) 
SPCA 2402(10)(ii) 
SPCA 2402(10)(iii) 
SPCA 2402(10)(iv) 
SPCA 2402(10)(v) 
DESCRIPTION OF FEE 
Index Number 
RJI 
Note of Issue 
Jury Demand* 
Civil Appeal 
Recording 
Values: 
Less than $10,000 
$10,000 to $20,000 
$20,000 to $50,000 
$50,000 to $100,000 
$100,000 to $250,000 
$250,000 to $500,000 
Over $500,000 
Filing Fees: 
SPCA 607 
SPCA 711 (Fiduciary) 
SPCA 711 (Customer 
to Guarantee) 
SPCA 715 
SPCA 717 
SPCA 1401 
SPCA 1420 
SPCA 1421 
SPCA 1502 
SPCA 1508 
SPCA 1703 
SPCA 2003 
SPCA 2102 
SPCA 2103 
SPCA 2107 
SPCA 2108 
SPCA 2205 
EPTL 7-4.6 
Demand for Jury Trial 
Objections to Probate 
Note of Issue 
Objection to Answer 
Will for Safekeeping 
OLD FEE 
$35 
NEW FEE 
$100 
$50 
--- 
$50 
$200 
$41pg 
Heinonline - -  39 Syracuse L. Rev. 155 1988 
Syracuse Law Review [Vol. 39:75 
SPCA 2402(10)(vi) 
SPCA 2402(11) 
SPCA 2402(12) 
SPCA 2402(13)(a) 
SPCA 2402(13)(b) 
SPCA 2402(14) 
SPCA 2402(15)(a) 
SPCA 2402(15)(b) 
SPCA 2402(16)(a) 
SPCA 2402(16)(b) 
SPCA 2402(16)(c) 
NYCCCA 1911(a); 
UDCA 1911(a)(l); 
UCCA 1911(a)(2) 
NYCCCA 1911(b); 
UDCA 1911(a)(2); 
UCCA 1911(a)(l) 
NYCCCA 1911(c); 
UCCA 1911(a)(3) 
NYCCCA 1911(d); 
UDCA 1911(a)(9); 
UCCA 1911(a)(4) 
NYCCCA 1911(e); 
UDCA 1911(a)(3); 
UCCA 1911(a)(5) 
NYCCCA 1911(f); 
UDCA 1911(a)(4); 
UCCA 1911(a)(6) 
NYCCCA 1911(g); 
UDCA 1911(a)(5); 
UCCA 1911(a)(7) 
NYCCCA 1911(h); 
UDCA 1911(a)(6); 
UCCA 1911(a)(8) 
NYCCCA 1911(i); 
UDCA 1911(a)(7); 
UCCA 1911(a)(9) 
Bond: 
Less than $10,000 $7 
Over $10,000 $15 
Transcript $7 
Certificate of Letters $2 
Certifying Will $31pg 
Authenticating W i  $7 
Searching and Certifying Records: 
Under 25 years $15 
Over 25 years $40 
Producing Paper $15 
Messenger Fee $.I5 
Recording $4/pg wl 
$8 min. 
Foreign Will $4/pg wl 
$30 min. 
Taxing Bill of Costs $4 
Issuance of Summons, etc. $20 
$51pg wl 
$10 min. 
$5/pg wl 
$40 min. 
$5 
$25 
Filiig $20 $25 
Infant's Compromise $20 $25 
Notice of Trial $20 $25 
Judgment upon Confession $20 $25 
Notice of Appeal $15 $19 
Satisfaction of Judgment $3 $4 
Demand for Jury Trial $35 $44 
Exemplification $6 $8 
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NYCCCA 19116); Certification $3 $4 
UDCA 1911(a) (8) 
UCCA 1911(a)(10) 
NYCCCA 1911(k); Notice of Petition $20 $25 
UCCA 1911(a)(ll) 
NYCCCA 1911(1) Name Change $30 $38 
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